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During the weeks before the Agra summit, Pakistani and Indian spokesmen, including the two heads of government, reiterated their traditional positions on Kashmir but also emphasized repeatedly that they would be open-minded, flexible, willing to engage in the process of give-and-take, ready to discard the old texts and explore new paths to peace.
According to one report, Musharraf and Vajpayee had eight hours of private, one-to-one, discussions. It is reasonable to assume that of these eight hours two or three, possibly four, were devoted to the subject of Kashmir, considering the importance the Pakistani side attached to it. I cannot imagine that all of this time was spent on arguing whether the subject was a "dispute," or an "issue," and whether it was to be accorded "centrality" or "core" status in their deliberations. They must have gone beyond these procedural concerns and said something substantive.
What did they say? Given their previously declared willingness to give and take, what concession did the prime minister or, for that matter, the general offer, and what, in return, did he expect? Were any departures from each side's known position broached? Nobody is saying, and it is conceivable, even if incredible, that none were.
Yet, they have decided to have more meetings. What for? Surely not to get entangled once again in terminological disputes. One cannot be sure, but it is possible that Musharraf and Vajpayee reached an understanding that substantive concessions with regard to Kashmir would have to be made, but that each must first prepare the ground for them at home before the same could be made public. This is speculation on my part, perhaps wishful thinking.
In getting ready for the forthcoming meetings, a few issues need to be straightened out in our own minds. First, it no longer serves any useful purpose for Pakistan to keep referring to the "state of Jammu and Kashmir" as disputed territory. This "territory" includes Azad Kashmir. Pakistan's traditional position in this regard had value in the context of a plebiscite that would go in its favour. None of the major powers invokes any longer the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir that had called for a plebiscite. The UN secretary-general says these resolutions are no longer operative. Pakistan, too, has pretty much dropped its insistence on a plebiscite. If the issue is then to be settled by means other than a plebiscite, why allow India or any other party to call Azad Kashmir a disputed territory and call into question Pakistan's present relationship with it.
What is then the nature of the issue to be discussed with India? It does not relate to Jammu and Ladakh where there is no opposition to Indian rule. It relates to the Valley whose people are in revolt. They were always unhappy with Indian rule, but the harshness of that rule has changed their discontent to rebellion. They are fighting colonial rule, imposed upon them by military force, and it is with reference to their struggle that the principle of self-determination applies unambiguously.
India characterizes Pakistani assistance to the Kashmiri insurgency as an intervention in its "internal" affairs and, secondly, as export of terrorism. Pakistan has never taken interest in rebellions that have periodically erupted in parts of India. But Kashmir is a special case. Pakistan has been deeply involved with the aspirations of the Kashmiri people and shared their resentment of Indian rule. Even if it were to give up the thought of adding Kashmir to its own territory, it cannot simply throw away its 54-year-old linkage with the Kashmiri people's destiny. Pakistan has never accepted India's rule in Kashmir as legitimate; nor has the world community at large. Strictly speaking, its assistance to the Kashmiri insurgency cannot be regarded as intervention in India's internal affairs
Consider also that concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention have undergone radical change as "globalization" has proceeded. Even in the old days, great powers interfered in the domestic affairs of smaller states and got away with it. But now there is hardly any state whose internal affairs are not open to the scrutiny, advice, and/or pressure from others. India intervened in Pakistan's civil war in 1971, a "domestic affair," and got away with it. The only weakness in the Pakistani position is that, as compared to India, it is a smaller state, and in terms of "realpolitik" that which is right for the "goose" is not necessarily right for the "gander."
Does Pakistani assistance to the insurgents (including not only funds but fighting men and weapons) amount to sponsoring terrorism? Two considerations are relevant here. If the insurgents are killing unarmed civilians and/or destroying private property, they are acting as terrorists and aid to them is aid to terrorism to that extent. But if they are attacking Indian military personnel and installations, and Indian-controlled paramilitary and police forces, they are fighting a war and aid to them is an act of partisanship in that war.
So far as assistance by private individuals and organizations is concerned, the government of Pakistan may or may not be able to control it, and it should not be held responsible for it. There have been parallel situations in other parts of the world. Irish-Americans, more notably in Massachusetts, have sent money and weapons to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its fight against British rule for decades, but the British government has never held the US government responsible for it. In another situation, many Americans, acting on their own initiative and without seeking their government's permission, participated in the Spanish civil war.The government of Pakistan could halt its own assistance to the insurgents, and it could attempt to persuade private organizations in the country to do the same, in return for some significant concession from India. It might also formally drop its demand for a plebiscite, and be content with the part of Kashmir that it controls, as an additional concession. But what would India "give" in return? It must relate to Kashmir, not to trade and tourism and things of that sort.
Pakistan cannot withdraw its support for the Kashmiri people's drive for self-determination. But this drive can find expression in arrangements short of complete separation from India. Pakistan might consider asking India to give the Valley the same kind of status and governmental structure that Azad Kashmir has. The argument that if India gave Kashmir a special status, it would have to give the same to all of its other states, is not valid. These other states have not been the object of Indo-Pakistan conflict for more than half a century. Nor have they been ruled by military force against their will.
Recall also that initially the Indian
constitution had given Kashmir a special status. If India were receptive
to the idea of conceding Kashmir a substantial measure of autonomy, Pakistan
might offer to use its influence and good offices to persuade the Kashmiri
leaders to accept such an arrangement. Given the "ground realities" on
all three sides, I think a special status for Kashmir within India is the
best we can expect and, in private negotiations with the Indian leadership,
this is what we should strive for as a part of the "give- and- take" to
which both are committed.
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