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The Gujral Doctrine is making a big impression in the United States.
Many of the American South Asia hands, whom this writer recently met at
a series of conferences in the U.S., are unstinting in their praise of
Mr. Gujral for having transformed the political dynamic in the
subcontinent. These officials give high marks for his sensitive
handling of the new opportunities for improving ties with Pakistan, and
his performance at the recent Male summit of the South Asian heads of
state.
The outgoing Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs in the
Clinton administration, Ms. Robin Raphel, in a recent speech at the
Princeton University, claimed with considerable justification that
Washington was among the "most vociferous fans of India's recent efforts
to reach out to its neighbours". She also concedes that the Gujral
Doctrine was launched "not because of outside pressure, but because
India understands that this approach is in its own interest".
Whatever the motivation, India's good neighbourly policy could help
reshape the U.S. approach to the subcontinent and rewrite the current
assumptions in Washington. The American emphasis on "even-handedness"
between India and Pakistan after the Cold War has been seen in New Delhi
as an attempt to equate the two countries despite the vast differences
in their size and potential. Indian policy-makers saw this as part of a
U.S. "design" to deny New Delhi its rightful place under the
international sun and link it forever with Pakistan.
To be sure, the commercial interests in the U.S. began to look at India
in the early 11990s as a big emerging market with attractive economic
opportunities. This was critical in the decision of the Clinton
administration in mid-1994 to engage India across a broad front.
The results of this engagement were limited, however, by the difficult
regional politics of the subcontinent. The intensification of the
Indo-Pak. dispute over Kashmir and the U.S. policy on nuclear and
missile proliferation tended to reinforce the notion of parity between
India and Pakistan. But an American approach based on parity has become
increasingly, unsustainable, thanks to the growing economic
differentiation between the two countries in the late Nineties.
India has overcome a major macro-economic crisis and now appears set on
the path of high economic growth rates. But Pakistan is now caught in
the midst of a debilitating economic crisis.
Analysts in the U.S. familiar with the Pakistani economy are pessimistic
about Islamabad's ability to make the structural adjustments required to
manage the crisis. Without breaking the hold of the landed aristocracy
on the economy and making decision-making for more representative of the
emerging political classes, they argue, it may not be possible to turn
around the economy.
Despite the bold efforts by Mr. Nawaz Sharif to set the house in order,
it will be a while before Islamabad steps out on a path of rapid
economic growth. In the near-term, then, the divergence between the
Indian and Pakistani economic strength is most likely to grow. Even if
the economies of the two countries grow at the same high rates in the
future, the gap will continue to increase. Given the substantial
disparity in the size of the economies. Pakistan's ability to match
India in the strategic areas will continue to diminish.
In short, Pakistan will have to run much faster than India even to
maintain the current distance between the two. If the military
establishment continues to believe in the principle of political parity,
it will be courting disaster. Mr. Sharif's willingness to loosen the
linkage between the Kashmir question and cooperation in mutually
beneficial areas is indeed a recognition of this reality.
In Washington, the gulf between the economic potential of India and
Pakistan, and hence the greater Indian weight in the American commercial
diplomacy were easily understood. But the political context of South
Asia marked by a deepening cleavage between the two countries appeared
to drive the U.S. policy to the counter-intuitive direction of defining
a parity.
The Gujral Doctrine may have helped crack open the American paradigm of
parity. The Indian foreign policy establishment, the U.S. has been
convinced for long, did not possess a single creative bone. No one
really expected that New Delhi would ever seize the political high
ground in the subcontinent in favour of regional cooperation.
But that precisely is what Mr. Gujral did in his stint as Foreign
Minister in the 10-month government led by Mr. H.D. Deve Gowda. His
recognition that India needs to be more generous in the resolution of
its disputes with its neighbours and that New Delhi must be prepared to
give more in return for less has dramatically altered the tone and tenor
of its relations with them.
The Clinton administration was quick to welcome the Gujral Doctrine and
its positive impact on India's ties with Bangladesh and Nepal. But there
was scepticism in Washington over a similar breakthrough with Pakistan.
To its pleasant surprise, it now rinds that Mr. Gujral is leading India
into a deft but complicated manoeuvre with Pakistan that could open the
door to substantive economic interaction.
Some U.S. analysts argue that as India takes on a leadership role in the
economic integration of the subcontinent and seeks to reasonably manage,
if not resolve, its outstanding disputes with its neighbours, the notion
of parity between India and Pakistan could soon disappear from the
American framework.
As New Delhi builds on a constructive agenda for the subcontinent, these
experts argue, it will only be a matter of time before the U.S. begins
to acknowledge India's political primacy. It is not that India would
want such a certification.
But an India viewed as a responsible regional power that promotes a
positive agenda of cooperation in its neighbourhood is likely to have a
far greater space in its dealings with the great powers. More
important, India could then begin to engage the U.S. in a far more
self-confident manner than it does today.
The Gujral Doctrine also helps generate a subtle shift in the
subcontinental pecking order. One of its less noticed consequences is
the slow but sure rise of Bangladesh into the number two slot. Long
dismissed as a basket case, the country is on the verge of an economic
takeoff. In many areas, Bangladesh has better social indicators than
its larger neighbours. There is a growing international confidence in
its ability to sustain higher growth rates. If the proposed plan for
the sub-regional cooperation between the eastern parts of India,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan gets off the ground, Bangladesh could well
emerge as the next Asian Tiger.
Both on the list of Indian economic priorities and in the perception of
the international community, the weight of Bangladesh could steadily
increase and could become bigger than that of Pakistan. There are
indications in Washington that Dhaka is beginning to be sighted on the
American radar. Besides the economic opportunities, there are other
factors that could make Dhaka an exciting capital.
Bangladesh is one of the largest Islamic countries that has worked hard
to build a democratic society. its future role as a bridge between the
subcontinent and South East Asia gives it some strategic significance.
As the world struggles to cope with religious extremism, the country as
a moderate Islamic state wedded to modernism would eventually loom large
for both India and the U.S.
For far too long, many in India have assumed an inevitable clash of
geopolitical interests between New Delhi and Washington in the
subcontinent. The Gujral Doctrine and the American response to it
suggest that this need not be the case. An India that leads the
subcontinent towards cooperation could well liberate Indo-U.S. relations
from the Pakistan factor and pave the way for political cooperation
between New Delhi and Washington on a range of issues including security
in eastern and western parts of Asia.
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