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Author: Sandipani Dash
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: December 20, 2006
Meghalaya, which is by far the most peaceful of States in the North-East, is showing signs of unrest
Year 2006 saw a consolidation of the trend, discernible since 2002, of decreasing militancy-related violence in Meghalaya. Till December 7, twenty-five persons were killed, including eight civilians and 17 militants. Previous fatalities were 29 in 2005, 35 in 2004, 58 in 2003, and 64 in 2002.
The Garo Hills, consisting of three districts, East Garo Hills, South Garo Hills and West Garo Hills, as in previous years, witnessed the largest proportion of fatalities, accounting for 15 of the 25 killed this year. East Garo Hills had four civilian and five militant fatalities. West Garo Hills had four; South Garo Hills: Three, Jaintia Hills: Three, West Khasi Hills: Five, and East Khasi Hills: One fatalities.
Of the 17 militants killed in Meghalaya in 2006, eight belong to Assam-based United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS). Among the rest, five belonged to newly formed smaller Garo outfits. Further, five out of eight civilian casualties were ascribed to these new groups.
Prominent among these minor groups, formed especially in the Garo Hills area to fill the vacuum created by the surrender of the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), are the United Achik National Front (UANF), Liberation Achik Elite Force (LAEF), United Achik Liberation Front (UALF), Achik National Liberation Front (ANLF), Hajong United Liberation Army (HULA), and Retrieval Indigenous Unified Front (RIEF). Similarly, the Hynniewtrep National Special Red Army is active in the Khasi Hills area.
Apart from killings, these outfits, with cross-border networks in the North-East, also engage in several acts of abduction and widespread extortion targeting villagers and Government officials. The UANF chief, Nimush Marak, was killed in an encounter with the Bangladeshi security forces at a Rangamati hideout in Bangladesh bordering the Gasuapara village of South Garo Hills district, on June 12. While security forces claim to have successfully neutralised these smaller outfits, the ULFA and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) have created tactical alliances with these amorphous groups to replace their arrangement with the ANVC to facilitate their cross-border movement.
The Jaintia Hills and its adjoining Ri-Bhoi district witnessed an extortion drive by the Karbi militants from neighbouring Assam. On June 24, several villagers of Moolaber, Skap, Deinler, Saba, Myntang, Psiar, Lum Moojem, Khatkhasla, Mooshrot, Mukroh and other adjoining villages near Labang-Nongphyllut were forced to pay Rs 200 each by UPDS cadres. Again on July 1, several farmers of Mawlasnai area in the Ri-Bhoi district, with their cultivable lands in the Madan Umwang and Khlieh Umwang areas, were served demand notes by the UPDS to pay levies. They were later asked by the militants to attend a meeting at Madan Umwang, and were threatened with dire consequences in case demands were not met.
On June 28, several civil society groups and chiefs of local self-governance institutions, Rangbah Shnongs, urged the Government to create more police outposts and deploy additional police personnel to prevent the UPDS from harassing Khasi-Pnar families in the Block-I and II areas of the Jaintia Hills. Meghalaya Chief Minister JD Rymbai, on July 5, accused the UPDS of violating rules of the ceasefire agreement of May 23, 2002, with the Centre, by indulging in unlawful activities along the Assam-Meghalaya border. It is not clear whether his statement has led to any ground-level augmentation of security forces.
Assam-based groups were involved in 13 incidents during 2006 (till December 8) in Meghalaya. While smaller outfits from Assam have targeted Meghalaya for extortion. Larger and more dominant groups such as ULFA, Meghalaya has served as a crucial transit route to and from Bangladesh. Significant levels of movement by ULFA cadres have been reported from the Garo Hills.
Prospects for peace with the HNLC have remained bleak despite efforts by the State Government and church. Former Chief Minister DD Lapang stated that the proposal for peace talks with the HNLC is a better option than surrender of its cadres. The HNLC's top leadership continue to be ensconced in Bangladeshi safe havens and have resisted several attempts by the Government and church to start a peace process. In the last week of April, however, HNLC chairman Julius K Dorphang requested the Chief Minister to urge the Centre to 'expedite' the peace process. On September 10, the Union Government authorised the Meghalaya Government to negotiate with the HNLC.
Meanwhile, sporadic activity by the outfit continues in the Khasi Hills region. Two HNLC cadres were shot dead in an encounter with the police at Nonghyllam in the West Khasi Hills district on June 23. Meghalaya Police killed another HNLC cadre, Bankit Khonjee, during an encounter at Umkrem in the East Khasi Hills district on September 20. On September 25, police recovered dead bodies of two former HNLC cadres, Philio Hashah and his brother Anthony Hashah, from Wah Khri in the West Khasi Hills district.
Meghalaya, arguably the worst victim of infiltration across the 443 km-long India-Bangladesh border, has recorded a very poor rate of detection, prosecution, conviction and deportation of foreign nationals. Fencing, an effective deterrent to infiltration has remained unimplemented. Fencing has been found to be damaged along the 198 km already fenced in the Garo Hills, while fencing work in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills areas has been paralysed by protests from the local people. Ominously, official inaction in containing infiltration is provoking locals to adopt vigilante measures.
On March 6, villagers from Nongjri-Umnuih-Nongshken area in East Khasi Hills district announced a programme under the call, "Gun down a Bangladeshi criminal and collect Rs 3,000", in protest against the alleged killing of people and looting of agricultural produce by Bangladeshi infiltrators. Such incidents can further escalate violence in a State that has long been simmering in the absence of adequate and effective policies to neutralise its internal insurgencies, and to contain the overflow of troubles from Assam.
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