Author: Saikat Datta
Publication: Outlook
Date: August 28, 2006
URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20060828&fname=Cover+Story+%28F%29&sid=9
Introduction: Local terror outfits get an Al Qaeda connection, look to go global
In April 2006, officials from the Intelligence
Bureau and RAW, the pillars of India's security apparatus, held several meetings
to dissect the latest dictats from Al Qaeda's Osama bin Laden.
Two words that Laden mentioned in his short message had India's intelligence
community worried. "Unlike his earlier pronouncements which were primarily
targeted at the West, Laden emphasised on 'Hindu' and 'Kashmir'. It was reason
enough for us to start looking for a possible Al Qaeda footprint in India,"
a senior intelligence official told Outlook.
Barely four months later, as details started emerging in the thwarted Heathrow terror plot, links surfaced between those who planned the London attack and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). The Indian security set-up was naturally concerned since intelligence inputs had already suggested that the country was in Al Qaeda's crosshairs. There was information that it had forged strategic links with the LeT and other jehadi groups operating out of Pakistan. In fact, the Jamaat-ud-Daawa, suspected to be behind the August 10 terror attempt, is a front for the LeT and the operatives involved were from Mirpur in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
It's been a vindication of sorts for Indian intelligence agencies, which have repeatedly pointed out that funds collected from immigrant Mirpuris in the UK are a major source for terrorist activities in Kashmir. In fact, Indian agencies had earlier provided detailed reports on a UK-based NGO, Mercy International, linking it to the International Islamic Relief Organisation, another alleged source of funds for terror outfits.
Sources told Outlook that an SMS sent by one of the suspects in Pakistan to his colleagues in the UK on August 10 proved the Kashmir link to the international terror network. The SMS, sent barely an hour before the first arrests, had asked the terrorist cell in London to go ahead with the bombing plan. This alerted the British authorities and they in turn alerted their Pakistani counterparts.
Intelligence agencies are also looking at linkages emerging between the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi with Al Qaeda. A chief suspect in the London terror plot, Mati-ur Rahman is believed to be the second-in-command of the LeJ. He's believed to have also participated in terror acts in Kashmir in 2003. However, opinion within India's intelligence community is divided on the definite presence of Al Qaeda in India so far.
While the IB has reported that there is a presence in the upper reaches of Kupwara, Handwara and the Macchil sector in Kashmir, there isn't clear evidence to back this. Officials have also received information that some Al Qaeda operatives of Sudanese origin could be operating in Kashmir.
There are also inputs to confirm the LeT's growing international reach. The arrest of Abdul Rashid 'Dakhil', a Pakistani national, in Mosul, Iraq, a year ago by British authorities is a clear pointer. Rashid had earlier been sent on missions to the Kashmir Valley in 2002, but he subsequently returned to Pakistan before leaving for Iraq. The Indian security agencies also had another recent windfall, managing to nab LeT operative Abu Anas who is believed to have infiltrated into India from Nepal. Anas has reportedly confessed that he had links with Asim Cheema, the LeT man believed to be behind several major blasts in India.
Ever since August 10, Indian security agencies have been swamped with inputs, and officials are now busy sorting out credible ones from the vague threat perceptions. The information overload explains the panic reaction when a routine travel advisory from the United States to its citizens in India was blown out of proportion. Home secretary V.K. Duggal was quick to point out that it was "routine", but the fact is India's war on terror is going to be a long-drawn-out one.