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After Musharraf, the fundamentalist deluge.
2.That was the widely expressed fear over Pakistan during my last visit to the US in November, 2002.
3.Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s military dictator, and his country’s Embassy in Washington DC have discreetly and effectively added to this fear.
4. The phobia over what could happen to and in Pakistan if he leaves the scene is quite high and even many Jewish and neo-conservative circles, who publicly express their solidarity with India in its fight against the Pakistani State-sponsored jihadi terrorism against India, privately justify the Bush Administration’s support for Musharraf, right or wrong.
5. There is no alternative to Musharraf, it is repeatedly said. One may not like him, but one has to work with him in order to win the war against terrorism.
6. The continuing ambivalence in governmental and non-governmental circles on the question of US support to India against jihadi terrorism is too obvious to be missed.. All-out support to India against jihadi terrorism, yes. But, no support to India in its efforts to have the State of Pakistan held accountable for using terrorism as a weapon against India.
7. “Understand our need for Musharraf. Leave it to us; we’ll find ways of making him behave,” one is told. “Afghanistan is a land-locked country. There is no other way of operating in the Pashtun belt against the Al Qaeda and Taliban dregs except through Pakistan. To be able to do so, we need him. He understands our concerns over the need to prevent the weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists better than anybody else in the Pakistani military. We just cannot afford to ditch him. We need him just as much as he needs us.”
8. Musharraf understands how to play on these fears and how to exploit them to ensure his continuance in power, democracy or no democracy, and the continued flow of lollipops from the US.
9. All arguments about the way Musharraf has been taking the US for a ride fall on deaf ears, whether in governmental or non-governmental circles---except in some sections of the Congress who see Musharraf for what he really is. One may have the best of evidence, the most compelling of arguments, but of what use when imaginary fears fed by Musharraf himself cloud lucidity in thinking.
10. The US has been helping India in various counter-terrorism fields---training, exchange of intelligence so long as the intelligence does not reveal the role of Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment in sponsoring terrorism, sharing of expertise in meeting new threats such as cyber terrorism etc. But, when it comes to acting against Pakistan, doors and minds are closed.
11. The US may be a democracy, but has little understanding and patience for those who do not fall in line with it and think and argue differently. India has to fight its battle against Pakistani State-sponsored terrorism on its own. It will get little or no help from the US, unless the Pakistan- based terrorists pose a threat to American lives and interests, particularly in US territory.
12. There is considerable disappointment and even suppressed irritation over India’s decision not to meet the US request for the dispatch of a division of its troops to Iraq. It is openly expressed, politely, but without ambiguity.
13. “An opportunity missed;” “vestiges of the old non-aligned mentality”;
“ wanting to be a big power, but thinking and acting like a small one;”
“ shows little consideration for the Iraqi people;” “ India does not realize that the strength of its armed forces lie in their legendary peace-keeping ability” (as if it does not lie in their fighting capability); “how can there be a strategic relationship with the US, if this insular mentality persists?”
14. These are the arguments one hears wherever one goes. None of these arguments was compelling enough when India was keen to join in peace-keeping in Afghanistan, which India knows as well as it knows Iraq.
15. Afghanistan was different, one is told, without explaining how. One, of course, knows how. Musharraf did not want Indian troops in Afghanistan. Indian peace-keeping where the US wants them, and not where India feels it can play a better role.
16. Even the argument “if you are not with us, you are against us” is indirectly used while deploring India’s decision against sending troops to Iraq. When one points out India’s willingness to train Iraqi police officers, participate in economic reconstruction and medicare and possibly even assist the US in creating a civilian intelligence agency in Iraq which would be accountable to a democratically-elected Government, such offers are dismissed as falling far short of US expectations.
17. The feelings and misperceptions over Iraq are still so strong that any rational debate is difficult. What are the ground realities confronting the US? No weapons of mass destruction found; not many Iraqi troops and Republican guards found; no trace of Saddam Hussein and his sons; when the US was patting itself on the back that the war has ended without many body counts, it seems to be just starting. Americans are dying---not yet in dozens, but in ones and twos, every day.
18. There is a reluctance to accept that their understanding of the Iraqi people and assessment of the ground realities have proved terribly wrong. “We are not worried. Time is on our side. We will prevail,” one is told, projecting an outward look of optimism and nonchalance.
19. But the new breed of jihadis, who are coming out of the deserts of Iraq, one doesn’t know from where, feel Allah is on their side.
20. “We have a fine set of soldiers. The best in the world. We teach them: know the terrain, know the enemy, act decisively,” it is said. “Wait and see. They will defeat the jihadists.”
21. The jihadis swarming out of the madrasas of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries to fight the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq are being told by their mulla-instructors: “Know Allah, know the Holy Koran and know the glory of martyrdom. You can defeat the American military might.”
22. The Stars & Stripes vs the Holy Koran. That is what the already raging jihad in Afghanistan and the looming one in Iraq are about. When told about the active role of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba in mobilizing jihadis to go to Iraq, one is greeted with skepticism. “They don’t know Arabic. How can they operate in Iraq?” one is asked. When one points out that the Chechens, the Filippinos, the Indonesians and others operated in Afghanistan without knowing the local language, one has no answer, but the skepticism persists.
23. The final outcome of the war will affect not only the US, but the entire democratic world. It is in the interests of India and the rest of the democratic world that the US emerges victorious in this war. We had serious differences with the US over the way it invaded and occupied Iraq. We have legitimate grounds for unhappiness over its lack of solidarity with us vis-à-vis the terrorist State of Pakistan.
24.However, it would be short-sighted on the part of India to let the US falter in this battle. The jihadis have to be vanquished---wherever they are found and the threat posed by them to peace and security removed once and for all.
25. India could be a valuable ally of the US in this, even without sending its troops to Iraq. The US has the best of its troops and equipment in Afghanistan and Iraq. If they are facing difficulty, it is not for want of resources or reinforcements, but for want of adequate understanding of the jihadi mentality. India, the greatest victim of jihadi terrorism in the world today, understands this mentality better than any other nation.
26. India can share this understanding with the US, but before the US can hope to benefit from this, it has to open its eyes wide and see the primordial source of all jihadi terrorism in the triangle of terrorism constituted by Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.
(The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,
Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Observer Research
Foundation (ORF), Chennai chapter. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com )
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