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Fifty years ago Britain's Labour government under Clement Attlee
raised a persisting stink of conspiracy in relation to events and
arrangements in Jammu-Kashmir. Half a century on another Labour
Prime Minister in Britain, Tony Blair, wants Britain to "accept its
responsibility as the former imperial power" and use "its good
offices with India and Pakistan to assist in a negotiated solution
to (the) tragic dispute" over Kashmir. He stated this position on
the eve of ,his election. It would be a leap forward towards
independence in the running of South Asian affairs if Nawaz Sharif
in Islamabad and Inder Gujral in Delhi, who have had a fruitful
exchange at Male on Indo-Pak relations, could ignore such
declarations and offers and themselves continue the "evolving
process" of peace.
There is no proof as such that there was a conspiracy in 1947-48
relating to arrangements in J-K after its accession to India - the
legality of which Lord Mountbatten and Jawaharlal Nehru compromised
by making gratuitous commitments to the UN Security Council and to
Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan. But the circumstantial
evidence is not easy to brush aside. For example, the forces of
Pakistan as well as of India were commanded by British generals.
General Gracey commanded the Pakistan army and General Bucher
commanded the Indian army. Nobody seems however to have commented
on the patent absurdity of British generals under Whitehall's
control leading two armies at war with each other.
Mountbatten of course represented Whitehall. His silence then and
his compromising of the accession's legality do not cause surprise,
But what about Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad and the rest?
Evidently, nobody found the situation ridiculous. indeed,
commentators have since then reflect upon and analysed it with
almost ludicrous solemnity. Alastair Lamb, for example, could
write blandly in his Crisis in Kashmir that the rapid agreement on
the ceasefire by July 1949 "was due to the fact that in late 1948
the commanders of the armies of both India and Pakistan were still
British ... (They) had remained in close touch...." The echo of
guffaws probably still rolls down Britain's corridors of power.
In his 1973 work, Debacle in Baltistan, Skumar Mahajan gives an
eyewitness account ofthe way in which Lt-Col. Sher Jing Thapa, who
commanded the small force at Skardu, was consistently denied
reinforcement from Srinagar. He surrendered on August 14, 1948,
and "India presented Baltistan and its adjoining areas to Pakistan
on a platter". Prof. F. M. Hassnain of Srinagar, in his Gilgit:
the Northern a of India (1978), details how a British officer,
Major Brown, organised a revolt of the Gilgit Scouts against the
governor of Gilgit Wazarat and sent telegrams to the authorities in
Peshawar confirming his success. He then handed over control of
the Wazarat to Pakistan.
It has been noted often that whenever there is even the slightest
movement in Delhi and Islamabad towards discussing their
differences the big powers hasten to 'activise" Kashmir.
Coinciding with the Male meeting of the Indo-Pak Prime Ministers
came reports of Kashmir being on the agenda of talks between Blair
and Clinton due later this month. Ale Pakistani President, on a
pre-appointed visit to China, was welcomed even more warmly than
usual, with loud promises of augmented military supplies. And one
would very much like to know, which power group direct at precisely
such moments activity like the recent shelling of Kargil, which
could have been intended to but did not sabotage the Gujral-Sharif
meeting at Male?
Most big nations would seem to be interested in keeping India and
Pakistan apart, some for continuing lucrative arms and sales and
some also, like China, to check emergence of another power centre.
For stable prosperity, India and Pakistan will have to move
together independently towards abiding peace.
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