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The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which enters into force on April 29,
1997 will find New Delhi in an extremely embarrassing situation, with the US,
Russia, China and Pakistan continuing to remain outside the Convention. The
unusual haste shown by New Delhi to deposit its Instrument of Ratification
(IOR) on September 3 to become the 62nd country to do so has landed India
into an avoidable but NPT-like situation. Although Foreign Minister Inder
Kumar Gujral soft-pedalled on the issue in Parliament recently, New Delhi
should, before it is too late, seek to redress this unnecessary step by
unequivocally stating that it reserves the right to opt out from the
Convention if India's neighbours and the US and Russia do not ratify the CWC
by April 29.
There is sufficient justification to question why New Delhi decided to
deposit its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary General.
Admittedly, there might have been the overarching explanation that since
India had vigorously supported the CWC during the long period of negotiations
in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it was natural that India become one
of the State Parties to the Convention because it met with the country's
basic concerns like non-discrimination and comprehensive verification system.
But the situation has changed. The CTBT debate had finally forced New Delhi
to openly admit 'security interests' as a major factor when deciding to sign
or refuse to sign international treaties. By September 1996, although the
CWC Entry Into Force (EIF) provision was close to reaching the "trigger
point", from India's point of view, important countries including Pakistan,
China, Russia and the US had not made appreciable movement towards completing
their ratification processes. This, by itself, should have forced the
Government to rethink its commitment to becoming an original State Party to
the CWC.
Having overlooked this aspect, New Delhi now finds itself in a piquant
situation. The powerful anti-CWC lobby in the US has not been outwitted by
the Clinton Administration. Although Senator Jesse Helms has recently
mellowed his stance on the CWC, there are significant differences of opinion
between the extreme right and the Administration.
The refusal of major powers to remain outside the CWC, means that when it
enters into force on April 29,1997, it will be reduced to a toothless body.
It will also make it much more difficult for the US to eventually accede to
the treaty, because apart from the objections that Jesse Helms has been
raising about rogue states, the US could find itself not agreeing to some
decisions that may be taken by the State Parties to the Convention.
While such an approach might take the heat off New Delhi, it would do
irreparable harm to international treaty negotiating practice, as it would
acknowledge and formalise the disparity of obligations and responsibilities
between CWC ' possessor and non-possessor states. It is therefore imperative
for New Delhi to reconsider its stand of becoming an original party to the
CWC. The recent Indian statement indicating that India would review its
decision if the US, Russia, China and Pakistan were not to ratify the CWC is
a step in the right direction.
Although the CWC text does not allow for any reservations to be incorporated
by State Parties, there is a nebulous condition that exists till April 29.
There is a treaty but it has not entered into force. This would imply that
any earlier commitment made by India could be superseded by a fresh
commitment. India could either withdraw its IOR, with an explicit commitment
that it will continue to support the objectives of the treaty and that will
rejoin the CWC at an appropriate time.
If New Delhi were to withdraw its IOR, the date for EIF will be further
postponed because the 65th ratification to be counted will not be that of
Hungary, but of Swaziland which deposited its IOR on November 20 last year,
giving another two months of breathing time. This might lead to criticism
from other countries for wrecking the CWC in its infancy. But such an
approach would be in consonance with India's security interests.
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