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But for United States intervention in 1971 India could have taken over Pakistan occupied Kashmir and resolved the Kashmir issue once and for all. The United States prevented that from happening and Henry Kissinger's book 'White House Years' recounts the story in detail. The American view then was that if India takes over Azad Kashmir, turns on West Pakistan and smashes the Pak Air Force and tanks, what would be left of West Pakistan would be a vassal state - vassal, that is, to India. The United States did not want to see this happen.
The White House viewed the conflict between India and Pakistan as a 'ruthless power play by which India, encouraged by the Soviets, used the ineptitude of the Pakistani government and the fragility of the Pakistani political structure to force a solution of the East Pakistan crisis by military means.' As Kissinger put it: "The dismemberment of Pakistan by military force and its eventual destruction without any American reaction thus would have profound international repercussions."
Kissinger's conviction was that India's non-alignment derived not from affection for the United States but from its perception of its national interest. As he saw it, once India liberated Bangladesh, Indian forces would proceed with the liberation, of the southern part of Azad Kashmir - the Pakistani part of Kashmir - and continue fighting until the Pakistani army and air force were wiped out. As he put it: "In other words, West Pakistan was to be dismembered and rendered defenceless." He told the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) on 8 December 1971: "Should we, in full conscience allow the liberation of the same disintegrating forces in West Pakistan as in the East? Pakistan would be left defenceless and West Pakistan would be turned into a vassal state."
In the Security Council, George Bush Sr, then the US Permanent Delegate to the United Nations said: "Does India intend to use the present, situation to destroy the Pakistan Army in the West? Does India intend to use as a pretext the Pakistani counter attacks in the West to annex territory in West Pakistan? Is its aim to take parts of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir contrary to the security council resolutions of 1948, 1949 and 1950?" The truth, if it must be said, is that India could have done so in 1971 easily. It was prevented from doing so by the United States for its own selfish reasons. And how did the United States save Pakistan whose brutality in East Pakistan was only too well known? It put a whole lot of pressure on the Soviet Union and on China to prevent India from taking over West Pakistan. Kissinger, among other things writes. "I remained convinced that the Indian Prime Minister decided in the spring and summer of 1971 to use the opportunity to settle accounts with Pakistan once and for all and assert India's pre eminence on the sub-continent."
Indira Gandhi was frustrated in her plan - if indeed she had the kind of plan Kissinger attributes to her - and we will know what happened. For the United States, it geopolitical concerns were important. As long as these were taken care of Kissinger - and Nixon - couldn't care less whether these were attributed to 'personal pique, anti Indian bias, callousness towards suffering or inexplicable immortality.'
Notes Kissinger in his book: "Had we followed these recommendations, Pakistan, after losing its eastern wing, would have lost Kashmir and possibly Baluchistan and other parts of its western wing - in other words, it would have totally disintegrated. We maneuvered with some skill and considering the few cards we held, considerable daring - to avert disasters, we succeeded in confining the impact of the conflict to the sub continent..." Exactly what kind of pressures were exerted on India - and Indira Gandhi - are not known and will probably never b e known unless the External Affairs Ministry archives are opened for public consumption. But it is well known that Washington put the heaviest possible pressures on Moscow and Beijing to get India Gandhi change her position. On 20 December, 1971, Nixon told British Prime Minister Edward Heath, "I felt that if it was true that Gandhi's goal was to force Pakistan to surrender in the West, there would be serious repercussions on the world scene. It could be a lesson for other parts of the world." Over and over again in his book Kissinger talks about India's plans to dismember Pakistan without providing substantive evidence. But what comes through clearly is that as far as the United States of the Nixon/Kissinger era was concerned it was not prepared to let India take Pakistan occupied Kashmir lest that, in turn, break up Pakistan. One would imagine that thinking still prevails in George Bush Jr's administration. Armitage does not think there is any content in Pakistan's demand for parity with India.
Will this view get translated into
actual practice in Washington's approach both towards India and Pakistan
remains to be seen. In past years, especially during the Cold War years
the United States saw India in terms of its close links with the Soviet
Union. That does not hold good any more.
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