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Media attention, hence public awareness, including those of
intellectuals and power elites in India, has traditionally been
directed at events occurring in the North-Western parts of India.
It has been quite apparent since independence, except during the
Sino-Indian war in 1962. The problems of Pakistan and Jammu and
Kashmir have dulled Indian public and political sensitivities
although more security personnel and civilians die annually due to
insurgency and inter-tribal conflicts in the North - Eastern states
than anywhere else. The contiguity of this region to several other
countries, especially China which is India's strategic adversary,
makes this region extremely sensitive.
Let us take a look at an important geographical aspect which
affects India's security at the strategic level. Entire North
Bengal and a bit of Western Assam for about 300 km is sandwiched
between Nepal, Chumbi Valley and Bhutan in the North and Bangladesh
in the South. The Siliguri corridor which at its narrowest is only
30 km has an average width of about 150 km. Through this corridor
all surface communications, both road and railway, to the
North-Eastern region pass. Any threat to this corridor or the
lower Brahmaputra Valley can seriously affect all movement in
peacetime or during war. There are two major factors which are
causing problems in this area. The first is the illegal immigration
of aliens which is affecting the demographic balance and is a
constant source of socio-economic tensions. The second is the
emerging socio-ethnic conflicts among the peoples of this region.
This is due to a combination of several factors such as tribal
groups trying to seek a separate identity because of perceived
social, political and identity because of perceived social,
political and economic injustice, mainly due to the short - sighted
political policies of different regional and national level parties
competing for power. The emerging patterns in the states of North
Bengal, Assam, Manipur and Tripura are discussed here.
North Bengal
This is a complex sector. Indian Gorkhas and Indian Muslims who
form two major groups of this sector have close emotional, family
and cultural links with the peoples in Nepal and Bangladesh. This,
coupled with a porous border and lower economic status, provides
fertile ground for illegal immigration. A senior Intelligence
Bureau official posted in this region for several years revealed
the following methodology of illegal entry into India in an
informal conversation with the author.
People exchange property on both sides of the border and migrate.
This probably refers more to Hindus from Bangladesh.
Marriages take place between members of the family with links
across the international border (IB) followed by the whole family
migrating to live with the married members of the family on the
Indian side of the IB.
There is a seasonal or frequent employment migration from
Bangladesh into the border belts of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura,
over a period of time. This author during a study tour in 1995
found a large number of alien rickshaw pullers in Guwahati,
Agartala and even in (outsider hostile) Dimapur. Apparently this
state of affairs extend to head load labourers and farm labour,
especially in the lower Brahmaputra Valley in Assam.
People come on pilgrimage to visit various Muslim shrines or their
families and do not return to Bangladesh. Our system of detection
and identification of foreigners is full of loopholes.
An IG-level BSF officer in charge of the IB in North Bengal
bemoaned that force levels allotted to him for border security were
less than half what is available for border security along the
Indo-Pak border. He opined, and so does this author after visiting
some fenced areas in this region, that fencing is not a solution in
this type of terrain. Since the sanction is not total the fencing
is in patches (about 125 km in a 1000 km stretch in West Bengal)
the BSF does not know whether to guard the IB or the fence! The
connivance of the lower strata police, paramilitary personnel and
local officials is common for a consideration. Photographs and
ration cards are prepared even before the illegal immigration.
Ration cards are only a step away from getting into the voters'
list, especially with political or bureaucratic help. The
population increase in North Bengal is 33 per cent as against West
Bengal's and the national average of 23 per cent.
Darjeeling Hill District
This district had Siliguri, Kalimpong and Darjeeling sub-divisions.
Darjeeling was ceded to British India after the Anglo-Nepal war in
1816 and therefore has predominantly ethnic Gorkhas of Nepalese
origin. Kalimpong was and continues to be on perpetual lease from
Sikkim Durbar; it also has a predominantly Gorkha population of
Nepalese origin. However, people of both these sub-divisions are
Indian citizens and so are the Gorkhas who have settled down here
after service in the Indian Army. The migration of Nepalese people
into Siliguri area and Jalpaiguri district has increased since
1970. In recent years, after the Nepalese settlers from the Terai
region of Bhutan (Bhupatis) were driven out, the sensitivity of
this area has increased. At present about 65,000 Bhupatis have
been located in refugee camps in the Japa district of Eastern Nepal
under UNHRC. Some of these are roaming around the Dooars area of
North Bengal creating law and order problems. It is in this
context that we should look into the temporarily pacified
Gorkhaland agitation for the demand of a separate Gorkha state
under the Indian Union. The agitation under Shri Subhash Ghising,
had turned violent or a couple of years in 198788. This was the
time the Sino-Indian border in the Eastern sector had become active
after the Chinese intrusion into the Sumdorong Chu Valley South of
the McMohan line. Our surface communications to the Sino-Indian
border in the Eastern Sector were in jeopardy. To appease the
agitation leaders, as it normally happens in Indian politics, the
Darjeeling District Hall Council (DGHC) was formed with limited
autonomy in the social, cultural, developmental and educational.
It had no power to raise revenue and had limited capability to
cater for all the aspirations of the Gorkhas under DGHC. Should
this continue beyond the tolerance level of the people or due to
political manoeuvres of the DGHC (State and Central level) the
Gorkhaland pot could be on the boil again. This time, taking
advantage of the changing demographic pattern in Jalpaiguri
district, they could even get "volunteers" from the nearby Bhupati
refugee camp in Eastern Nepal. Shri Subhash Ghising has tried to
extend his influence into Gorkha-dominated Sikkim and into Eastern
Nepal. Off and on Shri Subhash Ghising drops hints of greater
Gorkhaland to include Sikkim too. This is bound to result in
serious resistance by Lepchas and Bhutiyas who are the original
inhabitants of Sikkim. They are in minority after being swamped by
ethnic Nepalese who now form nearly 80 per cent of Sikkim's
population Emerging sub-nationalism and socio-ethnic tensions in
this sensitive area would pose problems for national security.
Assam
When the East India Company established their control over the
Brahmaputra Valley, it started large-scale officially sponsored
migration into assam from the rest of Eastern India. Better
educated and emancipated Bengalis came as white collar workers less
educated Bengalis, Bihari Muslims for farming, tribal labour from
Orissa, Santhal Parganas and Bhihar as tea labour, and Nepalese for
coal mining in the upper Assam Valley. As early as 1931 fears were
expressed about the effect of this movement on Assamese identity
and culture.
While presenting the 1931 census report Mr C. S. Mullan said: "it
is sad but by no means improbable that in another 30 years,
Sibsagar district will be the only part of Assam in which Assamese
will find himself at home!" Prophetic words. Today the ethnic
Assamese population, i.e., Ahoms and all sections of the plain
tribals form barely 30 to 40 per cent of the population, if one
does not take into account certain early Bihari and Bengali Muslim
settlers who adopted Assamese language and culture.
The influence of illegal Bangladeshi Muslims continues: this not
only worsens the identity crisis but also poses a threat to India's
national security. Today's estimate of illegal Muslim immigrants in
Assam could be two to three million, bulk of them concentrated in
the lower Brahmaputra Valley contiguous to Bangladesh and the
illegal immigrant infected areas of North Bengal. The areas where
they are being permitted to settle are in Kokrajhar, Barpeta and
Nalbari. They have been allotted pattas in the same areas which
Bodos are claiming and an for an autonomous Bodoland. This has
created hostility between the Bodos and Muslim setters in what
Bodos perceive as their land.
There is considerable connivance of the parties in power, and out
of power, in legalizing the allotment of pattas of land for illegal
immigrants. The latest entry into the game is Assam Ganatantra
Parishad (AGP), who were the "knights in shining armour" during the
Assam liberation agitation in the eighties and whose main platform
for this agitation was detection, identification and deportation of
foreigners, i.e., anybody other than Assamese. Today ethnic
Assamese, i.e., Ahoms, Bodos and other tribes, who do not want to
be identified with Ahoms, are not in majority. Shri S. L. Shokdar,
the erstwhile Chief Election Commissioner, in a conference
highlighted the abnormally high rate of increase in an electoral
college in Assam, especially in 1977 when within 10 months there
was an increase of 10.3 per cent. The population growth during the
census in 1961 and 1971 was 34.98 per cent as against the national
average of 21.64 and 24.87 per cent respectively.
>From the late seventies to the mid-eighties the Assam liberation
movement kept the Brahmaputra Valley on the boil ULFA (United
Liberation Front of Assam), the militant wing of this agitation,
committed political 'harakiri' with its excesses and is not a force
to reckon with at present.
The Bodos, who supported the Assam liberation movement, were
disillusioned after the AGP came to power, Plains tribes
represented by PTCA (Plains Tribal Council of Assam) have always
felt dominated by Ahoms. The undercurrent has been used by the
powers that be to fragment Assamese society. The demands for
autonomous councils of Karbi Anglong, Udayachal and Bodoland are
all part of this process. An autonomous council of Karbi Anglong
has been formed; the Bodo Autonomous council has been accepted but
is not fully functional, In the meanwhile the Bodo Security Force,
the militant element of the Bodo agitation, is actively targeting
Bangladeshi Muslim settlements and villages in Bodo-claimed areas,
like Kokrajhar, Barpeta and Nalbari. In some incidents in 1994-95 a
number of Bangladeshi Muslims have been killed and their
settlements destroyed. Muslim setters are believed to be
organizing village defence forces with active help from Bangladesh.
If the illegal immigration continues, the situation could become
dangerous in an area through which surface communications to the
rest of North-Estern India pass. Currently this area is swarming
with security forces operating against the Bodo Security Force
whose sanctuaries extend into adjacent Bhutan. ULFA, SULFA (who
surrender from ULFA), who were supplied with money and weapons by
the Saikia Government and Bodo militants are extorting money from
shopkeepers, truckers, tea industry workers and even common
citizens. In fact this seems to have become a way of life to a
generation of unemployed youth.
Manipur
Manipur is located in the southern part of North-East India
bordering Myanmar. To its North is the Indian state of Nagaland
and on its West are Indian state of Nagaland and on its West are
the Indian state of Assam and Mizoram. All these states, including
Northern Myanmar, have been in a state of turbulence due to
sub-nationalism, resulting in insurgency for the past four decades.
Manipur is a typical example of a multiethnic and multicultural
society, despite living together for hundreds of years, it can be
easily affected by ethnic revelry and hostility.
Manipur has an area of about 22,000 sq km of which about one-third
forms the Manipur valley and the balance hilly area surrounding the
valley. The valley people numbering around 1.2 million, a bulk of
whom are Meiteis, have been in contact with other parts of India
for centuries. Meiteis follow Hindu religion (Vaishnavism) and
culture. They are generally well-educated, culturally advanced and
revel in many forms of art. The hill people, about 30 different
tribes, were animists till the entry of Christian missionaries in
the latter half of the nineteenth century. The bulk of them are
now Christians with a sprinkling of tribes following Hinduism and
Buddhism. Because of their advanced cultural heritage and
identification with Hindu religion, Meiteis do not come under the
Scheduled Tribes (ST) status while the hill tribes, forming
one-third of the population, come under the ST category and enjoy
certain privileges like job reservation, protection of their lands
from settlement and ownership by non-STs even if they are
Manipuris. This has led to discontent among the Meiteis who
perceive that the hill tribes are getting jobs disproportionate to
their population, education and culture. Manipur state was a
feudal state for many centuries. When India became independent in
1947 Manipur acceded to India. It became part of the Indian Union
as a 'C' state in January 1950 and became a full - fledged state on
21 January 1972. This delay was an unfortunate political error
because the Meiteis the Valley people, felt that their
identification with "Hindu" Indians brought them no political or
economic benefits, while agitating Nagas both in Nagaland and the
hill districts of Manipur benefited because of the agitation. These
feelings gave encouragement to separatist tendencies; several
separatist groups claimed that they were not Hindus and belonged to
the old Senamai culture. Corrupt politicians and administration,
economic backwardness increased the number of educated unemployed
people, who acted as a catalyst.
Insurgency
The insurgency in Manipurean be classified into insurgency in the
hills which is linked with insurgency in Nagaland and the Valley
insurgency connected with the Meitei separatist movement.
The Pan-Mongoloid movement which started in 1956-57 was the first
political step of separatists for the Meities liberation from
'Hindu' India. This simmering discontent exploded in 1980 into a
full - scale insurgency. There are several militant factions like
the United Liberation Front (UNLF), Revolutionary Government of
Manipur (RGM), People's Liberation Army (PLA), People's
Revolutionary Party of Kanglupak (PREPAK), Joint Revolutionary
Council (JRC) and Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP). Each of these
factions, through having similar objectives, act separately and
sometimes clash with each other. "in Manipur it is as easy to
launch a militant outfit as it is to launch a business project in
Mumbai," says Shri Yambem Laba, a Meitei special correspondent for
The Statesman (24 September 1993). Extortion from all sections of
society seems to attract unemployed youth as a means of livelihood
besides giving them the macho feeling of having power over people.
The Army suppressed the insurgency to controllable levels in the
early eighties. But the follow-up political action was wanting
because the political leaders were busy "horse trading" and
shifting party alliances to stay in power. For the same reason they
started covertly backing and getting the support of different
militant groups. The political instability of the state has
contributed considerably to the insurgency though the current
turbulence in Manipur is linked more to the intertribal conflicts.
The security environment of the society is also vitiated by youths
brandishing arms and brand names of one organization or the other
to indulge in extortion and kidnappings.
Naga-Kuki conflict
Kukis are originally inhabitants of Northern Myanmar, bordering
Manipur and Mizoram. They were basically nomads but good fighters.
They were recruited by Manipur kings for their army, who later
settled some of them along the border with Myanmar. Some of these
settled down alongside Naga villages and tilled the land owned by
Nagas with the latter's concurrence. The Kukis soon started
claiming these lands and this was not acceptable to the Nagas who
cited the earlier tradition of Kukis handing the land back to Naga
villages before they remigrated. Now the Nagas want to drive the
Kukis off their lands and villages, hence the ethnic tension and
the conflict.
The Kukis are well-organized now: there is Kuki National Front
(KNF), Kuki National Army (KNA), Kuki independent Army (KIA) and
Kuki Defence Force (KDF). There is also a demand for 'Kukil'
within the Indian Constitution, somewhat similar to the demand of
Bodoland. In addition to all this is the struggle to control the
border town of Moreh and the national highway linking Imphal to
Myanmar which passes through Moreh. Moreh is the focal point for
smuggling and drug traffic. Till the Kuki - Naga conflict started,
NSCN (IM), a strong Naga insurgent group, controlled this town.
Now the Kukis are controlling it. The NSCN (IM) is determined to
drive the Kukis out of Moreh and out of Kuki settlements in
Naga-dominated hill districts. Violence erupted between these
tribal groups in June 1992 and till now there have been nearly 1000
killings; and about 2000 houses have been burnt. Nearly 100
villages are affected. The killings have been brutal and the
tribal tradition of sparing women and children has been forgotten.
Recently there was a brutal attack on Tamil and Punjabi traders of
Indian origin from Myanmar, who have settled down in the border
town of Moreh.
Mention has been made earlier about the ethnic tensions between the
Nagas and the Meiteis of Manipur. In fact, so far as Manipur is
concerned the socio-economic problems and lack of security for the
general populace caused by ethnic conflict is more serious than the
so-called separatist militant movement. The state's armed police
and constabulary are incapable of controlling the situation as are
the political and civilian agencies. The police force is generally
following tribal loyalties. In fact the armed police is handing
over their arms to their respective clansmen at a faster rate than
the central security forces can capture. National Highways 39 and
53, the only links to Manipur from the rest of India, have become
"death traps".
The situation, which is essentially the result of socio-ethnic
conflict, is serious. Innocent lives are being lost, properties
destroyed and many security personnel are losing their lives. The
politicians are playing with fire for short-term gains and lack the
will and political cumen to solve these problems.
Tripura
Tripura is a tiny state, by Indian standards, situated in the
South-West corner of the seven North-Eastern states of India. It
is surrounded on three sides by Bangladesh with an international
boundary of 845 km and a short corridor of contact with the
mainland through Cachar district of Assam in the North. It is
connected to the mainland by a National Highway and a metre gauge
railway. Political changes in this part of the subcontinent,
firstly by the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, and later by
the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 have created upheaval in this
state's demographic balance. Before August 1947, the tribal
population formed two-thirds of the total population and the rest
were plainsmen, most of whom were Bengalis who came in service of
the king of Tripura. The situation is reversed now. The loss of
identity and pressure on the tribal land has caused serious
socio-ethnic tension during the past three decades.
Tripura was a princely state with its history dating back a few
thousand years. It has a population (1 991 census) of about 27
lakhs in about 10,500 sq km. The 1961 census showed a decadal
increase of population by 78 per cent, i.e., the aftermath of the
partition as against the national figure of 21 percent. The 1971
and 1981 censuses showed a 36.28 and 31.55 per cent increase as
against the national average of around 24 per cent. This could be
attributed to the migration of refugees both Hindu and Muslims from
Bangladesh. Herein lies the bitter pill for the 19 tribes, the
natives of Tripura. The political and economic power has gone into
the chands of the immigrants. In 1967 some tribes formed a
political front called Tripura Upjati Juba Samiti (TUJS) whose
demands were restoration of tribal lands allotted to non-tribals,
creation of reserve areas for tribals and creation of Tribal Area
Autonomous Councils (TADC). The Tripura National Volunteers (TNV),
a militant wing, was formed in 1980. The anti-foreigner's call
given by it resulted in the Mandal massacre when about 1,800 people
lost their lives, over 3,600 huts were burnt and there was heavy
loss of property.
The Communist Party ruled the state for 10 years between 1977 and
1987 and the Congress party for the rest of the time. The former
appears to have popular support and they did provide a better
administration. At present while most of Tripura is quiet, there
are pockets of unrest in the tribal hill areas, astride roads
illegal taxation on load -carrying vehicles is imposed, extortion
by kidnappings and occasional attacks on security forces are
carried out. None of the so-called insurgent/liberation forces are
really strong. TUJS, TNU and National Liberation Front, Tripura
(NLFT) are more prominent. Their factional fights cause law and
order problems as well as casualties and loss of property of
innocent tribesmen. The CPI (M) and Congress(I)'s political
competition reverberates through these intra-tribal and
intra-militant group's conflicts. In the meanwhile illegal Muslim
immigration from Bangladesh continues though not to the extent seen
in Assam and North Bengal. The international border is mostly
riverine. Border fencing and the border roads being constructed at
a cost of a couple of hundred crores of rupees is not likely to
reduce this flow of immigrants very much.
The state of Tripura should not be allowed to become a festering
wound in the body politics of India.
Conclusion
The Gorkhaland agitation had been within the framework of the
Constitution. A more radical and violent leader than Shri Subhash
Ghising could spring up and agitate for greater Gorkhaland to
include Sikkim, Darjeeling Hill District and even Jalpaiguri
District. This may or may not be within the framework of the
Constitution. Imagine a scenario, however wild, of the demand for
an Islamic state and greater Gorkhaland gaining strength from
external influences taking firm roots in North Bengal and the lower
Brahmapurta Valley of Assam! This could not only isolate the rest
of the North-Eastern region but also give a greater fillip to
cessionist movements in Nagaland, Assam and Manipur. This could
result in disintegration and dismemberment of the nation state. Is
there a way out?
Yes, there is in this scribe's view. Since this problem has risen
mostly due to short-sighted acquiescence, if not all the time
direct connivance, the solution should come from the same source.
Constitutional, legislative and administrative reviews must be done
in consultation with all parties, both national and regional, to
facilitate a pragmatic solution to the detection and identification
of foreigners and, where required, deregistration, and deportation.
The legislations that affect the foreigners. Viz., Foreigners Act
1946, Foreigners (Tribunal) Order 1964, Registration of Foreigners
Act 1939 and Illegal Immigrants (Tribunal) Act 1983, as amended in
1985 should be reviewed by a committee consisting of judges and
constitutional lawyers, after hearing views of political leaders
and administrators from border districts.
The Election Commission too should become more vigilant during
review of electoral rolls. In doubtful cases the onus of proof
should lie on the claimant and not on the establishment.
Political "hands-off" understanding from dabbling with insurgents
or terrorists must emerge from political parties. Such support
must come under not only criminal but also corrupt electoral
practices act.
A free hand must be given to the security forces to whittle down
the strength of insurgency, of course within the framework mework
of human rights. Legislation must be reviewed to strengthen their
hand.
Our neighbours must be openly told that we will reserve the right
to chase and destroy insurgents across the international border, if
necessary, unless they take firm action to curb their activities.
The US and Israel do it. Our intelligence agencies too must
develop a sword arm of action to eliminate insurgent leaders
sheltering across the international border.
To inhibit illegal immigration from Bangladesh, India should
undertake and fund specific development projects in the border belt
of Bangladesh and also be more generous in solving the problem of
sharing river waters. In the ultimate analysis this will work out
cheaper.
Promises are being made, and in some instances given too for grant
of autonomous councils for different tribal areas to satisfy their
aspirations. The constitutional validity of these councils, the
extent of their financial and administrative powers should be
reviewed sincerely so that they can function effectively for the
good of their respective tribes.
In conclusion, one can see the gloomy picture of Balkanization in
the next few decades, of the North-Eastern region. Our political
leaders should take greater note of the events in this region and
work out a common multi-dimensional strategy to solve the issues in
the national interest because India's national security and
integrity are at stake.
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