Cutting Tape
A.K. Verma
The Telegraph
June 29, 1999
Title: Cutting Tape
Author: A.K. Verma
Publication: The Telegraph
Date: June 29, 1999
The release of tape recordings of two intercepted telephone
conversations between two Pakistani army generals was an electrifying
event. The tapes established beyond doubt certain basic truths
concerning the Pakistani misadventure in Kargil. One, that it was a
premeditated and carefully planned Pakistani military operation.
Second, the Pakistani army had not taken the top civilian leadership
of Pakistan into confidence before launching the operation. Third, the
army brass would dictate to the civilian leaders how the consequences
of the Kargil incursion would be handled, diplomatically or otherwise.
The underlying reality revealed by the tapes is that Pakistan
continues to be effectively ruled by its military under the guise of a
pseudo-democracy.
The release of the tapes produced a murmur of dismay among certain
quarters in India. They believed publication of the intercepts had
irretrievably compromised their source, that this constituted a
serious breach of security.
It is true a cardinal principle in intelligence work is never to
expose a source of information. Intelligence operatives would rather
not provide information if they believe their sources run a danger of
being exposed. The decision to release the intercepts in their
original form would therefore have been arrived at after considerable
anguished debate.
However, the principle cited above is not an absolute rule. While the
security of a source always remains a predominant consideration there
can be compelling situations, requiring the method of acquiring the
information to be disclosed, to reinforce the authenticity of the
information.
A pertinent parallel was the disclosure by the United States
government in 1983 of intercepted Soviet messages relating to the
shooting down of a South Korean passenger airliner by a Soviet air
force plane. The Soviet authorities had concluded the South Korean
plane, which had strayed from its approved flight route, was on an
intelligence mission. US spy planes had flown similar routes. Not
realizing the aircraft was a passenger liner, the Soviet authorities
ordered its destruction. US-Soviet rivalry being at its height at this
point, Washington wanted to show the world it was a case of cold
blooded murder of innocent civilians. By releasing the conversations
between the Soviet pilot and his controllers, who gave the order to
shoot, Washington scored propaganda points over the Soviets.
The reasons the Pakistani tapes were released were far weightier.
Most countries take diplomatic positions not on the merits or demerits
of an issue, but how they see it affecting what they perceive to be
their national interests. Many countries will turn a blind eye even
towards crucial issues if they believe their national interests would
be better served by such a posture.
It was necessary to prevent international indifference on the Kargil
issue. Therefore, incontrovertible evidence had to be made available
to prove Pakistani complicity. The tapes provided a testimony which
could not be ignored by capitals around the world. The favourable
assessment of the Group of Eight countries at their recent meeting was
no doubt influenced by this evidence.
For the past 51 years the dialogue with Pakistan has largely remained
a dialogue with the deaf. The tapes speak loud and clear why this has
remained so. The centre of power in democratic India has always been
the civilian leadership of the country. In Pakistan, power resides in
the general headquarters. No real channels of communication exist
between the two centres of power on policy matters. Undoubtedly during
the periods of martial law rule in Pakistan, the top ruler of the
country was a military personality. But he could not always carry the
GHQ with him. There have been instances of generals supporting a
decision taken by the top military personality, and then turning
against that decision the moment the top personality was gone.
The problem before India is with whom to carry out a substantive
dialogue. There is no solution to this problem in sight because
civilians as a rule do not talk to the military. The Pakistani case
calls for an exceptional treatment. Some way will have to be found to
make such a dialogue possible if any worthwhile progress is the
objective.
The defence minister, George Fernandes, had to face a lot of flak from
the opposition for his statement that the Pakistani prime minister had
not known of his army's intentions to carry out incursions in Kargil.
He must have wanted to vindicate his position through the tapes.
A closer look shows that the disclosure of the tapes is not such a
breach of security as it might look at first sight. It is common
knowledge that monitoring of electric and electronic signals is one of
the most basic tools of an intelligence organization. A number of such
organizations exist in India at the state and Central levels. Each one
has such capability.
Indian security authorities are acutely aware of the vulnerability of
their transmissions and are forever alerting officials about the
threats from interceptions. Despite such warnings, officials do throw
caution to the winds. This is exactly what the Pakistani generals did.
Any signal passing through cable or ether is liable to interception.
All countries try to capture these signals as they can provide
valuable political, diplomatic, economic or commercial information.
The advent of the cyberage has led to new levels of sophistication in
ferreting out information. Even codes do not necessarily provide
security.
The largest monitoring organization in the world is the US's national
security agency. No cable transmission can leave or enter the US
without the NSA having access to it. Its electronic monitoring
capabilities are formidable. The US's gargantuan reach is such that
any happening in the world of interest to Washington can be brought to
the notice of a US president within 10 minutes.
It is one thing to carry out interceptions, quite another to put the
intelligence obtained to proper use. There are innumerable recorded
cases of failure to use such information, leading to catastrophic
events. Intercepts had in advance revealed to the US government that
the Japanese planned to attack Pearl harbour during World War II.
However, the pertinent agency did not communicate this until it was
too late.
There should be satisfaction that the Kargil tapes have been put to
timely use. It is not worth scoring debating points over the so called
breach of security involved. If fault finding is the objective, there
are several related areas at which public ire can be legitimately
directed. Even after 51 years of independence no clear definition of
India's national interests is available. As a consequence there is yet
no national security doctrine nor an adequate mechanism for national
security management. These concepts by and large remain alien to the
prevailing bureaucratic and political culture in the country. The
public at large also shows little comprehension of their importance. A
recent survey showed only three per cent of those polled considered
national security to be among the major issues troubling the nation.
The Kargil tapes eloquently demonstrate how important it is to read
the mind of one's opponent correctly and why national security
management should remain a coldblooded business, unburdened by
sentimental romanticism. Only hardboiled professionals or experts can
be entrusted with the job.
(The author is a former secretary to the Union cabinet secretariat)
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