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The Bharatiya Janata Party-Bahujan Samaj Party alliance has been
described as a marriage between political untouchables and a social
untouchable. The comment has certain merit.
After the general elections of 1996, the way 13 parties joined
hands together to save 'secularism' and to keep BJP out of power,
and the way the minority BJP government headed by Atal Bihari
Vajpayee had to quit for want of support from touchables amply
prove the point that the Left and V P Singh succeeded in isolating
the BJP to a great extent.
The BJP's quest for breaking this imposed isolation was definitely
one of the main issues, but not the sole motive, of the alliance.
The long-term mission of BJP remains attaining power with its
allies, and for this, political segregation must end. Alliances -
particularly the ones that BJP has entered into - need not be
interpreted in terms of breaking this isolation,
First, the BJP-Akali Dal alliance for the recently held Punjab
Assembly elections. This pact has established a strong bond
between Hindus and Sikhs. Akali Dal under Parkash Singh Badal and
others had never endorsed Khalistan.
When BJP allied with the Akali Dal, critics sounded as if BJP -
forgetting its nationalist stance - had entered into an alliance
with the Khalistanis just for sharing power. Questions were raised
about Anandpur Sahib resolutions which has earned a bad image.
The Badal group has been striving for greater political autonomy
for the state. BJP does: not agree with this demand. Rather, it
has been demanding more financial autonomy for all states. Now,
Akali Dal itself plays down its support to the Anandpur Sahib
resolution.
BJP went for the alliance basically for social harmony in Punjab,
with the objective of ending the Hindu-Sikh divide. The recent
Punjab election has amply demonstrated the tremendous enthusiasm of
Punjabiat of Sikhs as well as Hindus. The message was loud enough
to be heard in Pakistan too.
The RSS as well as BJP believe that Sikhs are an integral part of
Hinduism. Guru Granth Saheb, the most sacred book of Sikhism,
contains many proofs of this bond. Being Keshdhari (follower of a
religious injunction against cutting hair) does not separate them
from Hindus, according to the BJP-RSS ideology.
A section of Sikhs were laying greater emphasis on separate
identity, negating the Sangh Parivar claim. Some extremist
elements have gone beyond this demand and clamoured for Khalistan.
Pakistan was in search of such an opportunity and it aided and
abetted the terrorist movement in Punjab.
The editor of a prominent English daily of Punjab recently visited
Pakistan. On his return, he has written a series of articles under
the caption Pakistan Today. In these articles, he has 'made very
significant comments on Pakistan's reaction to the Akali Dal-BJP
tie-up in Punjab and the victory of this alliance.
According to him. Pakistan's calculations about Punjab have all
gone awry because of this recent development.
The editor wrote: "Having been fed on Kashmir and 'Hate India'
campaigns, it is but natural that the people (of Pakistan) should
be ignorant about the changing ground realities on this side of the
border. How come the Akalis could join hands with the BJP? Does
this not run counter to what militant Sikh leaders had conveyed to
us? They have always projected themselves as a separate entity, a
knowledgeable Pakistani close to the establishment asked me
somewhat agitatedly in Islamabad.
"Apparently, he had no idea about the changing political
complexion of Punjab. What seemed to upset him was. that the
official Pakistani line of training, aiding and abetting
separatists in this part of the country has got derailed and hence
his agonizing query on the strengthening on Hindu-Sikh bonds under
the Akah leadership of Parkash Singh Badal."
The BJP-Akali Dal alliance was basically motivated by strengthening
the Hindu-Sikh bonds which even Pakistanis understood, but not
critics like Harkishan Singh Surjeet and others who termed it an
opportunist and internally contradictory alliance. The objective
of sharing power and breaking isolation were of course there.
Similar is the case with the BJP-BSP alliance 'in UP. The Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh was all for BJP's 'outside' support even two
years ago. This time too, just after the UP Assembly elections, RSS
was strongly in favour of BJP extending 'outside' support to form
the Mayawati government.
This time, BJP insisted that outside' support would not yield a
stable government and went for a coalition government with BSP. On
the other hand, BSP leader Kanshi Ram feared that if BSP and BJP
share Power, his Muslim support base would go to Mulayam Singh
Yadav. Earlier talks had failed on this very issue.
The stalemate was broken during the recent short bout of
negotiations. Both parties yielded ground and came to terms to end
the 17-month impasse. Their willingness was based on ground
realities, especially the law and order situation as aptly
described by the United Front's Home Minister Inderjit Gupta that
the state was heading for anarchy, chaos and destruction.
Here too, breaking the, isolation was secondary for BJP. Formation
of this coalition government would create greater harmony in the
society in relation to the Dalits. The RSS motive, apart from their
justification that they are not into electoral politics, stemmed
from boosting the morale of their cadres working for unity of the
Hindu society.
As far as Sangh Parivar is concerned, casteism and its by-products
are anathema to it. Their primary objective is greater social
harmony in keeping with the tenets of Hindutva although casteism,
untouchability and exploitation are a reality.
If we consider only this point, there are inspirational
similarities between RSS and BSP. But their methodology differs.
BSP follows the path of caste struggle and hatred. The Sangh
Parivar has adopted the method of social harmony to eradicate
casteism and its other ingredient. In UP, however, this alliance
of methodologies gives a higher dividend to BJP while breaking its
isolation in a major way.
The isolation of BJP or its earlier incarnate, Jan Sangh, is not a
new Phenomenon. Those who think that the BJP's isolation has
something to do with Ram Janmabhoomi movement or the demolition of
Babri structure should remember this history of isolation of BJP
and Jan Sangh.
During the fifties and early sixties, the Jan Sangh was branded a
communal party t)y Jawaharlal Nehru himself for its roots in RSS,
the chief proponent of Hindutva in the Country. During the
sixties, Jan Sangh's growth was quite impressive.
Ram Manohar Lohia realised that his anti-Congressism was not going
to succeed until Jan Sangh was brought into the broader
anti-Congress 'front'. In the fourth general election in the late
sixties, the efforts of anti-Congressism showed results. Several
Samyukt Vidhayak Dal (United Legislators' Party) governments came
to power at state level for a short time (1967-70).
The Jan Sangh became a partner in various governments. In Bihar,
even the CPI shared the power with the untouchable Jan Sangh of the
time. Sheerly by dint of its sizable power, Jan Sangh could no
longer be kept out. The message was clear - political
untouchability could end only if they had a sizeable political
strength.
But the label of communalism was a convenient opportunistic tool of
exploitation for all its opponents. 'Indicate and syndicate' were
the two antagonistic forces in the general elections of early
seventies. Jan Sangh was included in the 'Syndicate' only because
there could be no electoral viability of the alternative to
Congress 'Indicate' (headed by Indira Gandhi) without this
untouchable. It's a. different story altogether that the
'Syndicate' flopped.
After the 19-month Emergency in the late seventies when the Janata
Party conglomerate was floated under the stewardship of Jaya
Prakash Narayan, all the forces which today are known as Janata
Dal, Samajwadi Janata Party, or Samata Party could not afford to
keep the Jan Sangh out. The perception among the masses,
particularly in. north India, was that it had been the RSS and the
Jan Sangh which had fought the Emergency. Jan Sangh, with its
popularity, became the principle party of the coalition.
First Ram Manohar Lohia and then Jaya Prakash Narain - the two
chief architects of the Socialist movement in the country -
realised that ignoring the Jan Sangh would be at their own peril.
The two leaders, feeling the pulse of the people tried to end the
isolation of Jan Sangh.
JP and Jan Sangh plus some elements of Congress(O) may not have
shared the same ideology. But they shared the idealism and this
factor had brought JP nearer to the RSS and Jan Sangh. The
experiment failed because those who were bereft of this spirit of
nationalism betrayed the Janata government.
Socialist leader Madhu Limaye had raised the question of dual
membership, which ultimately paved the way for parting of Jan Sangh
group with Janata Party and the formation of BJP. Limaye was wary
of Jan 'Sangh's huge organisational structure and was afraid that
the RSS-Jan Sangh would gobble up the Janata Party. The
isolationists were ecstatic. But this phase did not last many
years.
Again in the early eighties, the ground realities of UP and other
states compelled Charan Singh to go for a democratic front along
with BJP in the Assembly elections.
The 1984 ' elections were fought in a surcharged atmosphere
following Indira Gandhi's assassination. But as the 1989 general
election was approaching, V P Singh' started courting Jan Sangh for
seat adjustments. In most areas, the Janata Dal secured 'outside'
support of BJP on one hand and of the Left front on the other,
For a year-and-a-half since 1990, V P Singh and the Left front
leaders had their weekly dinner with the 'untouchable' BJP leaders.
This, apparently, was not as opportunistic move. However, the BJP
and its earlier incarnate Jan Sangh never believed in political
untouchability.
The controversy had been thrashed out at the Calicut conference of
Jan Sangh when the SVD governments came into power - especially
with CPI as a treasury bench partner in Bihar. Party ideologue Deen
Dayal Upadhyay has spelt out the reasons as to why the electorate
would never endorse political untouchability in the long run.
The 1991 election results mirrored the real strength of the
respective parties. Even in isolation, BJP won 120 seats of Lok
Sabha. At that time, all isolationists unanimously pursued their
brand of secularism and unitedly tried their best not to have any
connection with BJP.
The Left leaders and V P Singh would not even allow floor
co-ordination with the BJP, a recognised Opposition party, against
the P V Narasimha Rao government. This attitude was exploited by
Rao to perpetuate his corrupt reign. Anti-BJPism reached a
crescendo after the 1996 elections, when BJP emerged as the
principal political party of the country relegating Congress to the
second position for the first time. The isolationists had not got
out of their 1993 UP Assembly election hang-over.
The actual political veto against BJP comes from the Muslim
votebank. When approached to support the minority Vajpayee
government - either as coalition or alliance partners Telugu Desam
Party leader (and Andhra Pradesh chief minister) Chandrababu Naidu
along with chieftains of other regional parties confided that they
could afford to lose Muslim votes.
"Majestic. isolation" is descriptive comment from BJP president Lal
Krishan Advani. But the isolationists got a severe blow when BJP
and BSP alliance shaped last week in UP. For BSP was the fifth
alliance partner of the BJP, which is a coalition partner of Shiv
Sena in Maharashtra.
Last month, Punjab got an Akali Dal-BJP government as the alliance
won more than two-thirds majority. Bansi Lal's Haryana Vikas Party
and BJP fought the election together and now rule Haryana. The
citadel of Janata Dal, Bihar, as well as the party president (and
chief minister) Laloo Prasad Yaday was rudely shaken when the BJP
and Samata Party (of fiery Socialists George Fernandes and Nitish
Kumar) fought the 1996 Lok Sabha elections as allies.
The political elite of the country have generally overplayed the
isolation of BJP. And in this respect, the BJP-BSP alliance is
very significant since it amply proves the RSS-BJP viewpoint. For
the Dalits an over the country, the strength and size of the BSP
does not matter. They recognise Kanshi Ram as their leader who has
revitalised them - socio-economically as well as politically.
The UP alliance has definitely given a good mileage to the BJP.
But more important is the fact that it has given a severe blow to
the opponents of BJP, who solely depend on the isolation of BJP for
their avowed aim of keeping BJP out of power.
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