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As the Musharraf visit draws near, the feeling that this is a defining moment in Indo-Pak relations and that next weekend could decide the future of both countries perhaps for all time pervades the entire subcontinent. So intense is the desire of the intelligentsia of both countries to see something positive emerge from it that most of the hectic questioning that officials have been subjected to has centred around what can come out of the summit, that is, what to look for to dub it a success. This has forced the two governments to let out tit-bits of their strategies, or the concessions they have in mind and would like to obtain. Shorn of background, these hints have fuelled fresh speculation and fired both hope and disappointment.
Almost no one wants to dwell on what might happen if the summit fails. Yet, the barest moment's reflection shows that this is the question we need focus on. Fortunately, both the governments have done an enormous amount of work to minimise the possibility of failure. This has involved an iterative process of narrowing down differences by showing flexibility on some issues and unwillingness to compromise on others. All this is designed to make the talks between Vajpayee and Musharraf as focused and meaningful as possible. But as the hints and concessions have multiplied, a distinct pattern has emerged which shows that on the fundamental issue of how to settle the Kashmir dispute, the two sides not only remain far apart—that is only to be expected—but are predisposed to following incompatible strategies for addressing it. If Vajpayee and Musharraf can't bridge this gap, the summit will fail.
In the last two weeks, New Delhi has announced a slew of 'unilateral' concessions—the release of fishermen, the easing of visa restrictions, unilateral trade concessions and a desire for increased cultural and informational exchange. Significantly, all of these have been announced in advance of the visit. The official explanation is that India is keen to improve the atmosphere for the talks to the maximum extent possible in order to give them the best possible chance of success. But Pakistanis have viewed these 'concessions' very differently. They point out, rightly, that not one of these is new. All of them have been offered, and accepted, before every Indo-Pak summit, and all of them have been part of an Indian negotiating strategy that has sought to 'home in' on Kashmir not first but last, i.e. after softening up Pakistan as much as possible. The Pakistan foreign office, which has never been particularly enthusiastic about Musharraf's departures from past positions, has lost no time in jumping on this evidence that, invitation notwithstanding, there has been no change in India's basic stance on Kashmir.
It's to Musharraf's credit that he hasn't taken fright and retreated into reiterating time-worn, hardline positions which will demonstrate that he is not about to fall for this strategy and 'betray' the Pakistani people. Instead he, and various spokesmen, have reiterated their position that Kashmir is the core issue and must be tackled first among all the issues, with a good deal of restraint. Much of this message has been delivered by actions and not words. Thus, by leaving the commerce minister out of his delegation, he has shown that trade is an issue that can only be taken up after a window has been opened for the future settlement of the Kashmir issue. Fishermen and Vikas Singh apart, Islamabad has shown its lack of enthusiasm for other relaxations, mostly through silence.
Pakistan's lack of enthusiasm has revived dormant fears in the Indian establishment too. Its insistence on Kashmir first is uncomfortably close to Benazir Bhutto's six 'non-papers' of 1990, which amounted to 'Kashmir or nothing'. Its requirement that the talks accept Kashmir as a dispute and establish a framework for a future settlement also brings back memories of past 'betrayals'. As the Kennedy era papers—declassified in 1993-94 in the US—show, the settlement of the Indus waters dispute had been cocooned in the understanding that a settlement of the Kashmir issue on the Ceasefire Line would follow. It didn't. Similarly, the Simla Agreement's wording makes it clear that it was meant to be an 'interim' settlement of the Kashmir issue (the word dispute was never mentioned) that would be tuned into a 'final settlement' ( the words of the agreement) in a fairly short time, after the relationship had been normalised. Thirteen years later, emboldened by his connection with the US, Gen Zia began systematically undermining the agreement by training Kashmiri mujahideen in his Afghan mujahideen camps. And today, Musharraf doesn't even consider himself bound by it.
All the old reasons for distrusting each other, therefore, still survive. Despite that, there is hope that this meeting will prove the beginning of the end of enmity between Pakistan and India. The reason is that beneath the surface continuity, literally everything has changed. Today, it is not just desirable or advantageous but essential for Pakistan and India to resolve their differences. For Pakistan in particular, it is a matter of life and death.
Pakistan's public stand today may reflect that of 1990. Its aspirations too may not have changed. But its capacity to realise them has. There is no secret about the frailty of its economy: its national debt is 106 per cent of its gdp (India's is around 45 per cent); 75 per cent of last year's federal revenues had to go into servicing this debt (India's is 44 per cent). Its gdp growth has fallen from over 6 per cent in the '80s to below 3 per cent in the past two years (India's was 6 per cent for the '90s). Its foreign debt exceeds $40 billion. In per capita terms, this is three times India's debt. The annual servicing of the foreign debt is five to six times Pakistan's total foreign exchange reserves. Pakistan is remaining solvent only because of debt rescheduling and some humanitarian aid, all of which requires a stamp of approval from the imf. And the imf is growing increasingly more insistent on a cut in military expenditure.
There's tremendous resistance within the Pak military and nationalist establishment to accepting that this change impinges on its relations with India in any fundamental way. But there's one place where there's no room for self-delusion. The buck stops there. That's Musharraf's office.
Musharraf came to power with a simplistic belief, popular in the Pakistan army, that the state was insolvent because of rampant corruption and tax evasion, assisted by corrupt political leaders. So, he first tried to raise revenues by weeding out corruption via the National Accountability Bureau (nab) and by increasing the taxes paid by traders (the general sale tax, gst) and the Bara market dealers in smuggled goods. The nab failed to make any dent on the fiscal situation; the gst was stiffly resisted and is hardly being collected even today. The best bet was the Bara market where customs duties lost amounted to an estimated 30 per cent of Pakistan's revenues.But the Bara traders—who're linked to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, the patrons of the Taliban, to the Asian transport mafia, and to other patrons of jehadi private armies—promptly went to their patrons for support. Faced with the possibility of an Iranian, Bazariya-type coalition between traders and mullahs, Musharraf retreated.
Musharraf also couldn't crack down on the jehadis directly because this would deprive him of the only lever he possessed against India in Kashmir. But the longer he didn't do so, the more did the jehadis entrench themselves and gain legitimacy in Pakistani society as the saviours of the people of Kashmir. This is the nutcracker that he has to get out of. This has made him appeal repeatedly to India to drop its preconditions and start talks on Kashmir.
There's a school of thought in Delhi that this is, therefore, the time to strike a hard bargain. This has an counterpart in Islamabad, which thinks that it's the jehadis who brought India to its knees and forced Vajpayee to invite Musharraf so this is the time to hang tough. Both are not merely wrong but, if listened to, would take South Asia straight to hell. On the contrary, precisely because Pakistan has no option but to be flexible, this is the time for India to show flexibility too. For without an overt willingness to compromise, there can be no peaceful settlement of any dispute.
In the past six weeks, Musharraf has made a truly heroic effort to make Pakistanis come to terms with their country's weakness and vulnerability, and the limitations these impose on its options. But he has also been forced to walk a tightrope and show that while he is prepared to move from the frozen positions of the past, he is not going to betray Pakistan's essential interests. That is the explanation for several of the harder statements that have come out from his government in the last fortnight, such as his insistence that he will not disallow the Hurriyat from meeting him. If he cannot keep Pakistanis convinced of his patriotism and concern for Kashmir, he'll not gain acceptance at home for any deal he may broker at Agra. He could also lose his life.
In sharp contrast to Islamabad, New Delhi has indulged in almost no public rhetoric. But this does not mean that there has been no preparation. It has needed no public rhetoric because India is a functioning democracy, in which there has always been an overwhelming (although tacit) consensus in favour of a settlement with Pakistan provided that it does not endanger India's social fabric. Vajpayee doesn't therefore need to talk to the public. He needs to talk to the other political parties, and to the rss. None of this can, or should, be done in public. But the position of the Congress, the Left, the tdp, the dmk, of Mulayam Singh Yadav and others on Kashmir is well known. Vajpayee therefore already has a freedom that Musharraf has had to create for himself in as little as two months.
So, what must the two leaders agree upon in Agra to make the summit a success, without endangering the position of either in his own country? The answer does not lie in, or solely in, confidence-building measures and scheduling further meetings but in announcing a simple but profound change of approach towards each other and Kashmir. Both leaders need to pledge themselves that instead of allowing Kashmir to remain a closed door that locks each country out of the other, it must be turned into an open window through which not only the people of Kashmir but of India and Pakistan can pass and mingle freely.
There will be no need to say any
more. For a moment's reflection will show that while the details of the
open window may take time to put in place, in the end there will be only
winners and, except for the jehadis, no losers.
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