If the renewed involvement of the Kanchi Shankaracharya in the Ayodhya negotiations generated a bout of optimism that a solution was imminent, the peremptory rejection of his plan by the Muslim Personal Law Board earlier this month has triggered the predictable recriminations.
Depending on preferences, the editorial classes have directed their ire at the usual suspects — either the so-called Muslim ‘hardliners’ or the irascible VHP leadership. To complicate matters further, a belated and feeble attempt to distance the prime minister from the Kanchi initiative has revived the familiar story of power struggle within the shadowy parivar.
As dark hints of ‘sabotage’ do the rounds and the deputy prime minister confuses the uninitiated by proffering “pragmatic Hindutva” one day and asserting the inevitability of a Ram Janmabhoomi temple the day after, the unmistakable impression is that Ayodhya is a show destined to run and run.
Yet, there was a genuine belief among India’s powerful, and predominantly Hindu, cosmopolitan elite that the Kanchi Shankara-charya’s direct involvement would facilitate a genuine dialogue, paving the way for a breakthrough. The optimism centred on the self-comforting belief that politicians being inherently evil, the politicisation of Ayodhya — first by Rajiv Gandhi and subsequently by the BJP and fractions of the Janata Dal — had converted a local dispute into a clash of civilisations. If only, or so went the argument, the ‘real’ Hindu godmen — as distinct from the unwashed charlatans — brushed aside the politicos and made Ayodhya their business, rationality would prevail over bigotry.
No one was entirely clear about the identity of the corresponding religious leaders on the Muslim side either. The mullahs were thought to be part of the problem, but because Muslim variants of either the benign Jayendra Saraswati or the affable Sri Sri Ravi Shankar weren’t at hand, the Muslim Personal Law Board just had to suffice.
From the political point of view, the Kanchi initiative was blessed with a degree of urgency. Since the Supreme Court, through its 1994 judgment and subsequent interpretations of it, froze all building activity in both the disputed and non- disputed areas of the Ram Janmabhoomi complex, it has become impossible for even a sympathetic government to accommodate the pro-temple lobby. Its hands have been tied by an uncompromising judicial veto.
This, in turn, has had serious political consequences. The inability to win concessions from a BJP-led government has angered the VHP, provoked intemperate comments from its leaders and created tensions between the RSS and the BJP. Apart from chipping away at the pillars of a future temple and keeping a fractious flock together, the Ram Janmabhoomi movement has been bogged down for over a decade. That, despite this, the VHP still remains a potent force with a dedicated following is a testament to the organisational skills of Ashok Singhal and Praveen Togadia. Confronted by frustrations of this magnitude, a lesser movement would have been reduced to a mere letterhead.
The Ayodhya impasse has also been kept alive by the Muslim leadership. Being mainly hostile to this NDA government, it has taken refuge behind the judicial shield and fobbed off negotiations. There is a perception in the Muslim community that recalcitrance on Ayodhya can help exacerbate tensions within the RSS and the BJP and, consequently, come to the aid of the ‘secular’ forces. It is a clever game but one that could have unintended consequences.
The Kanchi initiative, both now and last year, was aimed at finding a way out of this awkward jam. The Shankaracharya’s initial thrust was modest — to persuade the Muslims to yield ground on the undisputed land (over which it has no claim but still exercises a veto) and utilise the resulting goodwill to enter into a larger dialogue. To the Vajpayee government, the Kanchi initiative was important on three counts.
First, one of the most revered figures of Hinduism was taking the initiative to engage the Muslim leadership on an important religious issue. The Shankaracharya not only had moral authority among ordinary Hindus, he exercised considerable clout over the Dharma Sansad — the body that has kept the Ayodhya movement going. With his involvement, it was hoped the emphasis would shift from ‘political’ Hindu activism to religious Hinduism, a shift that would prove more palatable to the middle ground that Atal Bihari Vajpayee is assiduously cultivating.
Second, it was hoped that some understanding on the undisputed land would pacify the RSS and the VHP and enable the BJP to fight the next election with a united parivar behind it. As it is, in view of the complete breakdown of civil relations between Vajpayee and the VHP top leadership, a section of the VHP has been talking menacingly of promoting a new Hindu party. Such a party cannot win seats but, as the Jammu experience suggests, it has the capacity to ensure the BJP’s defeat.
Finally, implicit in the Kanchi initiative was the acknowledgement that Ayodhya will never be resolved by the courts. This is a self-evident truth that India has shied coming to terms with. It is, after all, not on account of incompetence or procedure that the courts have been unable to decide the core title suit for five decades. Yet, the fiction of Ayodhya being primarily a property dispute has been cynically perpetuated. The Kanchi initiative, had it got going, would have punctured the spurious sanctimoniousness that is attached to judicial prevarication.
In the end it all came to naught. Arguably, the Shankaracharya was not sufficiently diplomatic. His ‘clarifications’ were unambiguous and were seized upon by the Muslim Board as evidence of Hindu high-handedness. Amid the debris, what is significant, however, is the lucid articulation of a Hindu view on Ayodhya (as distinct from the secularist Hindu view) by the Shankara-charya in his second letter to the Muslim Law Board and his NDTV interview with Shekhar Gupta.
First, it is clear the Shankaracharya perceives the claim on Ram Janmabhoomi to be above negotiation. He has appealed to the Muslims to keep “in view the larger interests of the nation and communal harmony” and “donate the area” to the Hindus. Second, he makes only a nominal distinction between the undisputed and disputed land. To him, “it is essential both the issues are discussed together” because “nobody can remove the idol now, not even the courts”.
Third, the Shankaracharya is categorical that judicial intervention is undesirable. “In the present circumstances, if the judgment goes in favour of one community or even in favour of both communities, we cannot expect communal harmony.” Finally, he does not shy away from asserting the Hindu claim over Kashi and Mathura as well. “If not today but at sometime or other, these places have to be given to the Hindus. Muslims have to mentally prepare themselves for this.”
These are not the fulminations of some Sadhvi Rithambara. They happen to be the considered views of a Shankaracharya, a man whose credentials as a non- political, religious Hindu are impeccable. They also epitomise the emerging Hindu consensus on Ayodhya.
The well-meaning suggestion that putting the onus of a settlement on religious Hindus will bridge the gap between the Hindu and Muslim positions is based on pure fantasy. It overlooks the fact that the demand for a Ram Janmabhoomi temple in Ayodhya was conceived by the Dharma Sansad and enjoys the blessings of all important Hindu orders. Politics entered later when L.K. Advani took up the issue as an illustration of distorted pseudo-secularism.
The political discourse has undergone a shift but the sense of religious hurt that gave rise to the Ayodhya movement in the first place remains intact. Indeed, it has been bolstered by a distinct Hindu vote bank which is nominally attached to the BJP and the Shiv Sena but is being courted by, among others, the Congress and the AIADMK.
In such a situation, the pressure on political parties to consider legislation to build a Ram temple in Ayodhya, in case a negotiated settlement fails, is bound to intensify. There is a strong impression in Hindu circles that the Muslim leadership is unwilling to countenance any dialogue. This is an unhealthy development that could breed intolerance and extremism. There are enough Muslims who want to use a settlement of the Ayodhya problem as the basis for an enduring Hindu- Muslim concordat. They need to be politically sustained.
This is no time for the political
Hindus to abandon the field to the religious leadership. Neither is it
opportune for the Shankaracharyas and the Dharma Sansad to eschew the political
class on the ground its commitment to the Ram temple is based on expediency.
If the fierce emotions generated by Ayodhya are to be kept within peaceful
and constitutional bounds, the Shankara-charya will have to be complemented
by the prime minister. Fear of failure shouldn’t deter statesmen.
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