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AT long last the government came out with a three-phase plan of action to recover illegal arms. The so-called 'awareness and persuasion' stage has come to a close with nothing much to show for it, although the police officials have been juggling with statistics to prove that the effort has not been in vain. We have been told that the law enforcement agencies will eventually take the bull by the horn and not rely on voluntary surrender of illegal arms alone.
Given the government's track record of indecision and inaction in tackling the problem of rooting out violence from civil society, there is understandably a high degree of public scepticism about the efficacy of the on-going arms recovery operation. It is not merely a matter of raiding houses or apprehending the offenders; the government must demonstrate its political will to go the whole hog and without any holy cows to spare in the drive to flush out illegal arms.
The days are gone when law-abiding citizens in the country deemed it essential to secure a licence for keeping personal arms. Since the arms trade became a free-for-all venture and an extremely lucrative business, thanks to Zia-ul-Haq's collusion with the Americans to allow Islamic warriors from all over the world to converge on Pakistan en route to Soviet-occupied Afghanistan for jihad, weapons of all kinds - from Kalashnikovs to rocket-launchers - are freely available in the country's arms bazaar.
The traditional sources of locally-manufactured illegal arms, such as the Darra Adam Khel market, have since been marginalized. If you have the money you can acquire the choicest imported arms without much hassle, in all likelihood through a home-delivery service. Easy access to arms and virtually no penalty for possessing them has over the years made a mockery of whatever laws are there to regulate the arms trade in the country.
Regardless of assurances from high-ups that the arms recovery operation will neither be half-hearted nor selective, the apprehension remains that only the small fry will bear the brunt of the campaign, while the big fish will find ways and means of circumventing it. What makes the whole exercise a dicey business is the potential for confrontation with armed groups. Acquisition of weapons is no more an individual pursuit; there are groups of people banded together for one or the other cause in possession of lethal weapons, some of them engaged in organized crime and violence. Recovering illegal arms also entails disarming militant religious and sectarian factions.
The task facing the law enforcement agencies is therefore far more intricate than browbeating some local bullies or petty criminals into submission and calls for a no-holds-barred crackdown on the practitioners of organized crime and violence.
Sectarian warriors top the list of offenders who need to be given a shock therapy treatment. Routine police action in this regard will be of no avail, as the process is likely to be reduced to a wild-goose chase with neither any trace of weapons nor any clue about the culprits. There is no reason why the intelligence agencies, though popularly seen as white elephants, should not have a clear picture of the elements involved in sectarian killings. If there are only a handful of people actually involved in terror and violence, their modus operandi, linkages and hideouts should be fairly known to the intelligence agencies.
Any meaningful operation against illegal arms must necessarily aim at disabling hard-core fanatics in possession of arms and prone to using them for wanton killings. Among the sectarian warriors are some notorious killers wanted by the police for a long time but are still at large. If proclaimed offenders can manage to not only beat the law but also to remain visibly active, there is nothing to stop new recruits from swelling the ranks of sectarian militants.
The drive to seize illegal weapons, if and when carried out in right earnest and not merely as a PR exercise, will be just the beginning of a long and arduous process of eradicating the culture of violence that has struck deep root in the country. If the purpose is to secure peace, security and the rule of law in society, recovery of illegal arms, even if it was accomplished with flying colours, will be nothing more than a cosmetic operation unless it is accompanied by a simultaneous move to neutralize the mafias and numerous other criminal elements which have thrived on the proliferation of arms.
So long as fanatics, immune from reason and sanity, are free and able to regroup and act in pursuit of their criminal designs they can always rearm themselves. Equally crucial, therefore, is the need for a crackdown on the arms merchants, their supply routes and conduits. If they cannot be put out of business altogether for the present, their dealings should be made such a high-cost and high-risk venture that their role in providing easy access to arms is drastically cicrumscribed.
The jihadi groups have also contributed to the rise of militarist and chauvinistic tendencies in the country. Regardless of how sacrosanct is the cause for which they have been raising funds and procuring arms, their emergence on the country's political scene amounts to having all manner of private armies coming up to pose a challenge to civil society. For the present, these outfits may not be directly involved in the country's internal politics, and therefore some observers are prone to saying that they do not pose a threat to civil peace or social harmony. But who can vouch for their non-interference in domestic politics? If they get too big for their boots they may well turn their guns against those in authority whose policies and actions they do not like on ideological grounds or who they think are not Islamic' enough in orientation and outlook to qualify to be in power. No wonder, one has heard things about enforcing a Taliban-style system of governance in Pakistan, and consequently the lurking fear in some democratic quarters that Talibanization of Pakistan may in due course be the consensus agenda of the jihadi groups.
The jihadi groups represent a school of thought which believes in wagaing holy wars against infidels on every front, everywhere, regardless of the barriers of national frontiers. Given to a medieval outlook on the question of war and peace between nations and states, they are reckless enough to think in terms of taking on the whole world in pursuit of their own notion of religious duties. Gen. Musharraf himself took note of the disservice they have done to Pakistan's interest by making irresponsible statements like hoisting the Pakistani flag on Delhi's Red Fort. Needless to say, the rise of jihadi groups in Pakistan is seen abroad as a threat to regional and international peace and stability.
Although it has been rightly argued that the phenomenon of jihadi groups as a political force in Pakistan has been overblown, and that they are nowhere close to taking over power in the country, the fact remains that these groups have acquired a veto on vital national policy decisions. For instance, making peace with India is held unpatariotic and sacrilegous and therefore opposed by the jihadi groups, or whenever there is any suggestion of rectifying some of the retrogressive legal aberrations of the Zia-ul-Haq era the argument against it has always been the possibility of a backlash from the fundamentalist forces.
Opinions are divided on what exactly is the military establishment's equation with the jihadi groups. There have been plenty of accusations against the army, the IJI in particular of a collusion between the two on certain issues, including Afghanistan. Some critics are of the view that at least a section of the top brass is sympathetic to the cause of the jihadi groups, either for ideological reasons or as a strategic imperative for national security.
However, it is inconceivable that the GHQ is unmindful of the trouble that these elements can cause both internally and externally - more so if they are left free to grow into a parallel power centre, arrogating to themselves the right to challenge the authority of the state.
It is pertinent to recall what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said in 1972 as he ordered a crackdown on agitating industrial workers resorting to direct action in defiance of state authority. 'Henceforth the power of the street will be met by the power of the state', he declared, even though he was threatening direct action against his own constituency. Needless to say, the military regime will have to, sooner than later, begin to rein in those who choose to defy law and authority in the name of serving the cause of religion or ideology.
Purging civil society of the evil of arms proliferation will at best be a corrective measure to reinforce the writ of law and ensure a modicum of peace and security for the citizens. A multi-dimensional strategy is, however, called for to strike at the roots of the culture of violence. >From a long-term perspective, a process of reorientation of values and attitudes is needed to help create an environment of tolerance and accommodation in society. No one should be allowed to arrogate to himself the right to force his point of view on others or sit in judgment over the religious or patriotic credentials of others.
We must learn to live and let live
in order to save society from friction, disorder and fragmentation. It
is essential to wage a battle against fanaticism and intolerance, the rampant
negative tendencies in our ranks which have over the years nurtured and
nourished the culture of violence in the country.
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