Statesman News Service
The Statesman
June 24, 1999.
Title: Top Pak Generals shared the secret Author: Statesman News Service Publication: The Statesman Date: June 24, 1999. NEW DELHI, June 23. - The Pakistan Army had meant to keep its plans for the Kargil intrusions a secret shared by just a few top generals, and with only an "in principle concurrence" obtained from the Prime Minister, India said today. Plans for the operation were probably made as early as September 1998, though it was executed only towards the end of April, a government document has suggested. The Generals who knew about the Army plan were: Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Chief of General Staff, Director General Military Operations, GOC 10 Corps and GOC Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) who was made overall in-charge of operations in the Kargil sector. Even the Corps Commanders were not in the picture, which is substantiated by the taped telephone conversations between Pakistan Chief of Army Staff and his deputy. The idea was to keep the plan closely under wraps, taking into confidence as few people as possible, and avoid any activity opposite Kargil that might alert India to the Pakistani Army's intentions. The "in principle concurrence" to be obtained from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif would not involve "any specifics". A cover plan was to be kept in readiness to obfuscate the aggression, and appear to defuse escalation within a short time. The intrusion plan hinged on exploiting large gaps in defences in the sector, on both sides of the LoC. The Pakistani Army also banked on the usual Indian practice of opening Zoji La pass towards end-May or beginning of June, which would make for a late Indian reaction. As it happened, the pass was opened for troop induction in early May and the Indian reaction was far swifter and more vigorous than Pakistan had expected. "We do not think that Pakistan, while starting on the venture, reckoned on the level of Indian resolve in their calculations," the government has said. The artillery which was inducted into the FCNA during the heavy exchange of fire in July-September 1998 was not de-inducted, the government has said. Fresh troops were not moved into the area since that would draw India's attention. No reserve formations or units were moved in until after the plan was executed; after that, nearly a whole brigade was moved in to create reserves. The administrative bases were to be catered to from existing defences and the logistic lines of communication were to be along the ridge lines and the nullahs, well away from the tracks and positions of Indian troops. Four independent groups were created from four infantry battalions, the 3,4,5 and 6 battalions of the Northern Light Infantry, and two companies of Special Service Group were already in the area. For a modicum of air defence capability, the groups were allotted shoulder fired Air Defence Missiles of the Stinger variety, coupled with the 12.7 mm Air defence machine guns integral to the NLI battalions. The Pakistani artillery - 20 batteries - was to provide fire support to the intruding groups from across the LoC. Each intrusion had the support of three-four batteries. Observation post officers from the Pakistan Army were also grouped along with line and radio communication. Soldiers from each battalion and militants provided logistical support. Members of Laskar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Afghan war veterans were grouped with each battalion, to give the operation a facade of jihad. Following the intrusions, 800 or more militants have been moved to the Skardu area for reinforcements. The plan was put into operation towards the end of April. The main groups were broken into a number of sub-groups of 30 to 40 each to carry out multiple intrusions along the ridge lines, and occupy dominating heights with approximately 200 in Batalik, Dras and Mashkoh Valley sectors and around 100 in Kaksar. The intrusions, it was thought, if effective, would enable Pakistani troops to secure heights from where the Srinagar-Leh highway could be controlled at a number of points. This would give Pakistan control over a substantial piece of ground across LoC and enable it to negotiate from a position of strength, alter the status of the LoC and internationalise the Kashmir issue.
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