Will the US led coalition go only after bin Laden or topple the government that provides him succour? Since little intelligence appears forthcoming about bin Laden’s whereabouts, one may turn out inseparable from the other.
Bin Laden’s recent statements, aired on a TV channel in Qatar, make manifest how close he is to the Taliban regime — “we are steadfast on the path of jehad with the heroic, faithful Afghan people, under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar”. One might add that Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s absolute and inscrutable ruler, also happens to be his father-in-law.
Omar has warned that the Americans cannot emerge from the current crisis by murdering him and bin Laden, a message they ought to take seriously. They have to take a hand in the economic and political reconstruction of Afghanistan, altering the horrific dispensation Omar has imposed on it with crucial help from Pakistan. The Taliban not only terrorises its people but also allows the Al Qaida to export terror; the two have to be treated as part of the same complex.
DARK VISION
To provide an illustration of the nature of the Taliban regime — it has converted a football stadium, funded by the UN to provide entertainment to local people, into a locale for the only sort of entertainment allowed nowadays: public executions. Such things as television, music and even the flying of kites are anathema. In today’s Afghanistan women are not allowed to go to work or to school; they are shot in football fields on mere suspicion of adultery.
This dark vision of humanity, emanating from the middle ages, is not unrelated to the mentality which led to the destruction of the World Trade Centre. This is not just a war against one man but a war of ideas. The civilised world should understand that it is impossible to pursue “business as usual” with the Taliban, even if their Pakistani mentors try to get them off the hook.
Fortunately there are signs that the West understands this. Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, told the BBC that the international coalition involved in the “war against terrorism” was keen to ensure a proper government in Afghanistan. The Americans have initiated contact with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The alliance has already demonstrated its capabilities by raining rockets on Kabul the night the World Trade Centre was attacked.
Mohammad Fahim, who succeeded Ahmad Shah Masood as the commander of the alliance, has held talks with General Anatoli Kvashin, chief of the Russian general staff, in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. Britain has signaled its interest in forming a democratic regime in Afghanistan; Tony Blair has been in touch with Vajpayee on the question. Given the involvement of Afghan mujahedin in terrorist attacks in Kashmir, not to mention the duplicitous role played by the Taliban during the IC-814 hijack, India should be in the forefront of promoting alternate political arrangements in Afghanistan.
The difficulties of a military campaign against the Taliban should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the analogy with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan does not hold. In this case, the Americans will not be trying to hold Afghanistan; they want to turn it over to a representative government. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the rebels were supplied and trained by the Americans, the British and the Pakistanis. In this case, there is an international coalition backing the Americans, and the Taliban’s supply lines can be effectively cut off.
In an attempt to cover his tracks Musharraf has called off Pakistani officers and “volunteers” working for the Taliban, which considerably weakens them. In addition, the harshness of their regime means that the population, by and large, is hostile to them.
FOOD FACTOR
A cliché doing the rounds in the current situation is that Afghan tribals are fiercely independent and will not brook foreign troops on their territory. This one, however, can be turned on its head: it remains to be seen whether they will brook operatives of the Al-Qaida, foreigners who are mostly Arabs, given an opportunity to be rid of them. After all two Arab men, posing as journalists, assassinated Ahmad Shah Masood, the leader of the Northern Alliance.
The Americans will not need to deploy ground troops in large numbers, as they can rely on anti-Taliban groups already in the country and on the march. President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress indicated that this is going to be a thoroughly unconventional war, and made particular mention of special forces and covert operations.
An offensive by the Northern Alliance, for example, would draw out the Taliban to defend their territory, in which case air power could be used to destroy their forces. As more intelligence comes in with the advance of anti-Taliban forces, special forces or airborne troops could be used to neutralise the defenders of bin Laden or the Taliban leadership.
Afghanistan is facing a humanitarian catastrophe due to shortage of food. The Red Cross, normally allowed to operate in combat zones, has been drummed out by the Taliban, which has also seized UN food supplies. Food and other humanitarian aid could be set up on territory controlled by the alliance. The catastrophe could be averted by making available large-scale humanitarian aid on alliance-controlled territory, which would wean the population away from the Taliban.
Afghanistan tends to be portrayed in somewhat monolithic terms as a fiercely fundamentalist country. The hegemony of the Taliban, however, is reinforced by the fact that the theological seminaries run by it offer food and shelter in a country where almost everybody is hungry. If alternate means of food and shelter become available, the world will be surprised at the speed with which the Taliban’s hegemony unravels.
NO EXCEPTIONS
Since the US and other Western countries have declared war on terrorism in the name of democratic principles, instead of treating Afghanistan as an exception, they should keep faith with the notion that democracy, humanitarian reconstruction and economic development can be adequate substitutes for fundamentalism. There can be no more powerful demonstration of the ideas they stand for, one that would undermine the ideological terrain on which terrorism thrives.
What may cause headaches is the constitution of a future government, as the Northern Alliance consists disproportionately of Panjshiris, Hazaras and Uzbeks, who are distrusted by the majority Pashtuns. The Pashtuns, in addition, dominate southern Afghanistan, and make up the majority of the 50,000 strong Taliban army. Significant overtures, therefore, need to be made to the Pashtuns to form a representative government, and avoid the danger of the country splitting into two halves leaving Pakistan to foment trouble again in its southern half.
It is here that Afghanistan’s erstwhile King Zahir, a Pashtun himself but with whom the northern alliance has been in touch for the last two years, could act as a bridge figure. Zahir’s reign is seen in retrospect as a period of peace, prosperity and modernisation. He has himself signalled that he is not interested in reviving the monarchy, but would not mind presiding, as a symbol of unity and reconciliation, over an interim administration run by the UN, paving the way for free elections.
At which point, if the international community is to win the war of ideas, it would have to turn to Pakistan — the last remaining bulwark of jehadi forces in the region. Its job will be half-done if it rids Afghanistan of terrorist camps, but leaves Pakistan untouched.
(The author is Assistant Editor,
The Statesman.)