Editorial
The Times of India
May 24, 1999
Title: Influx season Author: Editorial Publication: The Times of India Date: May 24, 1999 The massive infiltration of Pakistan-supported militants into Kashmir is to be expected in the summer months before the rains set in. There was infiltration last year, too, following the nuclear tests and that was effectively neutralised and contained by the Indian security forces. There was no reason to assume that the Pakistani army or the Inter-Services Intelligence had changed their agenda in regard to Kashmir, notwithstanding the Lahore spirit. It is possible that the Indian political uncertainty further encouraged elements in Pakistan who have a vested interest in sustaining insurgency in Kashmir. The 1965 infiltration - Operation Gibraltar - was carried out when the Pakistani leadership had an extremely poor image of the Indian Prime Minister and a dim view of India's internal situation. The 1971 crackdown on Bangladesh happened even as India was putting together a government after the elections. Again in 1989-90, there was a sharp escalation in insurgency in the aftermath of a new coalition government taking office in Delhi. It is in this context that the chief of army staff, General V P Malik, spoke about Possible security-related developments for which the country had to be prepared. The massive Kargil intrusion has validated his fears. The Pakistani expectation probably is based on the earlier modus operandi, that given its political preoccupations, India would not respond effectively. If so, they are totally mistaken as the Indian operation demonstrated. Earlier, Pakistan attempted to use cross-border infiltration and the consequent clashes across the line of control as a leverage to convince the United States that such clashes could escalate into a nuclear conflict and therefore the US should intervene in Kashmir issue. It suited the Western powers to talk of Kashmir as a nuclear Cashpoint. That tactic does not work any longer as infiltration attempts and clashes have been routinised to an extent where in the longer run there will be recognition about the limited nature and scope of these operations. From the point of view of crying nuclear wolf such operations have become increasing-Iv counter-productive as they are repeated. Unlike in the early '90s, most of the infiltrators today are outsiders who cannot get support from the local population. Consequently these operations are becoming self-limiting. Unlike countries in the West which would have used enormous air and fire power to quell trouble of this kind, Indian armed forces deal with insurgents with great restraint to minimise casualties. The policy towards Kashmir and continuance of insurgency through transborder operations are less under the control of prime minister Nawaz Sharif and more in the hands of the army and the ISI which operate as a state with-in a state. Mr Nawaz Sharif obtained the resignation of General Kara-mat and demonstrated civilian supremacy. But that has not stopped the Pakistani army from acting as the ultimate decision-maker on Pakistan's India policy, particularly in Kashmir. The crossborder insurgency has to be tackled through attrition for some more time till it is no longer cost effective for Pakistan. Lahore spirit, unfortunately, has not influenced the Pakistani army and Mr Nawaz Sharif is yet to become the effective decision-maker on foreign and defence policies. These may well be meant to indicate to him the limits of his power.
|
||