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Author: G. Parthasarathy
Publication: The Tribune
Date: October 20, 2005
URL: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20051020/edit.htm#4
How Cold War affected politics in India
Vasily Mitrokhin, who died in 2004, was a KGB operative, who worked in the intelligence agency's archives from 1956 to 1985. He copied documents and defected to the West in 1992, just after the Soviet Union disintegrated. The two volumes of the "Mitrokhin Archives" reflect the realities of Cold War rivalries in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The Soviets then funded political parties, politicians, newspapers, trade unions, journalists and front organisations like the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society to influence Indian policies. The Americans acted similarly, but in a more subtle and discreet manner.
The more important question that arises from Mitrokhin's revelations is not whether any individual, or political party received money from one or another super power, but whether their foreign links compromised national security and sovereignty. There were many who believed in the values, ideals and policies practised by one or other of the contending parties. There were ideological differences within the ruling Congress party. Those reflecting Sardar Patel's thinking like Morarji Desai, S.K. Patil and Atulya Ghosh advocated liberal market economics and distrusted Soviet intentions. Others like Krishna Menon, Mohan Kumaramangalam and D.P. Dhar, labelled as "progressives," admired Soviet achievements. Civil servants and advisers like B.K Nehru and L.K. Jha favoured economic liberalisation. Others like T.N. Kaul, P.N. Haksar and G Parthasarathy were left leaning.
In a confidential assessment of Indira Gandhi's Cabinet colleagues in 1967 the then American ambassador described Mr. C Subramniam and Mr. Sachin Chaudhury, in a communication to the White House, as competent and forward-looking persons. But it would be ridiculous to suggest that anyone of these people was beholden to any foreign power. The Indian diplomat (codenamed "Prokhor"), whom Mitrokhin claims was seduced by the Soviets, called their bluff and told them that his bosses at home were well aware of his interests after office hours!
The differences among Congress leaders became public when the party split in 1969. The Soviet Union decided to back Indira Gandhi. Her opponents were dubbed as "reactionaries". Congress leaders visiting Moscow constantly spoke of the need for the Soviet Union to support the unity of "progressive and democratic forces" in India. Lacking an absolute majority in Parliament, Indira Gandhi got Moscow to force the CPI to support a Congress-led minority government. The CPI soon lost public credibility and support. When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she dumped the CPI and told President Ronald Reagan in 1981 in Cancun that her main political challenge was from the Communists. Even in the heyday of Indo-Soviet Bhai Bhai she never allowed Soviet leaders to take her for granted. She rejected personal intervention by Premier Kosygin to accede to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and refused to endorse the Brezhnev Doctrine for "Collective Security" in Asia.
Indira Gandhi believed that the CIA was trying to destabilise her government and that it had a role in the ouster of Sheikh Mujib in 1975 and of Bhutto in 1977. Her apprehensions were not unjustified, given CIA actions in Chile and elsewhere. When the Janata Party government assumed office in 1977, Moscow was anxious about the impact of the change in government on Indo-Soviet relations. A visibly anxious Andrei Gromyko was relieved when Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee assured him that Indo-Soviet relations were strong enough too transcend the fate of "any single individual or political party".
A senior American official, however, informed our Ambassador in Washington, Mr Nani Palkhivala, in 1979 that Moscow was working to bring down Morarji Desai's government. Moscow was not too concerned about India's improving ties with the US. Mr. Vajpayee's 1979 visit to China and our tacit acquiescence of the genocidal Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, however, evoked concern in Moscow about India joining the emerging China-US axis directed against the Soviet Union. Morarji Desai received a very warm letter from President Carter when he resigned in 1979. Charan Singh, who was not similarly greeted, soon sought to invite Kosygin to India. But this did not stop Charan Singh from strongly opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . A sulking President Carter then had to be coaxed by former British Prime Minister James Callahan to congratulate Indira Gandhi, when she won the elections in December 1979.
Political parties in India obviously have links abroad. They receive money when in office through defence and other contracts. While mainstream political parties benefited from such "deals", they rejected proposals that would make India a client state of any foreign power. However, according to the diaries of former Soviet Ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov, CPI leaders met him regularly to ask for funds. One senior CPI leader thanked the Soviet Union for supporting China during the Chinese aggression of 1962 - an action tantamount to treason - at a time when Indian soldiers were sacrificing their lives to defend the country's borders. The Communist movement in India split in 1963, just after the Soviet Union expressed support for and provided arms to India and changed course towards China. The CPI remained loyal to Moscow. The CPM aligned itself with Beijing.
As the Sino-Soviet rift widened and led to violent clashes in 1969 on their borders, the CPI, which earlier backed China in its conflict against India in 1962, became stridently critical of China. Everything that Moscow said to condemn China was echoed by the CPI and the Moscow-backed newspapers in India. The move to upgrade diplomatic relations and send K.R. Narayanan as Ambassador to China was not welcomed by Moscow and the CPI. The CPM similarly did not know how to react when China invaded Vietnam in 1979, with Deng Xiao Ping vowing to teach Vietnam a "lesson" just as China had done to India in 1962. When Gorbachev decided to normalise relations with China in 1985, the CPI fell in line.
These events are relevant, because both Communist Parties are implicitly advocating today that India should become a virtual camp follower of Beijing and accept China's policies on our nuclear weapons programme and on its present differences with the Americans. They conveniently forget that both in the Nixon and Clinton years, the US and China colluded against India on crucial issues. This is their concept of "nonalignment" and an "independent" foreign policy. While one can ignore such views as flowing from ideological myopia, one naturally has misgivings when the CPM demands a reduction in our defence spending at a time when its ideological patrons in Beijing are not only increasing their defence spending, but also providing tanks, aircraft, frigates, missiles and nuclear weapons knowhow to Pakistan.
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