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The significance of the symbolism is not to be minimised. Dialogue with Pakistan
was the last foreign policy matter that engaged the attention of the Deve Gowda
Government and it is going to be one of first subjects to be taken up by the new
dispensation. And that with one significant difference - the last round involved,
first, the Foreign Secretaries and then the Foreign Ministers, but now it will be
a meeting between the Prime Ministers. Mr. I. K. Gujral, and Mr. Nawaz Sharif, at
the time of the SAARC summit in Male within a fortnight.
Male was the venue of one of the reasonably successful encounters between the then
Prime Ministers, Mr. Chandra Shekhar and Mr. Sharif, in 1991. The Foreign
Secretaries recently established contacts after more than three years, while the
Prime Ministers will be talking after a longer gap. Ms. Benazir Bhutto, during her
tenure, did not get an opportunity to meet her counterpart. Mr. P. V. Narasimha
Rao. So prolonged was the frostiness in the bilateral field. The contactlessness
took a heavy toll. One recalls Mr. Wily Brant, high-profile Chancellor of the
then West Germany, who, asked about the outcome of his bold experiment with
Ostpolitik or establishment of contacts with the eastern bloc, quipped: "Very
successful. Previously we had no relationship, now we have had relationship."
India and Pakistan could have better luck than forging a "bad relationship", now
that a good measure of warmth was generated first after the return of Mr. Sharif
to power in Islamabad and now after the emergence of Mr. Gujral at the top in New
Delhi. The other day Mr. Gujral sprang a pleasant surprise on Mr. Sharif calling
him on telephone for a brief talk. The gesture was to establish a direct line of
communication - a helpful input riot only for their Male meeting but also for the
future.
As External Affairs Minister, Mr. Gujral initiated certain processes in
neighbourhood diplomacy. The conceptual framework or the doctrine which served as
the basis was well known - that because of India's size and resources it would do
well, not insisting on reciprocity by its smaller neighbours Bangladesh, Nepal and
Sri Lanka, among others. The 30-year Ganga water treaty with Bangladesh, new
trade and tariff arrangements and cooperation in hydro-electric projects with
Nepal and tariff concessions to Sri Lanka were part of the conscious effort to
create trust in the neighbourhood.
Pakistan constituted a different category and even though the earlier obsession
with Islamabad was given up in the last 10 months, it was time to address this
unfinished part of the agenda (of peace and amity in South Asia). No one ill New
Delhi was under any illusion about the magnitude of the job and the complications
inherent in it. Ms. Bhutto had committed the Pakistani ruling establishment to a
single-item diplomacy in its dealings with India - which meant there was no point
discussing other outstanding problems unless the "core issue" of Jammu and Kashmir
was taken up within the parameters, laid down by it. It is not easy for her
successors to remove the locks installed by her - they run the risk of being
lambasted by her, of being charged with selling out national interests, of
compromising the "cause" and doing a disservice to the "Millat".
According to the present Pakistani position, talks on other problems would be
meaningless in the absence of any progress on Kashmir. During the Foreign
Secretary-level talks, the Pakistani side took this very position - with the
result that there was no appreciable advance even though the atmosphere was
perfect and there was a shared keenness to continue the talks. The subsequent
meeting between Mr. Gujral, then External Affairs Minister, and his Pakistani
counterpart, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, confirmed the new cordiality. That, however, was
not the proper stage for an in-depth discussion in view of the political crisis in
India.
How to start and engage in meaningful discussions on the entire gamut of
relationship? Pakistan wanted working groups established to take up various issues
including one on Kashmir. The details of the discussions were not known but India
was stated to be lukewarm to the suggestion. In the absence of hard information,
one could only surmise the reasons - perhaps, Pakistan wanted this panel to
consider either the modalities of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir or of the
"implementation" of the U.N. resolutions.
There was no ambiguity in India's stand - that it was unrealistic to talk of old
arrangements in view of the sea-change in the situation - and that there was a
solemn agreement between the two countries - the Shimla Agreement - which had had
the effect of superseding what had happened decades ago. By insisting on the
modalities of a plebiscite (or a variant of this proposition) as the basis for the
dialogue, Pakistan wants India to start with an acceptance of Islamabad's stand.
This is hardly the way for conducting negotiations.
On its part, India would do well not to reject outright the proposal for working
groups. The terms of the one on Kashmir could be borrowed from the Shimla
Agreement. There were two references in the agreement. One sought to bind the two
sides to respecting the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire of December
17, 1971 without prejudice to their recognised positions. it added: "Neither side
will seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal
interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the
use of force in violation of this line". The second formulation mentioned "a final
settlement of Jammu and Kashmir".
India had been citing the parallel of its problem with China whereby the two had
agreed to resolve other matters even as discussions on the main boundary issues
were on. Pakistan did not accept it, even though the idea was commanded by the
Chinese President, Mr. Jiang Zemin (to keep the difficult issue aside and work for
the settlement of other problems). But Pakistan had no hesitation borrowing the
other part of the arrangement between India and China - the setting up of a joint
working group (on the boundary issue). Islamabad would do well to accept the
related mechanisms too - for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the Line of
Control. If the Line of Control It Jammu and Kashmir were to be peaceful, a major
step would have to be taken to defuse tension and create an amicable environment
for dealing with the core issue along with other problems.
Similar working groups could be set up to deal with trade, confidence-building
measures, promotion of people-to-people contacts by relaxing visa restrictions,
exchange of journals and newspapers, permission for journalists from one side to
operate in the other, maritime boundary and last, but not the least, the Siachen
issue.
As regards trade, the economic imperatives force both the countries to turn to
each other in case of dire need. The occasional dealings could be made part of a
permanent stable arrangement. At the moment, the volume of the "informal trade" -
a respectable nomenclature for smuggling via Dubai and other places - is 10 times
the official quantum. The direct opening up of trade would help divert all that
to the official channels to the benefit of both the sides.
There is a case for dispelling Pakistan's apprehensions over the sub-regional
development cooperation - between India and Nepal, India and northern areas of
Bangladesh and India and Sri Lanka. In Islamabad this was construed as a move to
isolate Pakistan in the SAARC set-up. The reassurance would be possible in two
ways - one, by taking the sub-regional cooperation out of the SAARC framework and,
two, by India and Pakistan forging a similar relationship - in the area of energy,
for instance. The opening up of trade is no favour or concession by one side to
the other. It is in the mutual interest of both.
To expect a major improvement in India-Pakistan relations in one-go is no realism;
a step-by-step process is not only feasible but also desirable. New Delhi has the
uncomfortable feeling that the real repository of ultimate power in Pakistan, that
is. the armed forces, is far from keen on mending fences and, as a result, the
ruling politicians find their style cramped. In case the signals from Islamabad
are encouraging, India would not be found wanting and even if the government is
hesitant, the public opinion would force it to reciprocate.
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