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As Director, Military Operations,
during the Chinese aggression in the autumn of 1962, Major General D.K.
Palit, then a brigadier, played a key role. Speaking to Saikat Datta, he
says he authored War in the High Himalayas, years later, as an ‘‘answer
to the lies’’ that had been written about the war so far.
Q.: How do you look back on the
Chinese aggression?
A.: We were not clear in our minds
about what the enemy was like. Nehru had fixed ideas and was convinced
that ‘‘Hindi-Chini’’ were bhai-bhai’’. So he never thought they would attack.
We were amateurish and had never fought a war outside the Commonwealth.
We were done in by Nehru’s stupid ideas.
Q.: At the Army headquarters, what
was the atmosphere like? Today, historians say you, as DMO, had major differences
with then army chief General Pran Nath Thapar on evacuating Tawang.
A.: When the Chinese attacked,
Thapar said ‘‘let us defend Tawang’’. I told him that was impossible because
it was on an incline. So we went to Nehru. But he just said, ‘‘I am not
a military man, these are decisions you have to take.’’ We had several
meetings and only Lt Gen Umrao Singh (commanding XXXIII Corp) kept saying,
correctly, that we were not ready. He even asked me, ‘‘what is the chief
doing?’’ I told him to go and ask the chief. He never went.
Q.: What was the relationship between
the military and political leadership like? How much did Lt Gen B.N. Kaul’s
relationship with Nehru affect the course of events?
A.: Thapar was a weak man and allowed
himself to be pushed around by Nehru. To the Chinese, it was important
to build a road from Sianking to Tibet. We should have let them and imposed
a nominal rent. All the senior army commanders hated Thapar. He had no
combat experience. Yet, he was appointed corp commander of IV Corp. Kaul
was a good Chief of General Staff but had no experience of command.
Q.: Why wasn’t the Air Force deployed?
Would it have helped?
A.: Someone wrongly advised the
government not to deploy the Air Force as the Chinese would the attack
Indian cities. But they did not realise the Chinese didn’t have air fields
in Tibet so they couldn’t have done that. Had we deployed the Air Force,
we could have hit targets in Tibet.
Q.: What did the 1962 war teach
the military?
A.: The lessons are mainly related
to the logistics of conducting a war. There was a time during the war when
our troops had enough ammunition to fight just an hour’s battle. With no
roads, we were dependent on air drops. The Chinese were by no means great
tacticians and were even bunching up during patrols. But there were misconceptions
that they came in waves. So, although the Indian jawan is a brave man,
we simply ran away from Se La pass.
Q.: What about the books that followed
the war?
A.: The government is yet to publish
an official history of the war and the Henderson- Brooks report has been
buried.
Most of the books were pieces of
self-justification. There isn’t much in the Henderson-Brooks report. The
government must publish an official account because the people have a right
to know. I had to back people like Thapar and Kaul because I was merely
processing the government’s instructions. But I wanted my book to be an
answer to the lies and it’s all there.
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