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At least 10 public-sector units have violated the Union
home ministry's specific directive and employed a Sweden-
based multinational `security' agency suspected to be a
front for commercial espionage.
The latest instance is that of Metallurgical and
Engineering Consultants which has engaged the Swedish
outfit, Group-4, from September last year for keeping a
vigil on its installations. MECON is located at Ranchi
and comes directly under the control of the steel
ministry.
The same agency is reported to be providing 'security'
for nine other PSUS, including Maruti Udyog Ltd, the
National Dairy Development Board, and the Co-operative
Milk Federation which has units at Bokaro and Ranchi.
Group-4 is reported to have all its share holdings abroad
and only foreigners are employed as its top executives.
The security agency started its operations in India in
1991 when it employed about 750 security guards to man
the United States embassy in Chanakyapuri and its various
units in Delhi. At that time Group-4 used to pay a wage
packet ranging from Rs 7,000 to Rs 9,000 to its Indian
employees. Other diplomatic mission clients were slowly
added to its list.
Investigations have revealed that Group-4 is headed by a
person who is alleged to have links with the Central
Intelligence Agency and who has rented a palatial house
in New Delhi's posh Neeti Bagh area at a monthly rent of
Rs 2.5 lakh.
In an era of high-tech clandestine industrial espionage,
the PSUs have swept under the carpet the spectre of
infiltration by choosing to employ the high-risk security
agency.
The home ministry had issued a circular (No
VI-2402/68/90-GPA. 1, dated November 12, 1992, signed by
a joint secretary) to all ministries stating, "It has
come to the notice of this ministry that a number of
foreign security/detective agencies are setting
up/planning to set up operations in this country. I would
request you to ensure that no foreign security/detective
agencies are engaged in Public Sector Undertakings
attached to your ministry without obtaining the prior
permission of the Ministry of Home Affairs."
The circular has neither been withdrawn nor modified.
Home ministry sources said not one of the PSUs had
obtained prior permission from the ministry to employ the
multinational agency to guard their installations.
Startling 'ignorance' surfaced after persistent
questioning of the MECON general manager by this
correspondent: Group-4 is an Indian company and has its
offices at Jamshedpur. "Its headquarters are in
Calcutta, employs about 50 persons, and payment is done
by the Calcutta-based director who comes down for this
purpose alone," was the contrary statement of Captain
Madhu Kumar, MECON's security chief.
Similarly, Raichaudhary of COMPFED confirmed that his
company employs personnel of Group-4. "But the company
is an Indian one and not an MNC as alleged by certain
quarters," he said. Whenever a tender was floated,
Group-4 was allotted the contract on the basis that it
quoted the best rate. The previous agency entrusted with
the security of COMPFED units had objected to the delays
and other irregularities on the part of COMPFED
authorities.
>From the conflicting statements trotted out by these
officials, one can safely assume that the right hand does
not know what the left is doing. Taking a serious note
of this blatant violation of the ministry directive, some
United Front MPs have written to Home Minister Indrajit
Gupta, requesting him to personally, look into the
matter.
"Our investigations revealed that the agency is not a
profit-making body and that it actually spends huge
amounts in getting contracts for guarding installations,"
said a senior Janata Dal MP.
There are other multinational agencies operating in India
too, according to home ministry sources, but they are
doing their business through Indian subsidiaries.
Alerted by Intelligence Bureau reports about the
possibility of such infiltration under the cover of
providing security, the home ministry asked the IB to
probe the matter in depth and prepare a detailed report
on the various foreign security firms operating here.
Investigations by the IB have revealed that infiltration
attempts have been made recently. The IB report
submitted to the home ministry confirmed that stringent
preventive steps should be immediately taken to prevent
such incidents.
The IB pointed out that once these foreign-based security
agencies were allowed to gain a foothold in the PSUs,
their activities would be difficult to monitor. Besides,
they would by then have succeeded in spreading a network
across vital installations located in sensitive regions.
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