|
|
|
There is no dearth of advice available on what requires to be done in Jammu and
Kashmir to effect a break with past patterns and ensure that the state returns to
the national mainstream. Advice is also forthcoming about the need for an
innovative and responsive approach to sort out political and economic issues and
overcome the psychological trauma of the past decade.
A near-total consensus exists on what should be the main priorities. These are: a
significant reduction in the scale and levels of violence; fuller integration of
the people of Kashmir - especially its youth with the rest of India; and giving
concrete shape to the concept of "maximum autonomy" promised by the United Front
government. With winter over and a return to the hothouse atmosphere in Srinagar,
the Farooq Abdullah government, the legislators and administrators face the grim
reality of the present. Neither the National Conference government in Srinagar
nor the UF ministry in Delhi. however seem to have fully comprehended that failure
to act urgently could result in serious reversals.
For too much time is presently taken up by peripherals, instead of concentrating
on the complex problems needing urgent solutions. Avoidable controversies and a
plethora of confusing statements aggravate the situation further. The chief
minister himself triggered off a needless debate, raising hackles all over the
country, by asserting that it was hardly possible for India now to get back
Pak-occupied Kashmir. Another statement that the LOC in J&K should be seen as the
de-jure boundary between India and Pakistan has similarly led to a flurry of
statements, muddying the waters further.
Despite all the rhetoric, few concrete measures for the economic rejuvenation of
this insurgency ravaged state have been initiated. Exaggerated promises of aid
and assistance by Delhi (running into several thousands of crore) only serve to
enlarge the credibility gap. In the absence of immediate relief or the launching
of specific programmes these only bring back memories of other, and unfulfilled,
promises in the past. Dr Abdullah's long absences from the state - out of
well-intentioned motives of helping the UF government at the Centre to. survive -
hardly help to shore up his image or that of the National Conference. Most state
governments ruled by regional parties tend to thrive on an image of constantly
confronting the Centre to secure benefits for the state; this is specially true in
the case of J&K where dislike for Delhi is almost visceral. Even granting that the
UF government in Delhi is the most federal friendly to date, consorting too
closely with Delhi can amount to a "kiss of death." The chief minister would do
well instead to prove by deed rather than by "words" that he is indeed the person
for the "Herculean tasks" that lie ahead.
Law and order and security are areas where immediate performance -and comparisons
with the recent past - are possible, and are in fact being made. The ruling NC
regime comes out second best in any such comparison. The perception that the
security situation has deteriorated after the installation of a popular government
in October last year is quite widespread. The perception, even more than the
actual reality, constitutes a serious setback to hopes of an early return to
normalcy. It further tends to undermine the legitimacy of the regime as also of
the popular mandate. Such perceived failures cannot be answered by mere counter
arguments or crying "foul." "Surrenders" of militants mean little when the "body
bag" count remains high. Success achieved by the elimination of top leaders
belonging to the Harkat-ul Ansar (Arif Sheikh, Abu Gazi) the Hizb-ul-Muahideen
(Abdul Majid Mallik, deputy supreme commander, Firdous Kirmani, Abdul Masjid Wani
among others) ' and the Tehrik-e-Mujahideen, again mean little when the daily or
weekly litany of persons killed causes widespread concern.
The ground reality is that the security situation is far from satisfactory.
Losses suffered by the security forces are of late on the increase. This is more
true of the countryside and the rural areas. Serious incidents reported from high
security zones like the state secretariat or the vicinity of the chief minister's
residence, suggest an ability on the part of the militants to perforate even the
best protected areas. The mindless massacre of several Kashmiri pundits during
March, the selective killing of political leaders and the reported influx into the
state of foreign mercenaries, also do not tie up with official pronouncements of
an effective improvement in the law and order situation.
There are other pointers to indicate that militants who had taken a back-seat
during much of '96 are once again becoming assertive. This is so in areas like
northern Kashmir, from where they were believed to have been gradually eliminated,
and in Poonch, Rajouri and Doda districts of the Jammu region. The writ of the
Majlis-e-Shoura-e-Jehad is often seen to be stronger than the authority of the
popular government. Within the Valley they are able to run a "parallel government"
challenging the attempts of the state government to collect taxes or revenues. As
in the past so also now, militants have been able to threaten publications from
coming out and able to impose a near-total ban an local newspapers for long
periods. These are clearly signs of recidivism on the security front.
To retain the initiative, Delhi and Srinagar need to avoid soft-pedalling on key
issues. Sections, who for historical or motivated reasons, have opted out of any
legitimate bargaining process as also elections need to be brought into the
negotiating process for even now they seek to undermine prospects of a lasting
peace by engaging in, or instigating, violence on their own or at the behest of
Pakistan. The All Party Hurriyat Conference, despite its public stance against any
dialogue except on its terms, has to be effectively targetted. Opinions within
the Hurriyat are not entirely homogenous or identical and scope does exist to try
and engage some members in a purposeful dialogue. The young Mirwaiz, for instance,
can hardly be ignored or disregarded. If he can engage in discussions with the US
ambassador he can certainly be persuaded to do so with Indian interlocutors on
issues such as more autonomy or greater freedom for J&K. There are others like
Shabir Shah, Yasin Mallik and JKLF leaders, to mention only a few, who are not
totally blinded by Pakistan's implacable hostility towards India, and retain more
than a modicum of faith and belief in an autonomous J&K within the Indian Union.
Carefully structured negotiations are called for, but this is hardly possible
unless some idea of the quantum of autonomy that can be provided to J&E is
properly determined and given concrete shape. The main responsibility for this
lies with the Centre, for it alone can decide on the quantum of autonomy to be
given. Instead of concentrating on this delicate and sensitive issue which has
far-reaching consequences for the federal polity, Delhi seems to have relegated it
to the background, and Srinagar is content with setting up a Committee to grapple
with this problem. In the absence of close interaction between members of the
Committee, policy makers in the state and the central government, political
leaders belonging to the regional and national parties, and other thinkers and
academics little can be expected from this body.
It is this kind of step-motherly approach to fundamental issues in the past that
was responsible for much of the frustration leading to alienation.
It is futile for India to constantly lament over external interference or
-involvement in J&K and in the affairs of the region. India must recognise that
J&K is seen as a multi-dimensional problem by the West on account of factors
beyond India's control. The US, and much of the West, have also convinced
themselves that instability in the region on account of a lack of agreement over
Kashmir would become a new flashpoint of conflict. As long as the J&K situation
remains troubled, such external interference can be expected to continue, India's
expressions of unhappiness over such "meddling" notwithstanding. Already with
elections having been held successfully and a popular ministry installed in
Srinagar, the US has shifted gear to some extent, acknowledging that this is a
significant step and the beginning of a process. The US caveat of "involving the
people of J&K in the process of reconciliation" can only be effectively countered
if India's suo motu efforts in this direction which are already on - are
accelerated, and the process of consultation and discussion with all segments of
opinion in J&K given a new impetus,
India needs now to concentrate more on grappling with the problem of sustaining
peace in the state than in being diverted by comments from "outsiders." In much
the same manner as it tackled the decade long insurgency and came out on top, it
should deal with current issues arising from people's expectations after the
election. Its strategic priorities should be clear and specific. Law and order
will figure very much on the top of the agenda. Dealing with a porous border and
infiltration/exfiltration of militants across it, and particularly the designs of
the ISI are vital. Foiling the plans of the ISI in the event of a new offensive
once the passes open after the winter will need advance planning.
The Centre will need to use diplomacy and employ diplomatic skills to checkmate
Pakistan's efforts to use the international fora once again to project Kashmir as
a conflict area, and side by side with this, give it a religious dimension.
Diplomatic skills would again be needed to convince the US still further of the
danger of turning a Nelson's eye to Pakistan's role as a hub of terrorism. There
is enough evidence with the US about Pakistan's efforts to support to militants
and ultras in the Kashmir Valley, but this may now have to be brought to fruition
by ensuring that sanction are imposed on Pakistan for exporting terrorism
 |
||
|
||
|
||
