K.P. Nayar
The Telegraph
June 16, 1999
Title: INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT Author: K.P. Nayar Publication: The Telegraph Date: June 16, 1999 One of the lesser known aspects of the visit to New Delhi of the Pakistani foreign minister, Sartaj Aziz, last week was that Islamabad made the most of his one day stay in India. The minister brought along with him - and sent to New Delhi ahead of him - an assortment of people from different walks of life with wide and varied personal contacts in the capital. While Aziz was engaged by the Indian external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, in talks which were doomed to end in a stalemate, his compatriots spread across New Delhi and engaged in chores which were ostensibly social. They renewed old contacts, dropped in on friends or professional associates of long standing and were wined or dined by their hospitable Indian hosts. But the objective of all this social interaction was just one. With a single-mindedness rarely associated with the south Asian character, all those who came from Pakistan to New Delhi - officially, unofficially, professionally - set about finding out whatever they could about how India obtained tapes of two conversations between Pakistan's chief of army staff and chief of general staff when the former was away in Beijing. If anyone in India had any doubts about the veracity of what those tapes contained, all that was needed was to talk to some of those who were in New Delhi from Pakistan during the weekend. Nothing this columnist has seen in the long years he has dealt with Pakistanis professionally has quite matched the Pakistani reaction to the release of the transcripts of General Pervez Musharraf's telephone conversation with General Mohammed Aziz. In the past too, India has had many intelligence coups via a vis Pakistan. The P.V. Narasimha Rao government, for instance, obtained documents from Islamabad which conclusively proved Pakistan's involvement in the Mumbai serial bomb blasts in 1993. On the basis of written evidence that Nawaz Sharif - then prime minister as well - personally cleared the Mumbai blasts, Rao subsequently tackled Sharif when the two met in Dhaka at a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit. Similarly, India has not only tracked visits by the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, to certain sensitive countries, it has also obtained transcripts of what Khan said at some of his meetings in those countries. Some of these tapes are worth a million times their weight in gold. The Pakistanis have come to know about some of these intelligence coups, more often than not, from India's "friends" with whom intelligence data were shared, perhaps unwisely. Yet nothing India has done vis a vis Pakistan has rattled Islamabad so badly as the tapes released by Jaswant Singh on Friday. There is more to this Pakistani nervousness than the contents of just two tapes released by Singh. It is Islamabad's worry that if India released these two tapes, then intelligence agencies in New Delhi must be in possession of a lot more sensitive information on what is going on in Pakistan. These fears have been reinforced by the uncomfortable realisation at the army general headquarters in Rawalpindi that the tapes released by Singh are not complete. They were edited to remove some sensitive information: the Indian government has told the public only what it wants the public to know. Such discretion has made the Pakistanis realise that India's idea in making the conversation public was not a desire to sensationalise the issue of civilian control - or lack of it - over Rawalpindi. Nor was it trying to gloat over its intelligence coup. If this had been the case, the tapes would not have been edited at all. The Indian reaction to the mutilation of its captured soldiers also made Islamabad realise that New Delhi was not trying to make capital out of the tragedy along the line of control. If India wanted to do so or to whip up war hysteria within the country all that was required was to release photographs of the mutilated bodies or at least be more descriptive about Pakistan's barbarism. In the aftermath of the Aziz visit, what Pakistan fears, therefore, is India's restraint, its discretion and its determination to play by the rules. It contrasts sharply with what the world now knows about Pakistan's aggression across the LoC and its militant support for the taliban-type mujahedin, who are perched on the hills in Drass, Batalik and Mashkoh. Pakistan fears India's restraint and discretion all the more because it believes that these are dictated by a full and complete knowledge of what is going on across the LoC, especially in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. This is why the Pervez Musharraf-Mohammed Aziz tapes are important. They have given India the kind of psychological superiority over Pakistan which - to talk cynically - only a complete flattening of Lahore or Islamabad through aerial bombing could have achieved. Even without the tapes, the Pakistanis are aware the Bharatiya Janata Party led government knows far too much about the present equations in the Pakistani government to feel comfortable. Such knowledge gives India much more power over its adversary in the Kargil conflict than at any time in recent years. Rawalpindi knows, for instance, that at their very first meeting in Colombo last year, the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, made it clear to his Indian counterpart, Atal Behari Vajpayee, that he was tired of having his foreign policy captive to the personal whims and obsessions of his then foreign minister, Gohar Ayub Khan. The occasion arose when Vajpayee proposed, as soon as the two delegations met, that the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers should talk alone. Sharif was happy to rid the meeting of Khan and said so. None of the newspersons from New Delhi who went with Vajpayee to Colombo believed perceptive Indian officials who told them after the Vajpayee-Sharif meeting that Khan would be moved out of the foreign ministry in weeks. But this was precisely what happened. In Colombo, Khan was the darling of the army. Moreover, his brother in law was then in the line of succession for the job which eventually went to Musharraf. The army could have forgiven Sharif for getting rid of Jehangir Karamat, Musharraf's predecessor. He represented the present, almost fading into the past. Khan and his brother in law, on the other hand, represented the future, a future which was also tied to Kashmir because of Khan's role as foreign minister and his deepseated anti-Indianism. Even without the tactical and military reasons which demanded that the Aziz mission was a failure from the Pakistan army's standpoint, Rawalpindi would have wanted a deadlock in the India-Pakistan diplomatic engagement. The stalling of the "composite talks" between India and Pakistan was the price the army had sought for the way Sharif endorsed Vajpayee's decision in Colombo to throw Khan out of his first interaction with Pakistan as the BJP led coalition's prime minister. For Rawalpindi, Kargil is merely a logical extension of the decision taken by Pakistan's three service chiefs on the eve of Vajpayee's arrival at the Wagah border to boycott his welcome ceremony.
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