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THE CONDUCT OF THE NARASIMHA RAO GOVERNMENT: CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE KAR SEVA AND DEMOLITION ON DECEMBER 6, 1992 |
1.1. The circumstances that
led to the outburst of the Karsevaks who destroyed the Babri Masjid are
an important and instructive part of the current history of India. While
the implications and consequences of this event are important in the context
of the future of India, what led to this event is an equally important
area of study for not just historians, but political parties as well. The
profane manner in which the Central Government and the Congress Party have
explained the event - as an act of betrayal and a violation of the court
order - and the equally profane manner in which the other pseudo-secular
parties have described the event - as the failure of the Central Government
to protect the “mosque” ignores the history of this country as well as
the brooding national mind that had been held in check for too long. What
happened at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 has as its background the highly
provocative context in which the Kar Seva took place.
Demolition, not inspite of court orders or the actions of Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, but precisely because of them 1.2. The chronology and narration
that follow will establish that the demolition took place not despite the
court orders or the efforts of Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, but precisely because
of them. To put it in brief, the Karsevaks were impelled to demolish the
structure by the provocative actions of the Certral Government, by its
taking refuge under an aloof judiciary, which in turn was dealing with
the question as if it was an ordinary property dispute which could be handled
by the usual adversary procedures of bilateral litigation. The forces of
unreason were met with equal anger by the Karsevaks. The Narasimha Rao
Government knew well that this emotive issue involved the people at large,
and not just a handful of leaders. But the object of the Government was
to deal not with the people which it left to the Uttar Pradesh Government
to tackle, but to score over the leaders of the Ayodhya movement by holding
the Courts against them. The chain of events and circumstances that inexorably
led to the demolition, and how the strategy of the Prime Minister to turn
the tables on the Ayodhya movement boomeranged on the disputed structure,
are explained in this chapter.
The threefold objective of the Narasimha Rao Government’s strategy on Ayodhya was:
1.3. The Prime Minister’s strategy to deal with the Ayodhya movement, explained in detail in the succeeding paragraphs, was conditioned by and aimed at three specific objectives. This strategy was obviously designed after the Prime Minister came under severe attack from his second in command, Shri Arjun Singh, that the Prime Minister was soft on the BJP. So the Prime Minister had, as of political compulsion, to prove his secular credentials by designing a strategy that would rule out such a charge. The strategy of the Prime Minister had the following three objectives:
The overall purpose of this
threefold design was to checkmate Shri Arjun Singh who was accusing the
Prime Minister of being soft on the BJP. Thus, the entire approach of the
Prime Minister to Ayodhya was conditioned by his personal political compulsions,
intra-party difficulties, and electoral objectives of attracting the Muslim
block votes. That this strategy greatly compromised the Courts and also
peace and tranquillity of the country did not appear to matter to the Prime
Minister at all.
The Prime Minister foists an impossible task on the Ayodhya movement in order to prevent the construction and to enforce the Court orders 1.4. The Prime Minister chose
to act clever when utmost sincerity was demanded of him as a national leader.
He forced on the Ayodhya leaders the impossible task of enforcing the Court
order banning the Kar Seva, and was enjoying the sadistic pleasure of putting
his political adversaries in a tight spot. What the Prime -Minister expected
from his design was construction in violation of Court orders, which he
could easily use for fixing the Uttar Pradesh Government and the BJP, and
sacking Shri Kalyan Singh. But neither he, nor anyone else could anticipate
the mass fury that consumed the very structure that his party had held
out as synonymous with secularism. If anyone did put the structure into
danger at the hands of Karsevaks, it was the Prime Minister himself; he
accomplished this by devising a plan that was to politically reward him
and his party, and put the Ayodhya movement on the defensive. The disciplined
leaders of the movement were willing to swallow the humiliation for the
time being as they had done in the past, though not in such acute manner;
but not the Karsevaks for whom the cause of the temple and the values that
the movement symbolised mattered above everything else.
The Prime Minister changes his tone and tack immediately after the Kar Seva pressure eased 2.1. The moment the Kar Seva
pressure on the Central Government eased due to the Sants’ decision to
stop the Kar Seva on July 26, 1992, the Prime Minister made a statement
in the Lok Sabha completely changing his tone and tack.
The disputed structure becomes “mosque” again 2.2. In the appeal to the
Sants and Mahants which was read to the Karsevaks in Ayodhya on July 24,
the Prime Minister had pleaded for the stoppage of the Kar Seva “so that
the problem of the disputed structure could be resolved in a time-bound
manner”. In fact, the choice and use of the word “disputed structure” in
the appeal was deliberate, as, on the previous day, the Sants had objected
to Shri Narasimha Rao referring to the structure as a “mosque”, unlike
the previous Prime Ministers who had always labelled it as a disputed structure.
The Press reports indicated that the Sants were happy with the Prime Minister
using the agreed expression “disputed structure” instead of the word “mosque”.
However, in his statement in the Lok Sabha on July 27, 1992 the Prime Minister
having secured the Sants’ consent to stop the Kar Seva by accommodating
them for a day with the word “disputed structure” went back to the word
“mosque”. So the disputed structure became a “mosque” again.
“Solution of the disputed structure in three months” becomes “efforts to solve in three months” 2.3. Second, while the Prime
Minister had told the Sants that “the problem of disputed structure could
be solved in a time-bound manner” in the three months period given by the
Sants, his statement to the Lok Sabha was that “the efforts to resolve
the dispute could be proceeded within a time-bound manner”, thus indicating
that there could be no solution in three months.
The Prime Minister’s commitment to the Sants to clear the way for Kar Seva held back from the public 2.4. Third, the Prime Minister had told Pujya Shri Pejawar Swamiji that he wanted the Kar Seva suspended to enable him to remove the hurdles in the way of the Kar Seva, which indicated that he had agreed to delink the Kar Seva from the dispute on structure; but, in his statement to Lok Sabha, there was not a word on removing the impediments in the way of Kar Seva. Pujya Shri Pejawar Swamiji has testified on how he met the Prime Minister and what transpired.
Not a word in the statement to the Lok Sabha that he had given such a commitment on Kar Seva. 2.5. Thus, having got the
Sants to agree to what he wanted the Prime Minister obviously changed his
track.
VHP refutes Prime Minister’s statement immediately 2.6. Shri S.C. Dixit, a VHP
leader, while speaking in the Lok Sabha on July 28, the day after the Prime
Minister’s statement, refuted the Prime Minister’s version and said: “There
is difference between Prime Minister’s understanding and that of the Sadhus
on what transpired between them and this should be cleared before any negotiation.
The Sadhus and Mahants will give three months time to the Government to
solve the problem after which the process of negotiation will no longer
be binding on them.”
The VHP maintains its position, stated on July 26, 1992, that if the problem is not solved within 3 months, the Kar Seva will commence in November 2.7. The VHP’s decision to call off the ongoing Kar Seva on July 26, 1992 was subject to the express announcement that it would be resumed at the end of the three month period. It has consistently maintained this position. The published news reports make the VHP position explicit:
2.8. Thus the VHP was never
in doubt, and never left anyone in doubt, about what the 3 months period
was for and when the Kar Seva would recommence. On 26th July, 1992 when
the Kar Seva was suspended, the VHP had made it clear that it would resume
Kar Seva in November. Ignoring everyone of these facts, the White Paper
of the Government says that the decision to resume the Kar Seva announced
on October 30-31 was sudden and inexplicable and was a unilateral course
to disrupt the negotiations. This is a false statement. There was nothing
sudden or inexplicable about the announcement on October 30-31 about the
resumption of Kar Seva. The announcement was totally consistent with the
stand taken by the VHP from day one after the July Kar Seva, namely, that
it would resume Kar Seva in November.
The hydra-headed strategy of the Prime Minister to deal with the Ayodhya issue and to corner the Ayodhya movement leaders, the BJP and the Uttar Pradesh Government 3.1.1. The multi-pronged strategy of Shri Narasimha Rao to deal with the Ayodhya issue was aimed to achieve the threefold objective (explained in Para 1.3) and to corner and fix the Ayodhya movement leaders, the BJP and the Uttar Pradesh Government for his political gain over his rivals in his party. He played a petty political game in respect of a major national issue. The hydra-headed strategy of the Prime Minister was:
The unfoldment of the Prime
Minister’s strategy took him closer to Shri V.P. Singh who had employed
most of the very means, and failed, during the year 1990. Even after having
known what Shri Chandrashekhar did between December 1990 and February 1991
Shri Narasimha Rao chose the V.P. Singh method of multiple agencies instead
of the open dialogue as the only method. Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, thus,
appeared to be an anagram for Shri V.P.Singh.
The revival of VHP-AIBMAC dialogue - delay as a method of dealing with the Ayodhya issue 3.2.1. Shri P.V. Narasimha
Rao promised in the Lok Sabha on July 27. 1992 that he would “revive the
efforts in this regard by the previous Government that had remained unfinished”.
For Shri Chandrashekar, it took 20 days to start, but for Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, it took 70 days! 3.2.2. The promise to revive the dialogue was made on July 27, 1992 and the actual revival of the dialogue was on October 3, 1992, that is, 70 days thereafter, this was to revive from where it stood suspended and not to start anything afresh like talking to the two sides and make them agree to participate in the dialogue. In contrast, Shri Chandrashekhar was sworn in: on November 10, 1992, and the first round of dialogue between ‘the VHP and the AIBMAC had taken place by the 1st of December, 1990, that is, within just 20 days. His Government could get both sides not just talk, but agree on what to talk and also to what end. 3.2.3. Shri Narsimha Rao
had no such untreaded area to begin with. The dialogue could have been
restarted from where it was left within a couple of days, if the performance
of his predecessor Government was any guidance. And yet the Rao Government
took 70 days to recommence from where it stood suspended on 6th February,
1991. This is how Shri Rao lost mm than two thirds of the time he had secured
from the Sants to solve the issue.
“Record not available” - an absurd alibi for the delay 3.2.4. As to how the Rao
Government managed to delay it so long, Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat,
who participated in the talks in 1990-91 and also in 1992, has said in
his testimony, that “even the delayed dialogue commenced only under
pressure from Parliament, and not by the volition or initiative of the
Government”. He further said that “the reason given for the delay
was that the records of the previous dialogue were not available! It
was a mockery.”
Another reason given for delay – ‘Getting the documents authenticated’ - is false; authentication was mostly over in February 1991 3.2.5. In attempting an explanation of how this delay occured, the Government ended by telling a blatant lie. The White Paper says:
How blatant a lie it is, is demonstrated by the last para of the “Note on the negotiations relating to Ramajanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute during 1990-91” made Government itself. It reads as follows:
3.2.6. Thus the authentication of historical and archaeological documents was completed and the legal and revenue documents were in the process of identification even prior to-the announcement of 1991 General Elections. 3.2.7. The White Paper writers were obviously unaware that the Note extracted above was also prepared by the very Ministry of Home Affairs which prepared the White Paper. 3.2.8. So, delay as a method
of dealing with the Ayodhya issue was one of the methods employed by the
Narasimha Rao Government.
To keep the dialogue going without breaking and to no objective or solution, so as to mark time 3.3.1. The purpose of the dialogue initiated by the Narasimha Rao Government was the dialogue itself. Testifying to the difference between the dialogue that took place during December 1990-February 1991 and the dialogue under the present Government, Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat who participated in both, and who, in fact, was instrumental in organising the first, testified as follows:
“Keep the talk going, shall see later what we want out of it”, says Shri Rao 3.3.2. Shri Shekhawat continued: “Shri Narasimha Rao was a contrast. When I asked him what was the objective of the dialogue and what should be its direction, he said: “We shall see that later, for the present, keep the talks going.” 3.3.3. It is not that Shri Shekhawat was saying all this after the event. As early as October 18, 1992 the Indian Express had reported about the manner in which the dialogue was going on. The report which was never contradicted read:
“Sit outside -the Room”, S/Shri Pawar and Shekhawat are told, and “keep advising” 3.3.4. Shri Shekhawat also revealed a stunning fact about how he was involved in the dialogue of 1992.
To use different and independent channels and circulate different proposals, with no intention to own any so that the open talks become a farce 3.4.1. This was a strategy borrowed directly from Shri V.P. Singh. There were at least four Ministers from Shri Narasimha Rao’s cabinet who were involved in negotiations, as distinct channels - Shri Sharad Pawar, Shri Rangarajan Kumaramangalam, Shri Kamalnath, and even Shri Balaram Jhakar at some stage. A group of journalists and a top intelligence official were also involved in crucial formula making. 3.4.2. Different persons
were approached to moot varying formulae for settlement. This included
even very distinguished personalities like Pujya Pejawar Swamiji and the
former president, Shri R. Venkatraman.
Efforts through Pujya Shri Pejawar Swamiji and Shri R. Venkatraman 3.4.3. In his testimony Pujya
Pejawar Swamiji says as under on his involvement:
Shri Kamalnath meets Shri Advani and Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, but Prime Minister disowns the emerging solution 3.4.5. Shri L.K. Advani the Leader of the Opposition has testified to the efforts that were made by Shri Kamalnath, the Minister of State for Environment. The summary of Shri Advani’s testimony is as under:
3.4.6. Even as Shri Kamalnath was negotiating with Shri Advani, he also mentioned the same formula to Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat and the latter also agreed that it was a workable solution. 3.4.7. On November 11, 1992,
Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat told the Indian Express that “too many cooks
were spoiling the broth. Shri Advani approved of the Kamalnath package
after discussing with VHP and RSS.” He also confirmed that “the Prime-Minister
said that he was not aware of any package”.
Efforts through the medium of three journalists and an intelligence official 3.5.1. Three leading journalists came from the National Integration Council meeting on November 23, 1992 to Keshav Kunj, the RSS headquarters at Delhi, and met Professor Rajendra Singh, a top leader of the RSS. They had after meeting the Prime Minister, brought with them a draft agreement between the Government and the VHP. The draft agreement provided as follows:
3.5.2. An identical proposal was given by a top ranking Intelligence official also. The three journalists and the IB official concerned had direct access to the Prime Minister. Professor Rajendra Singh has testified to this effect. This proposal too fell through as obviously the Prime Minister having first agreed appeared to have retracted later. 3.5.3. So whatever the proposal in circulation, they followed the prescription of delinking the Kar Seva from the structure which is a BJP solution, and the only practical one - to divide the issue between the immediate need and the ultimate issue. But the obituary of every proposal of which the Prime Minister must have been fully aware, whether authorised by him or not authorised, was pronounced by him alone. This is how different proposals
were mooted through different channels, and the Prime Minister finally
disowned everyone of them.
Attempts to divide the Ayodhya movement leadership 3.6.1. The Prime Minister
also attempted to divide the Ayodhya movement, not just through known operators
like Chandra Swami (whose intimacy with the Prime Minister is a matter
of public knowledge), but also personally.
Shri Chandra Swami’s attempts 3.6.2. As early as August
22, 1992, Shri Ashok Singhal of the VHP charged Chandra Swami with trying
to create a rift among the VHP leadership.
Attempts through emissaries 3.6.3. A telling incident
of the Prime Minister’s attempts to divide the Sants from the VHP’ and
to create a rift in the leadership of the movement has been testified to
by Pujya Shri Vamdeoji, Chairman of Ramajanmabhoomi Nirmana Krama Samiti.
According to Vamdeoji, he had a meeting with the Prime Minister at the
latter’s residence on 5th October. He was accompanied by Swami Viyogananda,
Ramakrishna Das, and Ramte Yogi. The Prime Minister bluntly told Swamiji
that the Temple would be constructed but only outside the existing structure.
This he stressed thrice. Swamiji concluded from this that there was no
point in meeting the Prime Minister again. Accordingly, he told the Sant
Sammelan on 30-31 October that he personally would not meet the PM even
if pressed to do so by the Sammelan.
Yet another attempt 3.6.4. The most explicit attempt by the Prime Minister to divide the movement - which attempt he made personally - has been testified to by Swami Paramahans Ramachandradas. He has testified:
3.6.5. The Indian Express of 26.11.92 reported the news about the unpublished meeting of Swami Paramahans with the Prime Minister and said: This report, which directly implicated the Prime Minister in attempts at excluding the VHP, was not contradicted by anyone. Swami Chinmayananda’s public charge against the Prime Minister 3.6.6. It is not that the
Prime Minister started playing the divisive game only in late November
1992. Even earlier, as Shri Ashok Singhal had already charged, Chandra
Swami was at it in the month of August. A similar position was taken in
public by one of the Sants and an important Ayodhya movement leader, Swami
Chinmayananda, in early November 1992. Swami Chinmayananda said that “Senior
VHP leaders and Sadhus were no longer prepared to negotiate with the Prime
Minister, on the Ayodhya dispute” and charged Shri Narasimha Rao with “trying
to create divisions among members of the committee of religious leaders
set up to negotiate and holding meetings with softie of them individually”.
No denial by Prime Minister or any one At no point, either personally or in public, the Prime Minister contradicted the clad or even the impression that he was trying divisive means. 3.6.7. Thus, the Prime Minister
tried every trick in his book - from Chandra Sward to Mahant Seva Das to
the Shankaracharya Shantanadaji Maharaj - to divide the Ayodhya movement
leaders, but drew a complete blank.
Withholding of the evidence collected by the Naresh Chandra Committee, the public disclosure of which could have solved the dispute 3.7.1. As detailed in Chapter IV, the Special Cell led by Shri Naresh Chandra had compiled overwhelming evidence in regard to:
Taking positions that made the Government stand clearly hostile to the Ayodhya movement 3.8.1. The Prime Minister who was supposed to take a neutral position while undertaking to solve the problem clearly took an anti-Ayodhya movement line. 3.8.2. He repeatedly declared that the disputed structure was a “mosque”.
3.8.3. Thus the Prime Minister had consistently taken a blatant pro-masjid approach - an attitude that could hardly create any confidence in the Prime Minister among the leaders of the Ayodhya movement or the Karsevaks. It was this deliberately
conceived strategy of the Prime Minister ultimately led to the disastrous
result of preventing the Kar Seva on the disputed land, but ensuring the
demolition of the disputed structure.
Sharp deterioration in the relationship between the Prime Minister and the BJP 4.1. The conduct of the Prime Minister at the time of the Kat Seva in July 1992 and from October 1992 onwards showed a contrast. While during the July Kar Seva, he sought and took the advice of the BJP/RSS leaders including S/Shri L.K. Advani, A.B. Vajpayee and Prof. Rajendra Singh, during the months of October and November, particularly towards the later half of November, he showed a perceptible distate for the suggestions and pleadings of the RSS and the BJP leadership. 4.2. There could be political reasons for this.
4.3. First, Shri L.K. Advani who had earlier praised Shri Narasimha Rao as the best Prime Minister after Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, revised his opinion after the Stock Scam and the Solanki-Bofors Scandal, and publicly came out against the Prime Minister on October 18, 1992, accusing him of abetting corruption and saying that Ayodhya and corruption would be the nemesis of the Rao Government. 4.4. Second, the BJP came out with an official statement on November 6, 1992 characterising the Narasimha Rao Government as “a national disaster” and pledging to oust it. 4.5. Thereafter the things were never the same again. To what extent the relationship de-terioriated was evident from the fact that the last time Shri Narasimha Rao met Shri L.K. Advani was on November 18, 19.92. During the most critical run up to the Kar Seva on December 6, the Prime Minister had no communication of any kind with Shri Advani. 4.6. Apart from the fact that the Prime Minister no more thought well of the BJP in the context of his own survival, according to Shri Advani, there could be another reason also. The Prime Minister was perhaps advised that since a showdown was inevitable with the Ayodhya movement ultimately (in view of the Congress Party’s and the Prime Minister’s pledge to preserve “the mosque”), why not have the showdown right now than some time later and nearer the elections? This is yet another reason, according to Shri Advani, why the Prime Minister, who was in regular communication with him, completely snapped his links with him from November 18, 1992 and never met or spoke to him. But even here the Prime Minister, according to Shri Advani, was inscrutable. 4.7. Shri Advani, wanting to be sure that because of any personal angle which could have prompted the Prime Minister to keep away from him, the cause is not affected, suggested to his senior colleague Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee that he meet the Prime Minister. Shri Vajpayee did. But, according to Shri Advani and as is obvious from subsequent events, nothing came of that meeting too. 4.8. Thus, the irresistible
inference from these developments is that the Prime Minister had really
decided to confront the Ayodhya movement without seeming to do so. Was
it because he thought that from the intra-party and electoral points of
view, it was politically wiser to confront than to so conciliate with the
BJP? It seems so. The totality of the Prime Minister’s hydra-headed strategy
was to give the appearance that he was working for conciliation while he
had already decided on a confrontation.
The circumstances leading to the announcement of Kar Seva on October 30 and 31, 1992 5.1. As already explained, the Kar Seva announcement on October 30/31, 1992 was not a sudden or new development. It was the affirmation and confirmation of a decision that had already been publicly and repeatedly stated by the Ayodhya movement leaders from July to October almost every fortnight. In fact, on the very day the Kar Seva was suspended (26 July 1992) the VHP told the Karsevaks that the Kar Seva would be resumed in November after the three months deadline expired. 5.2. The principal reasons which led to the Kar Seva announcement were:
The cumulative effect of all these factors compelled the Sants and the VHP to confirm on October 30 and 31, 1992 that the Kar Seva would commence not in November as repeatedly stated by the VHP in public, but in December, particularly on December 6, 1992. There was no surprise about the announcement at all. Only if the Dharma Sansad had decided not to do Kar Seva or to defer it, it would have been surprising. The date of the meeting of the Dharma Sansad in which over 5000 Sants were expected to participate, and eventually did was fixed as October 30 and 31, 1992, on September 29, 1992, that is, over a month earlier. So the Kar Seva announcement was no sudden or unexpected decision. 5.3. But the White Paper
published by the Government makes this announcement which it charges as
sudden, inexplicable and deliberate - as intended to disrupt the negotiations
and force a confrontation. This is clearly false in the face of the known
facts.
Frantic efforts by the BJP, the VHP and the Sants to get the Central Government to delink Kar Seva from the disputed structure, and determined efforts by the Government to thwart the delinking 6.1. The far reaching move
of the Uttar Pradesh Government to delink the Kar Seva on 2.77 acres from
the disputed structure had been thwarted by the interim injunctions which
the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court had issued at the time of
the Kar Seva in July 1992. It continued to remain crippled by the interim
orders as the hearings continued in the Allahabad High Court, day after
day and month after month. As a result, the final disposal which even the
Supreme Court expected to take place in December 1991, did not happen in
July, nor in August, nor in September nor even in October 1992. Thus even
a year after the Supreme Court expected the judgement on the land acquisition
Writs, things stood in October 1992, where they had been in October 1991.
Delay in High Court judgement unexpected and inexplicable 6.2. Despite the fact that
a well-meaning and the only practical solution had been caught in the maze
of court proceedings, the Uttar Pradesh Government, the BJP, and the Ayodhya
movement leaders were always clear that whether the judgement finally went
in favour of the acquisition or against it, the Kar Seva could commence.
As even if the judgement went against it, 2.04 acres out of 2.77 acres
acquired being owned by the VHP, it would revert only to the Ayodhya movement
and the Kar Seva could commence on that. By the time the Kar Seva decision
was formally announced on October 30 and 31, 1992, the hearing on the acquisition
Writs had virtually come to an end. Eventually, the hearing was concluded
on November 4, 1992 and the court reserved its judgement on that day. Considering
the importance of the matter and the narrow issue involved, no one expected
that the judgement would not be delivered even by December 6, 1992. The
Sants, the VHP, and the BJP were clear that whenever the judgement was
delivered, no force on earth could stop the Kar Seva on the 2.77 acres
if the court upheld the acquisition, and on 2.04 acres out of it if the
acquisition was struck down.
The High Court judgement is delayed despite the Supreme Court request in August to expedite it 6.3. But that is where the catch was. The judgement which was reserved did not come, despite the expectation to the contrary, before December 6, 1992 and finally came, much too late, on December 11, 1992. This was despite the fact that after the July Kar Seva, the Supreme Court in its order dated August 4, 1992 had clearly spelt out how an expedited judgement of the Allahabad High Court was necessary. The Supreme Court had said:
6.4. This was in August 1992.
But despite the Supreme Court order the High Court took its own time to
conclude the final hearing on November 4, 1992, reserved the judgement
which was badly needed before December 6, 1992, and did not deliver it
even as late as 25th November, 1992.
The judgement does not come even after a further request by the Supreme Court in November 1992 6.5. At this stage, the Supreme Court, which had greater appreciation of the sensitive nature of the issue, again passed an order on 25th November, 1992 as under:
6.6. The foregoing assurance by the Supreme Court suggested five distinct possibilities:
Therefore, neither the State Government nor the other leaders had any hesitation in giving a categorical and clear undertaking to the Supreme Court that no Court Order would be permitted to be violated. However, when the U.P. Government’s undertaking had been placed on the Supreme Court file, to the shock and dismay of the respondents, all that the Supreme Court ordered was as follows: “SHRI VENUGOPAL ALSO RECALLED TO US THE TERMS OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE ORDER MADE ON THE 25TH NOVEMBER, 1992 TO THE EFFECT THAT IF ANY CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE WAS FORTHCOMING FROM THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WE MIGHT CONSIDER REQUESTING THE HIGH COURT FOR AN EXPEDITIOUS DECISION OF THE MATTER. SHRI VENUGOPAL SAYS THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT BY ITS PERFORMANCE IS NOW ENTITLED TO COURT’S CONSIDERATION OF THIS PRAYER. INDEED, IN A MATTER OF THIS NATURE, IT IS NEITHER ADVISABLE NOR PRACTICABLE TO TELL THE HIGH COURT WITHIN’ WHAT TIME-FRAME IT SHOULD RENDER A JUDGEMENT; BUT HAVING REGARD TO WHAT WAS SAID ON PREVIOUS OCCASION, WE REQUEST THE HIGH COURT TO CONSIDER THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PARTIES AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF JUSTICE AND BESTOW ON IT. SUCH THOUGHT IT MIGHT CONSIDER PROPER.” In effect then, the Supreme
Court just backtracked. It did not issue any request to the High Court
that could strengthen the hands of the U.P. Government. In fact, what it
ultimately ordered emboldened the High Court to become totally impervious
to the pleas of urgency, and to decide to give its judgement only on December
11, 1992.
The Ayodhya movement and the BJP leaders plead for at least the operative part of the judgement 6.8. This is what was happening in the court, particularly in the Supreme Court, to a request to get the High Court to pass an early judgement. Outside, throughout the period subsequent to the announcement of the Kar Seva on October 31, 1992, the dialogue by the Sants, the RSS leaders, the VHP leaders, and BJP leaders centered around the single plea that the Central Government should request the Allahabad High Court to deliver the judgement, at least the operative part of the judgement, before December 6, 1992 so that the Kar Seva could go on. Scores of meetings took place throughout the month of November 1992 among different persons from the Ayodhya movement and the Ministers in Shri Narasimha Rao Government, including the Prime Minister Rao himself. 6.9. Specifically, the meetings that took place between the BJP, Ayodhya movement leaders, and independent personalities on the one hand, and the Central Ministers on the other, were as follows:
6.11. In all these meetings, the leaders of the movement pleaded for just one thing - let the Uttar Pradesh Government and the Central Government jointly approach the Supreme Court or the High Court for expediting the judgement. In fact, Shri Advani on 18th November 1992, Shri Kalyan Singh on 19th November 1992, and Prof. Rajendra Singh on 20th November 1992 and 3rd December 1992, appealed to the Prime Minister to take steps to ensure that if not the whole judgement, at least the operative part of the judgement, was pronounced before December 6, 1992. This plea was on the premise that the Kar Seva could go on peacefully and lawfully even if the judgement or the operative part of the judgement went against. This was not something which the leaders merely told the Government of India in private; it is their publicly stated position also. Shri Kalyan Singh publicly appealed to the Allahabad High Court on 18th November, 1992 to deliver at least the operative part of the judgement. 6.12. One of the last ditch
effort was made by Shri B.P. Singhal, a National Council Member of the,
BJP and a former bureaucrat. He spoke to Shri Naresh Chandra, the head
of the Special Ayodhya Cell in Prime Minister’s Office, on the morning
of December 5, 1992, and both of them agreed that on that afternoon the
Uttar Pradesh Government would plead before the Allahabad High Court that
it deliver at least the operative part of the judgement, and the Counsel
for the Central Government would support the plea. But when the Uttar Pradesh
Government moved the application pleading as agreed, the Counsel for Central
Government failed to turn up in the court, with the result that the application
made by the Uttar Pradesh Government was summarily dismissed.
The meetings with the Prime Minister were a farce, he had already decided to thwart the Kar Seva 7.1. The only sensible solution to the Ayodhya issue pending the sensitive issue of the disputed structure was to delink the karseva, and allow the construction to go on without affecting the structure. But that that was not found acceptable to the Central Government, which raised grave questions about the Government’s intentions in the matter. 7.2. Whenever the BJP leaders
or the Uttar Pradesh Government proposed the issue of Kar Seva being delinked
from the disputed structure, the Prime Minister- and the Home Minister
had no rational objection to that, but wanted the Uttar Pradesh Government
to consent to moving the Supreme Court under Article 138(2) of the Constitution.
When this suggestion was made to Shri Advani by the Prime Minister on 18th
November, 1992 and by the Home Minister on 17th November, 1992, Shri Advani
said that while BJP could not agree to invoking Article 138(2), that would
not solve the immediate problem of Kar Seva, and that Kar Seva had to be
delinked. Again, Shri Advani suggested that the Central Government could
refer the matter for judicial opinion by the Supreme Court under Article
143 and need not insist on the Uttar Pradesh Government’s consent. In fact,
Shri Kalyan Singh told the Prime Minister that the Uttar Pradesh Government
could not be party to the move under Article 138(2). He urged that Kar
Seva be delinked and permitted. Even as late as 22nd November, and 24th
November, 1992, Shri Advani publicly pleaded that the Kar Seva should be
delinked from the structure.
The Prime Minister had decided to go for confrontation 7.3. But all this was a cry
in the wilderness. All these meetings had no value; it was mere charade.
The Prime Minister had already decided a line, the line of confrontation.
But he was giving the very opposite impression, namely, that he was all
for a settlement and that the BJP and the leaders of the movement were
the law-breakers. The negative line pursued by the Prime Minister - to
delay the dialogue and other efforts; to mark time by dialogue; to operate
through multiple channels to no solution; to divide the Ayodhya movement;
to hold back and put in disuse the evidence collected; to take overt position
against the movement's' objectives and demands - ultimately left him with
no option, but to sink more and more into the quagmire of confrontation.
The Prime Minister tells the AIBMAC - Kar Seva will not he permitted 7.4. Consistent with that strategy, the Prime Minister assured the AIBMAC delegation as early as 12th November, 1992 that he "would not allow the Kar Seva and that the law would take its course"; and even before that, on 9th November, 1992, he decided to call a National Integration Council meet - the third exclusively devoted to Ayodhya. 7.5. Subsequently, in the
third and fourth weeks of November, massive and continuous reports appeared
in the Press about a contingency plan the Government of India had designed
- it meant the dismissal of the Uttar Pradesh Government.
The Central Government seeks an alibi from the court to act, but does not get any 7.6. This contingency plan commenced with an application moved by a private party before the Supreme Court, seeking to appoint the Central Government as the Receiver of the disputed structure and 2.77 acres, and to punish Shri Kalyan Singh for contempt.
The Prime Minister asked Shri Vinay Katiyar, MP (Faizabad) and leader of the Bajrang Dal, whether there, was a way to start the Kar Seva without violating court orders so that he, that is, the PM could get a few days more. Shri Katiyar answered in the affirmative. In confidence he explained that a portion of the platform adjacent to the former police outpost was outside the 2.77 acres, and that construction could be started there. But on 28th November the Attorney General asked the court to prevent the Kar Seva from being performed there also. The Supreme Court did not accept that plea. The Attorney General could not on his own have known of a plan which had been disclosed in confidence to the Prime Minister. Quite clearly, the latter had sought Shri Katiyar out merely to elicit any alternatives the Karsevaks may have open to them, so that he could have all of them blocked, and thereby deal a decisive blow to, the credibility of the Ayodhya movement. 7.7. Thus, the resolve of
the Government to prevent the Kar Seva was evident from the course of events,
notwithstanding the charade of negotiations and talks the Prime Minister
was having with the Ayodhya movement leaders.
The strategy of the Government in the final stages of the confrontation designed in November 8.1. The Central Government strategy was evident from its conduct:
The Prime Minister see the Ayodhya issue as only a poll problem, as a tussle between the Congress and the BJP 8.2. The Narasimha Rao Government obviously enjoyed the predicament of the Kalyan Singh Government to enforce the ban on construction of the Temple when it was, by its election mandate, obliged to build the Temple at Ayodhya. This was to heckle and to throw the BJP on the defensive - a politically sound strategy but, ethically and from the stand point of national interest, a disaster. The Narasimha Rao Government thus did not look beyond the political advantages it could get out of the difficulties of the Kalyan Singh Government. 8.3. In short, the Congress
Government led by Shri Narasimha Rao saw the Ayodhya issue as only a tussle
between the BJP and the Congress. And Shri Narasimha Rao also saw in it
the opportunity to outwit Shri Arjun Singh. Thus Shri Narasimha Rao and
his Government did not, arid could not, see beyond or rise above, the political
advantages that would accrue to them by their acts or omissions, regardless
whether such acts or omissions were for the larger good or not.
The strategy of the Ayodhya movement leaders in the final stages 9.1. When it was becoming
clear that the Central Government had taken a confrontations line, the
movement leaders and the Uttar Pradesh Government were working through
the Supreme Court for an expedited High Court order. Because if it were
an adverse order, Kar Seva would be legal as already discussed. They were
hoping for the judgement before December 6, 1992, especially after the
order of the Supreme Court dated 23rd November 1992. In fact, when it was
announced that the High Court would deliver the judgement on December 11,
1992, the Margadarshak Mandal directed on December 5, 1992 that the Kar
Seva not amounting to -construction would go on upto 10th December 1992,
and that from December 11, 1992, after the judgement came out, the possibility
of construction could arise.
Kar Seva Yatra by Shri L. K. Advani and Shri M. M. Joshi 10.1. When the BJP saw that the Narasimha Rao Government had become totally insensitive to the aspirations of the Hindus and stood against construction even when it was delinked from the structure, the party decided to send Shri L. K. Advani and Shri M. M. Joshi on a yatra to explain the position of the party and its Government to the people and to participate in the Kar Seva. Shri Advani commenced his yatra from Varanasi and Shri Joshi from Mathura. 10.2. The yatra received
unprecedented response. The yatra was more to expose the Central Government's
designs than to mobilise the Kar Seva. In fact, on the third day of the
yatra, the two leaders had had to appeal to the Karsevaks to defer their
departure to Ayodhya because of the unprecedented rush of Karsevaks to
Ayodhya.
Unprecedented rush of Karsevaks to Ayodhya 11.1. The Kar Seva had been
planned for 18 days from December 6, 1992 onwards. December 5, 1992 was
the day of Gitaopadesh by Lord Krishna to Arjuna. The organisers had planned
the inflow of Karsevaks so as to spread it throughout the 18-day period.
But seeing the press reports of a contingency plan of dismissal of the
Kalyan Singh Government, most of the Karsevaks who were to come later rushed
to Ayodhya. An unprecedented number, over 75,000, had reached Ayodhya by
December 4, 1992. The VHP had to issue an appeal asking the Karsevaks to
stay where they were and not to move towards Ayodhya. The unmanageable
number of Karsevaks as a result of provocative actions land speeches of
the Central Government and pseudo-secular parties and leaders, was one
of the important reasons for what happened on December 6, 1992.
Every one knows what happened at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992, but many and certainly the pseudo-secular parties and rulers do not know why it happened 12.1. The highly provocative structure on the one hand, government's calculated strategy to use courts to thwart Kar Seva and the provocative speeches of the pseudo-secular leaders in Parliament, set the stage for an emotive outburst. 12.2. The result was demolition
- an unexpected act. The Government's efforts to prevent the construction
succeeded, but only at the cost of failure to prevent demolition. The structure
was demolished, not inspite of the court orders, but because of the court
orders, and despite the efforts of the organisers. The role of the organisers
is now a matter of public knowledge. They certainly wanted the structure
to go though not the way it went. The observer appointed by the Supreme
Court reported to the court on December 6, 1992 that "no construction took
place" on that day. It is precisely because no construction took place
that the destruction happened.
Demolition - the historical and immediate provocation 12.3. The historical and immediate provocation for the demolition may be summarised as below:
12.4. The cumulative effect
of all this produced a volcanic explosion at Ayodhya which could not have
been controlled except by an understanding system - the Government, the
courts and the political parties.
A spontaneous reaction, not pre-planned 13.1. The demolition of the disputed structure was an uncontrolled and, in fact, uncontrollable upsurge of a spontaneous nature which was provoked only by the callousness of the Government in dealing with the Ayodhya issue without understanding the sensitive nature of the issue; it dealt with it as an inter-party tussle between the BJP and the Congress. A straightforward Government could have tackled it differently. But the Narasimha Rao Government chose to be cunning and conceited where the greatest understanding and sincerity was warranted. 13.2. When the demolition took place, the Prime Minister charged the movement leaders with conspiracy, criminal intent, and perfidy, in an effort to conceal the fact that the demolition was just the echo of all that he and his colleagues and comrades in ideology had said and done in the months and days preceding the Kar Seva. He even charged the Ayodhya movement leaders with pre-planning and conspiring to demolish, only to retract from the charge later. More than anyone else, it was his own Home Minister who, three weeks after the Prime Minister had alleged a conspiracy, denied it. Shri S. B. Chavan stated categorically that the demolition was not pre-planned. The Pioneer newspaper carried the following report on January 3, 1993:
What is not pre-planned can only be spontaneous. That it is the spontaneity of the Karsevaks' reaction which wiped out the disputed structure, cannot be denied even by the Narasimha Rao Government. Appendix XIV of the Government's
White Paper cites the Home Minister's Statement in Parliament on 18 December,
1992: "On 6 December 1992, initial reports from Ayodhya indicated that
the situation was peaceful. However, between 11:45 and 11:50 hours about
150 Karsevaks suddenly broke the cordon and started pelting stones at the
police personnel. Equally suddenly, about 100 Karsevaks broke the RJB-BM
structure. About 80 Karsevaks climbed the domes of the structure and started
damaging them. At 14:40 hours, a crowd of 75,000 Karsevaks was surrounding
the structure and many of them were engaged in demolishing it."
Saintly restraint shown by the Karsevaks in the past, not just on once, but on four occasions 15.1. The Karsevaks had in the past exercised saintly restraint in the face of all provocations - not once, but four times. First in November 1989, at the time of Shilanyas. Second in October 1990, at the time of the first Kar Seva; Third in December 1990, during the Kar Seva satyagraha. And last in July 1992, at the time of the previous Kar Seva which lasted for 18 days. Despite the gravest provocations, the Karsevaks were peaceful even when bullets hit them. 15.2. It was only when their
patience was tested beyond the tolerance limit of even saints, by an insincere
and insensitive Government, a judicial system that is not equipped or qualified
to adjudicate on such issues, and a heckling polity dominated by pseudo-secular
intellectuals, parties and leaders, that they reacted by being defiant
and irrepressible. The degree of their pent up anger can be gauged from
the manner in which they disregarded the appeals of the BJP-RSS-VHP leaders
not to harm the structure, and from the determined manner in which they
overcome the efforts of RSS volunteers to physically restrain them and
push them back.
Swami Vivekananda - on reconstruction of ravaged temples 16.1. What happened was not desecration, as only a non-mosque if it could ever be so-called was removed. How it happened was certainly a digression from the Hindu ethos. But Swami Vivekananda, whom even the Marxists have begun to revere as the model for modern India, obviously thought differently. This is what he says about the reestablishment of the destroyed Hindu temples:
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