K Subrahmanyam
The Times of India
June 21, 1999
Title: Threat to Global Peace Author: K Subrahmanyam Publication: The Times of India Date: June 21, 1999 Introduction: Core Issue Pakistan, not Kashmir THERE is a lot of justified speculation and concern in this country about the pressure on the Indian Army to cross the Line of Control, how long this border conflict will last and whether it will escalate. As is characteristic of the Indian political class and its mindset, the focus is on ourselves and what we will be doing. But this conflict was imposed on India by the deliberate aggression of Pakistan. If India were to behave like other countries which have been sovereign for much longer periods than we have, our attention should be on what Pakistan's next move will be. Plan that Failed Will it accept the international community's exhortations and wind down its aggression or will it escalate the conflict? What India should do and whether the conflict will be prolonged depend not on this country but on Pakistan. This inability and unwillingness of our political class to study, analyse and assess the other country's motivation, moves and aims are at the root of all our national security failures in the last 50 years. Pakistan's aim in initiating this aggression is obvious. It was intended to internationalise the Kashmir issue as per the Pakistani framework. It was carried out at a time when Pakistan thought the Indian leadership, preoccupied with the forthcoming elections, would be weak and indecisive. Presumably it thought that its massive intrusion would cut the Srinagar-Leh road and simultaneously the mercenaries it had already placed in different locations would strike, paralysing the Indian security forces and the Kashmir administration. Now Pakistan knows this plan has failed. The Indian response was both firm and restrained. The air strikes were launched, but both ground and air operations were confined to Indian territory except for retaliatory artillery fire. The most disappointing development for Pakistan was the recognition of leading nations that there was a definite aggression by Pakistan across the LoC and their consequent unwillingness to internationalise the Kashmir issue as per Pakistan's prescription. Therefore, our efforts should focus on assessing the alternative options open to Pakistan in the light of this situation. Pakistan may escalate the situation by sending in more intruders and supplies across the LoC. Pakistan may broaden and open new fronts. It can trigger a major sabotage and terrorist campaign in Kashmir and elsewhere in India. It can even initiate a limited conflict across the international border and use it to resort to nuclear blackmail. Last, if good sense prevails, Pakistan can quietly wind down its aggression and call it a day. The Indian response should be tailored to ensure that in any of these cases its action should contain Pakistan's aggression and prevent a possible escalation. Even if the Pakistan army and Mr Nawaz Sharif had been together in planning and unleashing the aggression in Kargil, their interests in respect of further escalation and their reactions to international pressures may not necessarily be the same. Pakistan has kept itself an exit route. Since it has not acknowledged that its own army is involved in the aggression, winding it up may not pose any problem in terms of loss of face. However, the launch of this aggression and its becoming counterproductive will have serious after-effects in the army-government relationship. While India may have legitimate reservations over internationalising the Kashmir issue in traditional terms, it cannot have any over internationalising the problem of a state like Pakistan posing a threat to international peace and security. According to Pakistan's own admission, its security forces cannot control the thousands of armed mercenaries who are causing domestic problems in that country besides indulging in international terrorism. Many of these terrorist groups are financed by the proceeds of narcotics traffic. Their extremism and fundamentalism are not only evident in the atrocities of the Taliban against Afghan women but also in the torture and mutilation of captured Indian Army personnel. Nuclear Status Therefore, this is the appropriate time for the Indian government to focus on the problems posed to international peace and stability by the state of Pakistan which is moving economically towards becoming a ``failed state''. It should be pointed out that Pakistan is poliitically unstable, involved i narcotics traffic, international terrorism and generates and harbours a large number of religious extremists. There is a strong assumption in India that the US-Pakistan bonds are unbreakable and, therefore, India raising the issue will lead to the US and its allies siding with Pakistan. That assumption gives too much credit to the sense of loyalty of both countries and their commitment to each other. In international politics, such commitments are rare. The anti-American feeling in Pakistan runs deep and the US has never been known to be loyal to any ally at the cost of its own interests. In India, there are still fixed ideas that the US-Pak, US-China and Pak-China relationships -- which were developed during the Cold War -- are immutable. In international politics, few relationships remain unaltered over a period of time -- especially those which were developed out of highly opportunistic considerations. Pakistan no longer serves a useful purpose for the United States as it did during the Cold War era and during the period of intense US hostility towards Iran. Though elements in the Pentagon are still nostalgic about past links with the Pakistani military, there are increasing worries elsewhere in the US administration about the growing Islamisation of the Pakistani armed forces. The US was used to a docile Pakistan and yet Pakistan belied that assumption by becoming overtly nuclear. The aggression in Kargil is a symptom of further Pakistani defiance of the US and an assertion of its autonomous nuclear status. A defiant nuclear Pakistan involved in international terrorism, narcotics traffic, money laundering and Islamic terrorism has very little use for the US. Mutuality of Interests Similarly, Pakistan was a convenient tool for China to keep India countervailed within the subcontinent. The overt nuclearisation of the subcontinent and Pakistan's roguish behaviour which can pose similar threats to China in Xinjiang must make China reconsider seriously the utility of its relationship with Pakistan. What happens in Kargil today can be re-enacted across Mintaka and Kunjerab passes. It is high time India seriously re-evaluated its long-held assumptions on Pakistan's utility to the US and China. We must explore the possibilities of developing a better understanding on a mutuality of interests with the US and China, however limited their scope may be.
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