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The swift conviction and sentencing of four Islamic militants for the abduction and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl offered a conspicuous sign that at its highest levels, the Pakistani government remains committed to collaborating with the United States in the war on terrorism. But like so much in that fragile partnership, the news of the verdicts Monday may have been less significant than it first appeared. Because the actions were taken by a special anti-terrorism court, they are vulnerable to reversal by higher appeals courts, and complications appear likely because of the trial's exclusion of three other suspects who, unlike those convicted, were allegedly present when Mr. Pearl was murdered. What looks like decisive action against a group of terrorists may turn out to be a half-step, and reversible -- even as it deepens popular resentment of the United States and its ally, President Pervez Musharraf.
Such ambiguous and troubling outcomes are becoming Mr. Musharraf's hallmark. At the beginning of this year he announced a sweeping crackdown against Islamic extremist groups in Pakistan; but many of the 1,500 or so suspects noisily rounded up were later quietly let go. More than once he has responded to intense pressure from India and the Bush administration by promising to end the infiltration of militants from Pakistan into Indian-ruled Kashmir; yet India says that after brief interruptions, the infiltrations have resumed. Mr. Musharraf has apparently allowed U.S. soldiers, police and intelligence agents to work closely with Pakistani security forces in pursuing al Qaeda networks around the country; but some of the cooperation has been sluggish, and the terrorists have apparently succeeded in moving much of their network to Pakistan from Afghanistan.
Such partial results might be accepted -- as they appear to be by the Bush administration -- as the best that can be achieved in a difficult situation. Yet the evidence is growing that Mr. Musharraf's ability to fight terrorism has been compromised by his own political ambitions. The general, who seized power in a coup nearly three years ago, has deeply antagonized Pakistan's civil society -- its political parties, media and human rights groups -- by insisting first on staging a referendum to extend his term as president for five years, and now on a series of constitutional amendments that would severely restrict any future democracy in Pakistan. Mr. Musharraf intends to ban the two Pakistani leaders who were democratically elected in the 1990s from holding office in the future, along with many of those who previously served in parliament; he would reserve for a national security council -- headed by himself -- the right to name and dismiss prime ministers and many other senior officials.
Mr. Musharraf says his actions are
necessary to correct the corruption and weaknesses that afflicted past
civilian governments. Yet the principal effect of his actions has been
to alienate his administration from the very forces in Pakistan most capable
of supporting a secular government against religious extremism. Without
such allies, he becomes ever more dependent on the military, which, in
turn, makes it harder for him to make the concessions in Kashmir needed
for peace with India, or even to pursue terrorists inside Pakistan without
compromise. The Bush administration has largely overlooked Mr. Musharraf's
political maneuvering, but it should be pressing him to seek accommodation
with the civilian leadership. The general may have been an important U.S.
ally over the past 10 months, but unless he is willing to accept that he
cannot rule Pakistan by himself, he will not be able to deliver the results
that are needed in his country.
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