Surendra Munshi
The Telegraph
June 28, 1999
Title: Their Feudal Lords Author: Surendra Munshi Publication: The Telegraph Date: June 28, 1999 Just before his visit to India, the foreign minister of Pakistan, Sartaj Aziz, said in Islamabad that while his country had always respected the line of control, India had always violated it. He moved a resolution in Pakistan's national assembly that was unanimously adopted. It condemned the "unprovoked" shelling, rocketing and air intrusions by India into Pakistan's side of the LoC. The resolution also deplored the repression that was unleashed on the people of Kashmir, and it reiterated the continued political, moral and diplomatic support of Pakistan to the struggle of the Kashmiri people. And then came the handing over to India of mutilated and disfigured bodies of six Indian soldiers who were held captive by Pakistan for a month. When India decided to show restraint and to go ahead with the scheduled talks between the two foreign ministers, Aziz came to India and refused to acknowledge any role in the intrusions that had taken place in Kargil. He saw in these intrusions Kashmiri mujahedin fighting their own war. Believing in the "sanctity" of the Shimla agreement, he asked India to halt heavy shelling and air-strikes to defuse the tension in Kargil. India had already released by then the transcript of telephone conversations between the Pakistan army chief and his deputy that were believed to have taken place on May 26 and 29. It is clear from these conversations that the military establishment has kept the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, the foreign minister, Aziz, and the foreign secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, in the picture, laying down the course of action and expecting Aziz to act as dictated. His brief was to keep the option of dialogue open without giving any commitment on the military situation. He was not to even accept a cease-fire. As far as the LoC is concerned, doubts were raised to the advantage of Pakistan and the dispute was given the colour of an Indian attack on their side of the LoC. Did the Mi-17 helicopter fall in their area? "No, sir," said Lieutenant-General Mohammed Aziz to his chief. 'This has fallen in their area. We have not claimed it. We have got it claimed through the mujahedin". He had said earlier that "the scruff (tooti) of their [militants'] neck is in our hands". The story about Pakistan's deception and doublespeak goes back to the earliest days. Tribal raiders invaded Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 for whom Pakistan refused to own any responsibility till its involvement and the direct participation of its regular army could no longer be denied. The brutality of that period is still remembered in Kashmir, as is the sacrifice of the local hero, Sherwani, in resisting the attack. Even M.K. Gandhi, the apostle of peace, could not overlook the role of Pakistan, nor deny the responsibility of the Indian army in defending Kashmir from external attack. A ceasefire line came into being under the direction of the United Nations in early 1949. Pakistan honoured it by continued violations. In 1965 infiltrators were used yet again in an attempt to take over Kashmir. When this too failed, the CFL was restored by the Tashkent accord of the Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the Pakistani president, Ayub Khan. In 1971, during the Bangladesh war, Pakistan again opened the front in Jammu and Kashmir and it proved costly for it. After the surrender of Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, a ceasefire was declared. This led to the Shimla accord that was signed in 1972, incorporating an LoC. This line was drawn on maps and defined in words, duly agreed upon and jointly signed. Both countries resolved by the accord to respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and to abstain from interference in each other's internal affairs. Both sides further agreed to respect the LoC and to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of the line. Pakistan has abused this accord in many ways all these years. Yet Pakistan has been able to get away with all its doublespeak. It is only now that it finds itself exposed internationally. Overwhelming evidence points to its direct role in the undeclared war in Kargil that has required much advanced planning. The Pakistani army appears to have admitted after weeks of denials through its spokesman, Brigadier Rashid Qureshi, that its soldiers have been involved all along in the battle. It has owned up to what has been aptly termed, its "great Kargil lie". Statements from Washington, Moscow, Cologne and Berlin indicate that Pakistan has not been able to sell its story this time. The United States president, Bill Clinton, has asked Sharif to pull out of Kargil. There are reports the US may go public with more evidence of the direct involvement in Kargil of the government of Pakistan, its army and intelligence services. That the Kargil crisis is the creation of the mujahedin has not been accepted. Why has Pakistan indulged in this adventure? It has been argued that the Pakistani game plan is to open the whole question of the territories so that the LoC may be altered. Through the appearance of a positional dispute an attempt is being made to raise a territorial dispute. Other reasons that have been noted are gaining strategic locations, controlling the important Srinagar-Leh highway, blocking Indian access to Siachen and creating a new route for infiltration into the Kashmir valley. Yet another reason noted is that an attempt is being made to bring back Kashmir as an international issue, all the more important in view of the normalcy that has been returning to the valley. All these reasons are plausible. Yet this move has to be seen in its proper context. It will be a mistake to consider this undeclared war as a replacement for the proxy war Pakistan has been carrying out in the Kashmir valley. It has to be emphasized that this war is meant to bolster that proxy war, primarily through the infusion of fresh mercenaries with more advanced weapons. These are then two wars that Pakistan has waged against India over Kashmir. It has systematically tried to keep the proxy war alive by sending infiltrators from outside and also by creating terrorists from within. The act of creating terrorists within has been carried out by terror and temptation, thus acting on the primary instincts of fear and greed. It is for anyone to see how weapons and money are flowing into the valley. Pakistani strategists understand well that a situation of terror breeds terrorism, and this has been exploited in provoking retaliations from the Indian forces. Moreover, systematic attempts have been made to introduce the ideology of Muslim fundamentalism from outside, an ideology that is alien to the culture of Muslim saints who have flourished in Kashmir. Pakistani compulsions are the compulsions of an oligarchy dominated by the top brass of the armed forces which rules in its own interest and over which the people exert hardly any influence. This oligarchy has learnt since the time of Ayub Khan to use democracy as a household drudge to be dismissed at will. It has also learnt to use Islam as an instrument of central power. This is an oligarchy of aggressive Punjabis who constitute the dominant ethnic group of Pakistan and who look upon other ethnic groups, including Kashmiris, with contempt. It is in the interest of this oligarchy to keep the conflict with India alive so that the prominence and privileges of the armed forces may be protected. Pakistan spends on military expenditure by way of percentage of gross national product more than double of what India spends, while its record with respect to expenditure on health and education is much worse than that of India. Its finance minister, Ishaq Dar, has stated that the defence budget may be further increased beyond the announced 10.9 per cent increase in the 1999-2000 budget, keeping an eye on the existing scenario at the LoC. To this oligarchy the Islamic state of Pakistan constitutes its ideological justification and the Indian secular state a threat of negation. Here are the true successors of the two-nation theory whose greatest misfortune would be if India were to hand over Kashmir to them on a platter. For then they would have to find other sources of conflict to keep themselves in power. (The author teaches sociology at the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta)
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