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The United States could well consider naming Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) a foreign terrorist organisation judging by the revelations spilling out now about its nefarious activities that have not only troubled India but also jeopardised Washington's battle against terrorism.
Pakistanis are apt to snicker at the frequent Indian invocation of ISI for all its problems. But recent disclosures of the spy agency's dirty tricks is earning it the mistrust of even its mentors in Washington. Following last week's expose showing the money trail of the September 11 terrorist attacks leading to Pakistan with possible ISI connections comes the disclosure now that renegade ISI operatives visited Kandahar last month to help the Taliban prepare its defences and strategy against U.S. attacks.
The clandestine visit, which came after the September 11 carnage, was reportedly made in defiance of military ruler Pervez Musharraf's orders. It was this skunk works which resulted in the replacement of the ISI chief earlier this week, according to Ahmed Rashid, author of a well- received book on the Taliban.
Senior retired army officers said Gen. Musharraf was infuriated when informed of the officers' trip because it could have jeopardised Pakistan's relations with the United States and Britain. There is no suggestion that Gen. Ahmad knew about the trip either, but he nevertheless resigned as ISI chief Rashid, whose work is highly respected in western circles, wrote in an article published simultaneously in London's Daily Telegraph and The Washington, Times.
According to Rashid, ISI officers have served as military advisers to the Taliban army, especially during their summer offensives against the anti-Taliban alliance. Several ISI officers have become intensely loyal to the Taliban and its hardline Islamic ideology. Yossef Bodansky, a military analyst with close Israeli links, has also written extensively on the ISI's link to and patronage of the Taliban, a fact that successive U.S. administrations have tended to sweep under the carpet. In part, this is because Washington itself initially encouraged the ISI- Taliban nexus.
Just how loyal and how many Pakistani operatives and officers are still in the Taliban camp is something Washington will have to weigh as it begins to co-opt the Pakistani establishment in its war against terrorism. Latest reports from Pakistan say Gen. Musharraf has given Washington permission to use two airports, one in Sindh and one in Baluchistan, and hundreds of American troops have already moved in to launch ground attacks that will inevitably follow the air campaign.
Expectedly, U.S. officials are already worrying about the safety of their troops in a volatile situation in an unstable country. Reports said Pakistani army and naval forces have been assigned to both airports to provide security for the U.S operations.
An even graver concern for the Americans is how much of the Pakistani intelligence and armed forces have been compromised to the fundamentalists. Some reports speak of the CIA even now taking the help of Pakistani intelligence to engineer defections from the Taliban, but it is an open secret that many Pakistani operatives have long since turned against the agency that once mentored them. In any case, it will be a tough task to figure out who is loyal to the antiterrorism cause, who is a Talibanist, and who are double agents.
Indian intelligence agencies have long mapped the ISI operations, ascribing to it everything from terrorism to drug-running, and even subverting Pakistan's own democracy. Indian officials have also noted that several former ISI chiefs have been given important diplomatic assignments, including ambassadorships to key European countries, to enable Islamabad advance its nuclear programme. Former ISI chiefs like Hamid Gul and Javed Nasir have grown old preaching the destruction of India and pontificating about its imminent collapse.
Washington has been far more credulous about the ISI and has frequently entertained both former and incumbent spymasters, evidently under the illusion that the maverick organisation is still beholden to the CIA for the close ties developed during the golden 1980s decade. That was when the two organisations worked hand in glove to arm the Afghan Mujaheedin (Mooj in CIA parlance) against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Although the two agencies fell out in the early 1990s amid reports of financial skulduggery by the ISI and a spat over weapons inventory, especially missing Stinger missiles, Washington continued to engage important Pakistani spooks. It was mandatory for all new ISI chiefs to pay their respects in appearance at least - to Langley and Foggy Bottom, home of the CIA and the State Department respectively.
Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs chief spymaster Gen. Ziauddin was in Washington a fortnight before he (Sharief) was deposed and Musharraf's chief spook Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed was also here on the day of the terrorist attack and he (Ahmed) was sacked thereafter.
Why the Bush administration continues to consort with the ISI, when there is probably enough material to proscribe it, is something of a mystery. One explanation is that Washington believes it can still purge and cleanse it of the renegade elements with the help of its trusted ones. Besides, the U.S. badly needs whatever intelligence the Pakistanis can provide its forces, even if some of it is dubious or false.
Notwithstanding the fact that some
U.S. officials believe the ISI tipped off bin Laden shortly before the
cruise missile strike on him in 1998, the CIA needs ISI more than the ISI
needs CIA.
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