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The opening of the Chashma nuclear power plant on March 28 was just a reminder of the wonderful years of a trustworthy relationship - that the Chinese have never failed us. We could always count on them for help and assistance when other doors were closed on us. The French wriggled out of a contract to sell Pakistan a nuclear reprocessing plant in 1976 because the Americans didn't want it. The Chinese could also have looked the other way, more so because they were then in the process of building bridges with the US. But neither duplicity nor expediency has ever been the trademark of China's foreign policy.
They were the first country to sign an agreement with Pakistan in 1989 for supplying a 300 MW nuclear reactor and that is how the Chashma project was launched. But Chashma is only one of the several living monuments to what has aptly been described as an 'all-weather' friendship. Rise and fall of regimes, reshuffling of leadership or shift in policies has had no bearing on the continuing process of mutual trust and cooperation.
From signing the border agreement in March 1963 to the opening of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) in February 1971, the foundation of a lasting relationship was laid. It has since been an on-going process of cementing cooperative partnership. Standing the test of time, the Sino-Pakistan relationship has now matured to a point where India's role as the 'common enemy' is no longer essential to its sustenance. It is therefore necessary for opinion leaders in Pakistan to outgrow their fixation with the 'India factor' in Sino-Pakistan relations. There should be no cause for concern in Pakistan if the Chinese were seeking to normalize ties with India. The Chinese are entitled to keep all their options open in foreign relations, as is Pakistan. For instance, the Chinese are not comfortable with Islamabad's Taliban connection, or to be more exact, with the entire gamut of dealing with the rise of Islamic fundamentalist forces in the region. Needless to say, it is, above all, a question of national self-interest.
That Sino-Pakistan friendship should not be allowed to become a hostage to the 'common enemy' factor is the lesson we must make haste to learn. Our ties with China should be built on a positive and concrete basis of understanding and collaboration for mutual benefit. We have to rise above the 'dependence culture' which we have inherited from long years of 'client-patron' relationship with the US, lacking in dignity and self-respect.
As Dawn wrote in an editorial on February 4, 1972, "China has been a great friend of Pakistan. Let us honour this friendship by being rational and realistic and not by imposing unnecessary burden and strain on this friendship." The reason why China is widely seen in Pakistan as a reliable friend and ally is the popular perception that the Chinese do not interfere in our internal matters and that there are no strings attached to the Chinese aid and assistance.
We have to set our development priorities right and drastically improve our economic performance in order to do business with the Chinese. That the Chinese are concerned about the health of Pakistan's economy is no secret. They have been telling us to divert resources from guns to development. To put the Kashmir question on the back burner and seek normalization of ties with India is something hard to digest for any government in Islamabad. But there is some merit in the Chinese prescription for peace and stability in South Asia.
The entire region, in particular
Pakistan, is desperately lagging behind in developing its human resources
and improving the quality of life of the teeming millions consigned to
lead a life of misery and deprivation. Whether or not we can follow the
Chinese example, their advice to Pakistan has been in line with what they
have themselves been practising since the launching of the modernization
campaign.
The end of the cold war era saw
the crystallization of a Chinese foreign policy propelled by its domestic
agenda. Henceforth the Chinese were primarily concerned with fostering
an international climate of peace and stability which they deemed essential
for single mindedly pursuing the goal of development and modernization
at home. They were in particular keen to have friendly ties with all the
neighbours, refrain from getting involved in any regional conflict and
go the extra mile to negotiate outstanding issues of discord.
Normalization of ties with Russia was a significant development as the Chinese were able to negotiate and settle the long-standing border question with Moscow, and turn a new chapter of cooperative relationship with their one-time adversary number one.
The rebuilding of ties with India was vigorously pursued in the wake of Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988. The process did not pay high dividends since there was no progress in negotiation on the settlement of the boundary dispute, and the Indian ruling elite remains sceptical about Chinese intentions. In a hard-hitting attack on the slow pace of border talks, an Indian observer wrote "after 19 yeas of talks the 4,004 km Line-of-actual control is still not defined, let alone delineated and determined." The Sino-Indian ties took a nosedive in early 1998 when the newly installed BJP-led coalition, in a bid to offer an alibi for nuclear testing, raised the China bogey. In April 1998 Indian defence minister, George Fernandes, said, "China posed a greater threat to Indian security than Pakistan." A month later Prime Minister Vajpayee himself joined the anti-China chorus by pointing an accusing finger at China for spoiling the security environment in the region.
As the government and the media in India shifted the focus of security threat from Pakistan to China, all guns wee turned on Sino-Pakistan military collaboration. The Chinese were accused of transferring missile technology and nuclear know-how to Pakistan by no less a person than the Indian defence minister, who branded China as the 'mother' of Ghauri missile test-fired by Pakistan in May 1998. In a bid to break the stalemate in Sino-Indian ties, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh undertook a trip to China in June 1999 and marked the beginning of a new chapter in Sino-Indian relations. "The threat chapter is over... the Pokhran chapter is behind us", he said.
In the aftermath of the Kargil conflict the Indian media saw some hopeful signs in China's India policy. The change of heart in Beijing, an Indian paper wrote, was reflected in its "sudden volte-face on Pakistan and its insistence that Kargil conflict be settled diplomatically." During the Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan's visit to India in July 2000, a section of the Indian press claimed that a positive gain vis-a-vis Sino-Pakistan nexus was 'China's neutrality' in the Kargil war and 'dilution' of its pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir.
Nevertheless, the Indians were far from satisfied with Tang Jiaxuan's explanation that Chinese ties with Pakistan were "normal relations between sovereign countries," including areas of military cooperation and trade as they raised the question of what they called extensive and sustained transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles to Pakistan.
As the Chinese have been trying to be as open and transparent as possible in their rather intricate endeavour to sell friendship to India without compromising their relations with Pakistan, they have encountered a degree of suspicion and misgivings from both India and Pakistan. The feeling in Pakistan has been that the Chinese were not as enthusiastic or vocal in their expression of support and friendship for Pakistan as they were until the 1990s and their courting of the Indians will inevitably lead to a slump in Sino-Pakistan relations. On the other hand, some hard-liners in India have not stopped accusing the Chinese of 'double standards and deception' in their India policy.
However the Chinese view of the multiple relationship was spelt out in clear terms as pressmen accompanying Indian President Narayan on a visit to Beijing in May 2000 were told that improvement of ties with India would not be at the cost of sacrificing China's all-weather friendship with Pakistan. "Pakistan is a good friend, India is a friend. We hope India too will become a good friend".
The Chinese have always insisted that they have no problems in their relations with Pakistan. Nothing will be allowed to impair the friendly ties between the two countries is the kind of reassurance they have often given. Nonetheless it would be fallacious to argue that China and Pakistan see eye-to-eye on all matters. Serious differences have existed between the two countries over Afghanistan, to be more exact, vis-a-vis the Taliban question.
Beijing's decision to join the 'Shanghai Five' along with Russia and three Central Asian states was an indication of China's alarm over the rise of militant religious fundamentalism in Afghanistan. While Islamabad's liaison with the Taliban was a cause of concern for the Chinese, they were particularly disturbed by reports that some religious parties in Pakistan also had a nexus with Islamic militants from Xinjing province.
Denouncing 'international terrorism' has since been high on Beijing's agenda. Nevertheless, the Chinese approach to the Taliban question has been significantly different from the Americans'. They abstained from voting on the UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Kabul and did not rule out the option establishing a back-channel with the Taliban. The Chinese seem to share the Pakistani perception that a policy of engagement will be more productive than containment. Little wonder, the Chinese have been amenable to letting Pakistan play the moderator and facilitate the process of a Sino-Taliban understanding.
That the Chinese are not susceptible
to exhibiting 'big brother chauvinism' in their ties with small nations
has been the key factor in the blossoming of their 'all-weather friendship'
with Pakistan. Premier Rongji is expected to visit Pakistan later this
year. His agenda will be no different from his predecessors in that it
will reaffirm friendship and cooperation with Pakistan. Nonetheless, what
is required of us is to reorient our approach to friendship and redefine
the parameters of cooperation.
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