While I see some limited evidence of progress in the 9/11 Commissioner's understanding of the global jihad we are facing, ultimately their report resorted to the same tired and ahistorical canards that distort the mainstream tradition – indeed which are central to Islam – of jihad war. The report mentions the ad nauseatingly referenced Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328), who despite his Muslim orthodoxy, now serves as a convenient prop for those who contend, either deceitfully or in blissful ignorance, that jihad war is not a main tenet of traditional Islam. Once again a distorted historical nexus is made between Ibn Taymiyya, but not countless other seminal jurists and theologians who expressed identical opinions, throughout the history of Islamic civilization, and 20th century ideologues like Sayyid Qutb, and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. This flimsy construct, reiterated in the 9/11 Commission Report, is completely untenable.
Jihad wars have been waged continuously
for well over a millennium, through the present, because jihad, which means
“to strive in the path of Allah,” embodies an ideology and a jurisdiction.
Both were formally conceived by Muslim jurisconsults and theologians from
the 8th to 9th centuries onward, based on their interpretation of Qur’anic
verses (for e.g., 9:5,6; 9:29; 4:76-79; 2: 214-15; 8:39- 42), and long
chapters in the Traditions (i.e., “hadith,” acts and sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad, especially those recorded by al-Bukhari [d. 869] and Muslim [d.
874]). The consensus on the nature of jihad from all four schools of Sunni
Islamic jurisprudence (i.e., Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafi’i) is clear:
Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (d. 996),
Maliki jurist 1
Jihad is a precept of Divine institution.
Its performance by certain individuals may dispense others from it. We
Malikis [one of the four schools of Muslim jurisprudence] maintain that
it is preferable not to begin hostilities with the enemy before having
invited the latter to embrace the religion of Allah except where the enemy
attacks first. They have the alternative of either converting to Islam
or paying the poll tax (jizya), short of which war will be declared against
them.
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Hanbali
jurist 2
Since lawful warfare is essentially
jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s
word is uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims, those who stand
in the way of this aim must be fought. As for those who cannot offer resistance
or cannot fight, such as women, children, monks, old people, the blind,
handicapped and their likes, they shall not be killed unless they actually
fight with words (e.g. by propaganda) and acts (e.g. by spying or otherwise
assisting in the warfare).
From (primarily) the Hanafi school
(as given in the Hidayah) 3
It is not lawful to make war upon
any people who have never before been called to the faith, without previously
requiring them to embrace it, because the Prophet so instructed his commanders,
directing them to call the infidels to the faith, and also because the
people will hence perceive that they are attacked for the sake of religion,
and not for the sake of taking their property, or making slaves of their
children, and on this consideration it is possible that they may be induced
to agree to the call, in order to save themselves from the troubles of
war… If the infidels, upon receiving the call, neither consent to it nor
agree to pay capitation tax, it is then incumbent on the Muslims to call
upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them, because God is the
assistant of those who serve Him, and the destroyer of His enemies, the
infidels, and it is necessary to implore His aid upon every occasion; the
Prophet, moreover, commands us so to do.
al-Mawardi (d. 1058 ), Shafi’i
jurist 4
The mushrikun [infidels] of Dar
al-Harb (the arena of battle) are of two types: First, those whom the call
of Islam has reached, but they have refused it and have taken up arms.
The amir of the army has the option of fighting them…in accordance with
what he judges to be in the best interest of the Muslims and most harmful
to the mushrikun… Second, those whom the invitation to Islam has not reached,
although such persons are few nowadays since Allah has made manifest the
call of his Messenger…[I]t is forbidden to…begin an attack before explaining
the invitation to Islam to them, informing them of the miracles of the
Prophet and making plain the proofs so as to encourage acceptance on their
part; if they still refuse to accept after this, war is waged against them
and they are treated as those whom the call has reached….
In Khaldun (d. 1406), jurist (Maliki),
renowned philosopher, historian, and sociologist, summarized these consensus
opinions from five centuries of prior Muslim jurisprudence with regard
to the uniquely Islamic institution of jihad:
In the Muslim community, the holy
war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the [Muslim] mission
and [the obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion
or by force...The other religious groups did not have a universal mission,
and the holy war was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes
of defense...Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations.
5
By the time of the classical Muslim
historian al-Tabari’s death in 923, jihad wars had expanded the Muslim
empire from Portugal to the Indian subcontinent. Subsequent Muslim conquests
continued in Asia, as well as on Christian eastern European lands. The
Christian kingdoms of Armenia, Byzantium, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Croatia, and Albania – in addition to parts of Poland and Hungary – were
also conquered and Islamized. When the Muslim armies were stopped at the
gates of Vienna in 1683, over a millennium of jihad had transpired. These
tremendous military successes spawned a triumphalist jihad literature.
Muslim historians recorded in detail the number of infidels slain or enslaved,
the cities and villages which were pillaged, and the lands, treasure, and
movable goods seized. Christian (Coptic, Armenian, Jacobite, Greek, Slav,
etc.), as well as Hebrew sources, and even the scant Hindu and Buddhist
writings that survived the ravages of the Muslim conquests, independently
validate this narrative and complement the Muslim perspective by providing
testimonies of the suffering of the non-Muslim victims of jihad wars.
But surely the much-lionized Sufi
tradition offers a healthy corrective to the so- called “narrow strain”
of Islam epitomized by Ibn Taymiyya, and the consensus opinions (cardinal
examples cited above) of many other classical scholars representing all
four main schools of Sunni Islamic Law. Indeed, the scholar and theologian
W.M. Watt wrote that al-Ghazali (d. 1111), the famous theologian, philosopher,
and paragon of mystical Sufism, had been:
acclaimed in both the East and
West as the greatest Muslim after Muhammad, and he is by no means unworthy
of that dignity…He brought orthodoxy and mysticism into closer contact…the
theologians became more ready to accept the mystics as respectable, while
the mystics were more careful to remain within the bounds of orthodoxy.
6
The 9/11 Commissioners, and those
who accept the views stated in their report, should read the lauded al-Ghazali's
writings on jihad war to understand that they differ not one whit from
the opinions expressed by the demonized Ibn Taymiyya. Below is what al-Ghazali
actually wrote about jihad war, and the treatment of the vanquished non-Muslim
[dhimmi] peoples (from the Wagjiz, written in 1101 C.E.):
…one must go on jihad (i.e., warlike
razzias or raids) at least once a year...one may use a catapult against
them [non-Muslims] when they are in a fortress, even if among them are
women and children. One may set fire to them and/or drown them...If a person
of the Ahl al-Kitab [People of The Book – Jews and Christians, typically]
is enslaved, his marriage is [automatically] revoked. A woman and her child
taken into slavery should not be separated...One may cut down their trees...One
must destroy their useless books. Jihadists may take as booty whatever
they decide...they may steal as much food as they need…. 7
The Commissioners might also find
particularly edifying the writings of two contemporary Muslim scholars
of jihad, the late Majid Khadduri, and Bassam Tibi. Majid Khadurri wrote
the following in 1955:
Thus the jihad may be regarded
as Islam’s instrument for carrying out its ultimate objective by turning
all people into believers, if not in the prophethood of Muhammad (as in
the case of the dhimmis), at least in the belief of God. The Prophet Muhammad
is reported to have declared “some of my people will continue to fight
victoriously for the sake of the truth until the last one of them will
combat the anti-Christ.” Until that moment is reached the jihad, in one
form or another will remain as a permanent obligation upon the entire Muslim
community. It follows that the existence of a dar al-harb is ultimately
outlawed under the Islamic jural order; that the dar al-Islam permanently
under jihad obligation until the dar al-harb is reduced to non-existence;
and that any community accepting certain disabilities- must submit to Islamic
rule and reside in the dar al-Islam or be bound as clients to the Muslim
community. The universality of Islam, in its all embracing creed, is imposed
on the believers as a continuous process of warfare, psychological and
political if not strictly military. 8
And in 1996, Bassam Tibi wrote
this:
At its core, Islam is a religious
mission to all humanity. Muslims are religiously obliged to disseminate
the Islamic faith throughout the world. “We have sent you forth to all
mankind” (Q. 34:28). If non-Muslims submit to conversion or subjugation,
this call (da’wa) can be pursued peacefully. If they do not, Muslims are
obliged to wage war against them. In Islam, peace requires that non-Muslims
submit to the call of Islam, either by converting or by accepting the status
of a religious minority (dhimmi) and paying the imposed poll tax, jizya.
World peace, the final stage of the da’wa, is reached only with the conversion
or submission of all mankind to Islam…Muslims believe that expansion through
war is not aggression but a fulfillment of the Qur’anic command to spread
Islam as a way to peace. The resort to force to disseminate Islam is not
war (harb), a word that is used only to describe the use of force by non-
Muslims. Islamic wars are not hurub (the plural of harb) but rather futuhat,
acts of “opening” the world to Islam and expressing Islamic jihad. Relations
between dar al-Islam, the home of peace, and dar al- harb, the world of
unbelievers, nevertheless take place in a state of war, according to the
Qur’an and to the authoritative commentaries of Islamic jurists. Unbelievers
who stand in the way, creating obstacles for the da’wa, are blamed for
this state of war, for the da’wa can be pursued peacefully if others submit
to it. In other words, those who resist Islam cause wars and are responsible
for them. Only when Muslim power is weak is “temporary truce” (hudna) allowed
(Islamic jurists differ on the definition of “temporary”). 9
In 1916, the great Dutch scholar
of Islam, C. Snouck Hurgronje underscored how the jihad doctrine of world
conquest remained a potent force among the Muslim masses 13 centuries later,
[I]t would be a gross mistake to
imagine that the idea of universal conquest may be considered as obliterated…the
canonists and the vulgar still live in the illusion of the days of Islam’s
greatness. The legists continue to ground their appreciation of every actual
political condition on the law of the holy war, which war ought never be
allowed to cease entirely until all mankind is reduced to the authority
of Islam- the heathen by conversion, the adherents of acknowledged Scripture
by submission. Even if they admit the improbability of this at present,
they are comforted an encouraged by the recollection of the lengthy period
of humiliation that the Prophet himself had to suffer before Allah bestowed
victory upon his arms; and they fervently join with the Friday preacher,
when he announces the prayer taken from the Qur’an: “And lay not upon us,
our Lord, that for which we have not strength, but blot out our sins and
forgive us and have pity upon us. Thou art our Master; grant us then to
conquer the unbelievers.” And the common people are willingly taught by
the canonists and feed their hope of better days upon the innumerable legends
of the olden time and the equally innumerable apocalyptic prophecies about
the future. The political blows that fall upon Islam make less impression…than
the senseless stories about the power of the Sultan of Stambul, that would
instantly be revealed if he were not surrounded by treacherous servants,
and the fantastic tidings of the miracles that Allah works in the Holy
Cities of Arabia which are inaccessible to the unfaithful. The conception
of the Khalifate still exercises a fascinating influence, regarded in the
light of a central point of union against the unfaithful.” 10
Writing a quarter century after
Hurgronje in 1942, Professor Arthur Jeffery stressed why detailed consideration
of the institution of jihad remained essential, “not merely academic,”
for understanding the contemporary Islamic world
for the theory of the world which
it enshrines is still fundamental to the thinking of great masses of Muslim
people to the present day. The troubles in India which lead up to the great
Patna conspiracy trials of 1864 were due to the fact that Syed Ahmad of
Oudh had preached against the Sikh cities of the Panjab a Jihad which later
turned to one against all non-Muslim groups. The bloody episode of the
Padri rebellion in Malaysia was due to the preaching of Jihad against the
pagan Battak tribes. The Fula wars in the Hausa country [Western Sudan]
in the early nineteenth century, which lead to Osman Dan Fodio’s setting
up the ephemeral sultanate of Sokoto, began as a jihad preached against
the pagan king of Gobir. The Moplah rebellion in South India in 1921, with
its massacres, forcible conversions, desecration of temples, and outrages
on the hapless Hindu villagers, could be heard openly proclaimed as a Jihad
in the streets of Madras. 11
With the resurgence of jihad military
campaigns and major acts of jihad terrorism literally across the globe
in the last decades of the 20th century through the present, Jeffery’s
additional insights from 62 years ago, resonate prophetically:
It is of course, easy to raise
the objection that a Jihad in the old sense is impossible of realization
in the modern world, for Islam is far too badly divided for anything like
a general Jihad to be contemplated and far too weak in technical equipment
for a Jihad to be successful even if started. This does not dispose of
the fact, however, that the earlier conception of Jihad has left a deposit
in Muslim thinking that is still to be reckoned with in the political relations
of the Western world with Islam. 12
Although time grows dangerously
short, it is not too late for the 9/11 Commissioners and, more importantly,
those who share their assessment to broaden their understanding of the
depth of the ideological threat posed by jihad and consider more concrete,
expansive actions to be taken, such as the creation of the Alliance of
Western and Democratic Societies recently proposed by Dr. Raphael Israeli.
ENDNOTES:
1 Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, La
Risala (Epitre sur les elements du dogme et de la loi de l'Islam selon
le rite malikite.) Translated from Arabic by Leon Bercher. 5th ed. Algiers,
1960, p. 165. [English translation, in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern
Christianity Under Islam, Cranston, NJ, 1996, p. 295]
2 Ibn Taymiyyah, in Rudolph Peters,
Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, (Princeton, NJ. : Markus Wiener, 1996,
p. 49)
3 From the Hidayah, vol. Ii. P.
140, in Thomas P. Hughes, “A Dictionary of Islam,” “Jihad” Pp. 243-248.
(London, United Kingdom.: W.H. Allem, 1895).
4 Al- Mawardi, The Laws of Islamic
Governance [al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, (London, United Kingdom.: Ta-Ha, 1996,
p. 60).
5 Ibn Khaldun, “The Muqudimmah.
An Introduction to History,” Translated by Franz Rosenthal. (New York,
NY.: Pantheon, 1958, vol. 1, p. 473).
6 Watt, W.M. [Translator]. The
Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali, Oxford, England, 1953, p. 13.
7. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Kitab
al-Wagiz fi fiqh madhab al-imam al-Safi’i, Beirut, 1979, pp. 186, 190-91.
[English translation by Dr. Michael Schub]
8 Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace
in the Law of Islam, 1955, Richmond, VA and London, England, pp. 63-64.
9 Tibi, Bassam. “War and Peace
in Islam,” in The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives,
edited by Terry Nardin, 1996, Princeton, N.J., pp. 129-131.
10 Hurgronje, Snouck. Mohammedanism.
New York, 1916, p. 59.
11 Jeffery, Arthur. “The Political
Importance of Islam,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 1, 1942, p.
388.
12 Jeffery, A. “The Political Importance
of Islam,” pp. 388-389.