|
|
|
|
|
Author: Kuldip Nayar
Publication: Dawn
Date: June 24, 2006
URL: http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/24/op.htm#2
If the number of bus services started between India and Pakistan was the criterion for judging their relationship, the latter would have been considered normal. The fact is that the enthusiasm over the inauguration of a bus service does not last beyond the duration of the ceremony.
Many bus services have been started - I have lost the count - but they generally carry more officials and staff than passengers. There are too many hassles - an unending series of checks and rechecks, besides the inconvenience of going to Islamabad and New Delhi, as the case may be, to get a visa for the bus journey. I wish the two governments would explain the purpose behind this frustrating and non-productive exercise. I find people-to-people contact lessening, not increasing.
Apart from the bureaucratic lethargy, the recurring violence in Kashmir is pouring cold water on whatever work has been done to improve relations between the two countries. Who is instigating the militants or, more aptly, who is using them to sabotage the peace parleys? Many such questions bewilder the public. The bigger worrying point is: how does violence help to solve the Kashmir problem?
This is not the first time that the militants have gone haywire. They go over the exercise every now and then throwing bombs in crowded places or shooting indiscriminately at people, including women and children. The security forces respond to the incidents, equally ruthlessly, caring little for the violation of human rights. At times, the security forces have themselves been the cause of violence. One side blames the other. This vicious circle has continued for almost two decades.
I thought that the militants or their masters would have realised by this time that no amount of violence is going to force India to consent to something which it does not want to agree to. If anything, violence has made the Indian mind more determined than before. The process began after the Kargil war.
The recent killing of pilgrims and labourers, when shown on TV, gave rise to a sense of horror throughout the country. Tourists who had flocked in thousands quitted the valley quickly. An average Kashmiri is finding it difficult. What he earned from visitors meets his yearly bill and also provides him with some leeway for the winter when he produces handicrafts and woollen shawls and carpets.
True, the militants do not want normality to return lest Kashmir goes out of the world's gaze. But how does it matter whether the problem is on the backburner or on the front one? Kashmir is at the point where it was decades ago. The only thing which has happened in the meanwhile is that thousands of people have been killed. The militants have alienated more Indians than before. Still worse is the communal dimension that the problem has acquired, restricting the space of secular Kashmiriyat.
I concede that the parties concerned - Kashmiris, Indians and the Pakistanis - have to agree among themselves for a settlement. But this does not seem to be coming in the near future. What will happen until then? Even a layman will admit that individual and state terrorism have to stop for a congenial atmosphere to evolve for talks. But here all three have a holier-than-thou attitude.
Let me begin with the Kashmiris. They are at best indifferent to the militants, if they are not their sympathisers. Once in a while, I hear words of condemnation from JKLF leaders. The Hurriyat too chips in at times. The Abdullahs and Muftis, when in power, are worked up against the militants. But once they are not rulers, they rationalise their acts. In fact, I find a conspiracy of silence among political parties in Kashmir. The Congress is no exception. Otherwise, it is difficult to comprehend why the militants get shelter in Srinagar itself.
My suspicion is that political elements in Kashmir have come to develop a vested interest in terrorism. They feel that it acts as pressure on India. Probably, it does. The idea of the roundtable conference of militants (called separatists) and others cropped up only after violence cut a swathe through Kashmir.
India's own response to terrorism suffers from a particular slant. There is more dependence on the army than the political machinery even though the top brass has characterised Kashmir as a military problem. This may well be the reason why the proposal for demilitarisation is not taking off. Even otherwise, when violence remains unchecked, no government can afford to take a chance, even though the groundswell of opinion is in its favour in the valley.
New Delhi is convinced that Islamabad has not given up terrorism as an option and "retains" the training camps and recruitment centres. Pakistan does not seem to understand the compulsions of a democratic system. The militants cannot hijack it with attacks here and there. Parliament is in no way cowed down by the attack on it. I am afraid New Delhi is not getting the Kashmir problem right. True, there are separatists in the state and I do not rule out Pakistan's assistance to them. But that is only a part of the problem.
The real problem is the people's alienation. Sheikh Abdullah, who was instrumental in integrating Jammu and Kashmir with India, told New Delhi as far back as 1952 that the Kashmiris should never be made to look like supplicants in the Delhi durbar.
He said his people would rather starve than accept India's wheat given as charity or gift. The state had acceded to the Union of India on only three subjects: defence, foreign affairs and communications. Sheikh Abdullah did not want New Delhi's encroachment in any other field. His straight talk cost him not only the state's prime ministership but also some 12 years of his life in detention in Kodaikanal in the south.
With his exit, New Delhi, under the very nose of his friend, Jawaharlal Nehru, changed the complexion of Kashmir and disfigured its identity on the plea that all the states in the country had to have, more or less, uniformity. Despite the limit of three subjects New Delhi usurped much more authority.
Worse, after the Sheikh's detention, the chief minister of Kashmir was first selected by Delhi and then imposed on the people through elections. The state never had free polls except in 1977 when the Sheikh swept the polls.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was wrong when he sent a letter to the state chief minister to justify the Sheikh's arrest. Nehru realised his mistake. But by then the damage had been done. The country is still paying for it.
The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.
 |
|
|
