K.K. Katyal
The Hindu
June 14, 1999
Title: The neighbourhood diplomacy Author: K.K. Katyal Publication: The Hindu Date: June 14, 1999 Introduction: India's dealings with Pakistan will never be the same again. New Delhi will have to take into account the betrayal of the trust reposed in the leadership in Islamabad not along ago. Sharply contrasting patterns are indicated by three major contacts between India and its neighbours - the India-Pakistan talks on Kargil last weekend, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh's visit to China and the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's presence in Dhaka for the inauguration of a bus service between India and Bangladesh this week. Highly significant, each case will go a long way in moulding the next phase of the neighbourhood diplomacy, In the case of Bangladesh, it will be a confirmation of the existing close relationship and an important step towards strengthening it. In the case of China, the first visit by an Indian External Affairs Minister after eight years coincides with repairing the damage to mutual ties wrought in the recent past. The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz's discussions with Mr. Jaswant Singh - in a crisis atmosphere overshadowed by disclosures of Islamabad's complicity in the Kargil operations - reflected the new, intractable complexities that had been evident since last month. India's dealings with Pakistan will never be the same again. New Delhi will have to take into account the betrayal of the trust reposed in the leadership in Islamabad not long ago. The realisation that Pakistan's armed forces were busy plotting against India when their Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, was affixing his signature on the Lahore Declaration and when the bus diplomacy appeared to promise a reversal of the adversarial past has rudely jolted India, causing incalculable harm to its psyche. No government here, present or future, will accept Pakistan's professions at face value. Instead, there will be an insistence on foolproof, firm guarantees to guard against a mismatch between words and deeds. Mr. Sartaj Aziz came and went back. He followed an agenda, carefully scripted in advance, and made use of the brief stay to put across his government's viewpoint to the media. India prevented his game plan to diffuse the focus from the immediate problem in Kargil. He was not left in doubt that what India wanted was not an open-ended dialogue but a response to its suggestions - for vacating the aggression and bringing to book those responsible for the torture of Indian soldiers in Pakistan's custody. He had to convey the Indian stand to Mr. Sharif and tell New Delhi about his response. To that extent, the move to obfuscate the central issue was prevented. But there was nothing to suggest that Pakistan would have second thoughts on the maximal position adopted by it in the hope of getting something in the bargain. However, even the minimum will be unacceptable to New Delhi. Major challenges are ahead of India, both in the military and diplomatic fields. Mr. Jaswant Singh's trip to Beijing is doubly important - as the culmination of one phase of bilateral relationship and the beginning of another. The steady improvement in ties, that had begun in December 1988 with the visit to China by the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was thwarted last year, first by the interpretations put on the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes' statements and later by Beijing's strong reaction to India's nuclear tests. The resulting tensions have now been tackled and the way has been paved for resuming the interrupted process. The Chinese officials, think-tanks and non-officials took the Minister's comments in their stride but they could not reconcile themselves to India's nuclear reality. During a two-week trip to China in April last year - days before the Pokhran tests - I heard sharp references to Mr. Fernandes' remarks. But after expressing themselves, at times strongly, the interlocutors moved on to other aspects of the bilateral relationship. On the whole, theirs was a constructive approach as they discussed ways to upgrade ties. They were receptive to suggestions with one exception - they rejected the Indian view on China's supply of military hardware and nuclear technology to Pakistan. It was a different story after the nuclear tests. Beijing was highly perturbed (be-cause it lost its nuclear monopoly in Asia, apart from other reasons); it took strong exception to the rationale provided by Mr. Vajpayee, in a letter to the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton; it regards the tests as China-specific. In that bitter mood, evident in the tough line taken by it at the meetings of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) and of the Council, China called upon India to reverse its nuclear programme, not to proceed with missile development and to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (rejected by India as a discriminatory regime). Early this year, when the U.S. seemed to have reconciled itself to India's nuclear doctrine of a minimum, credible deterrence and was inclined to accommodate New Delhi's viewpoint, as part of a mutually reinforcing process, China stuck to its hard posture. Mr. Singh's talks with his counterpart, Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, may not lead to China coming to terms with India's nuclear status but Beijing will not let the shadow of Pokhran-II fall on its future dealings with India. Even on the nuclear issue, it may prefer engagement to confrontation. Despite the strains last year, peace on the Sino-Indian border was not disturbed, and the confidence-building measures not only remained intact but also worked effectively. This was a welcome sign of stability which helped the two sides get over the crisis period. It is not unrealistic to hope for an improvement in the bilateral field, focus of the current contacts. Also in evidence is their increased like-mindedness on global is-sues. China and India took an identical line on Kosovo and NATO's action, even while taking care not to give the impression of ganging up on any other power. Sino-U.S. relations have of late been subjected to pressures, what with the NATO hits on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the Cox report blaming China for espionage in sensitive technological areas, the U.S. security arrangements with Japan and Washington's Taiwan policy. All these may have weighed with China in stepping up contacts with India but the basic equation between Beijing and Washington remains unchanged. In the regional context, the special relationship between China and Pakistan will remain a factor to be reckoned with and may manifest itself in different forms. However, Beijing keeps an equidistance between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, calling on the two sides to resolve their problems through dialogue and peaceful means and in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. This does not mean total comfort to Islamabad. Because of the disenchantment with the bus diplomacy in relation to Pakistan, there may be a natural tendency to curb any euphoria over the start of the Calcutta-Dhaka bus service. But India's ties with Bangladesh have not been plagued by the problems of the type that disturbed its equation with Pakistan. It is, therefore, in order to be optimistic about the meaning of the new service for the growth of amity between New Delhi and Dhaka. Because of their asymmetry, anti-India sentiments come in handy for whoever is in the Op-position in Bangladesh but the many commonalties and shared interests out-weigh the negative factors. This is evident from the increased political understanding and closer economic ties, both in the bilateral and regional contexts. The Tin Bigha enclave controversy and the pro-longed stalemate in the talks on the sharing of Ganga waters are things of the past. As regards trade, the two sides have expanded the concessional tariff regime bilaterally, apart from the mechanisms under the auspices of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The improved ties between India and Bangladesh have helped the two sides deal with the activities of extremists who used the Bangladesh soil as either a springboard for anti-India activities or as a safe haven. The political-level understanding has stood the two in good stead. The three cases thus add up to a composite scenario, with mixed signals - two positive, one highly jarring.
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