As Indo-Pak discussions on terrorism
continue to make fascinating study, the attack on the Commander of the
Karachi-based V Corps (consisting of two infantry divisions, two armoured
and one infantry brigade), Lt General Alisan Saleem Hayat, on June 10,
2004, is understandably alleged to have been carried out by "Indian" national
Maqsood Ansari.
According to Pakistan, "Ansari
came to Pakistan nine years ago and later married a Pakistani woman and
had been living in Lahore and Karachi, working closely with Rao Khalid,
a senior figure in Jundallah, or Allah's brigade, a militant group believed
to have links with the Al Qaeda." It is, however, not known as to how did
the "Indian" Ansari reach Pakistan - by rail, road, air, sea or on foot?
What was his avowed mission, if he had any? How did he "manage" to live
in Pakistan for nine years if he is still an "Indian"? Conversely, if he
has become a Pakistani national, after marrying a Pakistani woman, how
can he be referred to as an "Indian"?
Whatever may be the nationality of Ansari now or then, it is an indisputable fact that he is a confirmed terrorist of a deeply entrenched trans-national Islamic fundamentalist outfit, nurtured and patronised by the past masters of Pakistan. However, what had been sowed in the past for the benefit of that country and loss to its enemies appears to have boomeranged on the present masters, thereby giving rise to speculative conclusion about the nationality, intention and ability of the home-grown religious fanatics turning into "same side goal scoring terrorists".
In fact, Pakistan today appears unsafe even for some senior commanders of the traditional ruling class, the Army. Once known for its three-dimensional rulers, consisting of Allah, America and Army, contemporary Pakistan has got some additional forces of Mullah, Masjid, Madarsa and Al Qaeda competing at times and cutting corners at unexpected times the rule of the generals and the calculations of the Americans. This is a "pain in the neck" scenario which is difficult to cure and is likely to endure for long.
So much so, the strongman of the Pakistani Army and President, General Musharraf, survived two major assassination attempts. The first was on December 14, 2003, when five bombs exploded under a bridge seconds after General Musharraf's motorcade passed and the second was on December 25, 2003, when suicide carbombers attacked him. The General escaped, but the attack left 15 others dead. General Musharraf later stated that the organiser of both the attacks was a "Libyan member of Al Qaeda".
Still later, an unprecedented statement by General Musharraf accusing some of his junior colleagues of attempting to kill him, indicates that all is not well within the professional Pakistani Army's rank-and-file. Although it would be difficult to assess the role of senior officers of the Army on this unusual allegation by General Musharraf, it would also be equally difficult to not imagine that juniors certainly cannot conspire to kill an Army chief without some support and intellectual inputs from their superiors. Either way, General Musharraf is a slow motion loser and the Pakistan Army the victim of its own politics, both professional and non- professional.
Thus, with conspiring juniors, fanatic transnational terrorists, restless mullahs and madaris and a turbulent Afghanistan, one is not surprised at the attempt on the Karachi commander. Since Pakistan has traditionally been a nation of "General rule" with long tenures, there has always existed subterranean resentment against the long haul non-retiring military bosses (in perpetuity). Thus, Ayub Khan, as the first Pakistani Army chief (1951-58) and later as Field Marshal President of Pakistan till 1969, faced tremendous "political and military disenchantment" during the later stage of his rule, and at one point "many senior military officials joined the movement against his regime".
Ayub's departure, however, did not end the General rule of Pakistan. It was extended with the passing of the ruler's baton to then serving Army chief, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1966-71). Nevertheless, the dismemberment of Pakistan led to Yahya's downfall, and a few days after the surrender of the Pakistani Army to India, the Chief of General Staff made a round of key Army formations to assess the feelings of the senior officers and found tremendous resentment against General Yahya Khan. Both the Army and Air Force asked him to step down. The inevitable happened and Yahya had to step down on December 12, 1971.
Six years later, the next coup followed on July 5, 1977, by another serving Army chief, Muhammad Zia-ul Haq. His regime continued till his death on August 17, 1988, in a mysterious plane crash, thereby paving the way for General Mirza Aslam Beg to become the chief of a professional Army without the onerous tag of being a "political president." Today, Pakistan is saddled with its fourth "General rule" since October 12, 1999, and the biggest challenge to all - that is, Pakistan, its Army, its officers and the political parties - is whether General Musharraf will keep extending his tenure as the Army chief or whether it will be a post in perpetuity, till he is alive.
A question may be asked. Why did General Musharraf's juniors try to eliminate him? Perhaps, because no professional army would like a chief for life! All three illustrious predecessors of General Musharraf either faced the wrath and fury of their juniors or died unnatural deaths. Such is the dynamics of power that if one does not go home with grace, one may be compelled to retire with disgrace or expire through violence.
That the Pakistani Army officers more often than not try their luck to capture power through coup is too transparent to be ignored, especially since for some Pakistani Army officers the secret war in Afghanistan became a prototype for a new Pakistani strategic war-by-proxy against domestic and foreign foes. These officers made no secret of their views and one of the leaders of the aborted September 1995 coup, Major General Zahir-ul Islam Abbasi, had served as attache in India and on his return was promoted.
He spoke publicly on the need to "Islamise" both Pakistan and its Army. That Abbasi was part of a larger coup effort does not come as a surprise. As for "ideological motivation", there is some "evidence that the Tablighi Jamaat has grown in influence in the officer corps (as it has expanded its activities in Pakistan and among Indian Muslims)".
It is clear that the Musharraf regime
is bound to face challenges from the Mullahs,Madaris and the Al Qaeda,
and also from his own military colleagues because none, not even the best,
the most trusted and loyal subordinates of an Army would miss the opportunity
to become a General. But how can a junior become General when his own General
refuses to retire? As the Pakistani generals have a propensity to continue
in the chair beyond mandated years, they have been shown the door or the
flight to death. Seen in this light, the "attempts" on the life of Pervez,
the General, and Saleem Hayat, the Lt General, are neither surprising nor
unique. They were inevitable.