HVK Archives: To sign or not to sign
To sign or not to sign - The Pioneer
AP Venkateswaran & Praful Bidwai
()
4 August 1996
Title : To Sign or not to Sign
Author : AP Venkateswaran & Praful Bidwai
Publication : The Pioneer
Date : August 4, 1996
NO -- AP Venkateswaran
In looking at the heated debate on the early conclusion
of a CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and
in particular, the 'holier than thou' attitude adopted by
the US and its allies, it is important not to overlook
some very relevant facts.
Firstly, it was India which had advocated and called for
nuclear disarmament and proposed a CTBT as early as in
1954. But this proposal was strongly opposed by the US
and every effort to achieve this objective was blocked
systematically.
As highlighted in their book Nuclear Power Struggles, by
William Walker and Mans Lonnroth, "the countries that
deserve to be the most constrained -- those engaged in
nuclear arms races have ended up being the least
constrained. An elaborate system of multilateral
control, policed mainly by the superpowers and their
allies, has been erected to deter horizontal
proliferation. But there are no equivalent multilateral
checks on the actions of the nuclear-weapon states."
Secondly, the double standard adopted by the nuclear-
weapon states stands out starkly, both in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into effect in
1970, and been recently permanently extended, as well as
on the CTBT draft currently being pushed hard by the US.
Incongruously enough, China and Russia have also been
press-ganged for this purpose, in the post-Cold War
situation. The nuclear-weapon states seem to be
blissfully oblivious to the irony implicit in their
stressing the importance of retaining nuclear arms for
their own security, while sanctimoniously campaigning and
arm-twisting other countries against nuclear
proliferation.
In the case of the NPT, a full 25 years and five review
conferences later, nothing has been done to implement
Article VI of the Treaty, in accordance with which the
nuclear weapon countries had committed themselves to
nuclear disarmament.
Thirdly, it is a deliberate distortion to project India's
reservations on the CTBT draft as an effort to obstruct a
disarmament measure. If it is to be truly comprehensive
in scope, the CTBT should cover tests in all nuclear
categories. It cannot exempt sub-critical tests, as the
present CTBT text does. More over, there must be a firm
commitment for the elimination of nuclear weapons, within
a specified time-frame. The crude attempt to tie India
down by making the entry-into-force of the CTBT
conditional on India's signature, is also not acceptable.
India has to stand firm and not permit a perverse CTBT to
go through. We should also insist that every nuclear-
weapon state must solemnly pledge that it will not be the
first to use nuclear weapons. If that happens, it will
provide the necessary basis for proceeding further with
nuclear disarmament. China has done so and the erstwhile
USSR had made that pledge, but subsequently Russia
retracted it. The US, UK and France have consistently
refused to do so. What solace or comfort, then, can non-
nuclear states gain from a flawed NPT or a meaningless
CTBT?
It is debatable whether atomic weapons Would have been
used against Japan, if the latter had also possessed
them. If one goes by the theories of nuclear deterrence
popular with US strategists, it would have been unlikely.
India, with the second largest population, has the right
to become a nuclear weapons state.
As for possible consequences, such as sanctions, which
are held up as bogeys, their effects will be marginal and
shortlived, taking into account the changing
international configuration. Only an oil sanction by the
UN will hurt India substantially, but that would be
extremely difficult for the US to push through.
If, indeed, as the US Secretary of State has reportedly
stated in categorical terms last week that "the US is not
prepared to agree to total nuclear disarmament at the
present time," India should be equally firm in its
position that the CTBT, as it now stands, is totally
unacceptable. It is not often in a country's history
that principle and national interest coincide. This is
one such occasion.
YES -- Praful Bidwai
By keeping out or blocking the CTBT, India is making a
terrible mistake -- it is opposing a worldwide movement
towards nuclear arms control and disarmament, though the
movement is still weak, halting and uncertain.
The argument that the CTBT only bans "nuclear test
explosions and any other nuclear explosions" and will
drive all "future testing to laboratories" is specious.
Computers don't tell you what you don't already know.
They cannot replace explosive testing which alone
generates the data needed to benchmark, validate and
revise codes. Being highly complex, non-linear systems,
involving extreme temperatures, nuclear weapons cannot be
easily simulated. Thus the CTBT will effectively prevent
the development of third- and fourth-generation weapons,
like directed energy and microwave weapons, Stars Wars-
type lasers, and mini- and macronukes that can be used to
devastating effect in battlefield. India, therefore, has
more to gain than lose from CTBT.
The nuclear deterrence argument is equally disturbing.
Nuclear deterrence is a highly rated currency of power.
It leads to a continuous degeneration of strategic
dialogue. Some one's deterrence is another one's threat.
It escalates the level of threat and stokes the levers of
constant combat preparedness. The deterrence balance
works for a short time. It has been the main fuel of
arms race in the last 50 years. It is a degraded
doctrine with very limited use.
Even India has argued that it is abhorrent doctrine. No
one has any right to kill millions of innocent civilians.
Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate weapons of mass
destruction. They are not legitimate weapons for self-
defence. It is sad that India has fallen into this
terrible trap of the hawks.
In the recent past three nuclear states -- Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan -- have voluntarily given up
nuclear weapons and three other nuclear threshold states
-- South Africa, Brazil and Argentina -- have closed
their nuclear options. The world has further witnessed
the actual dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons
under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II). More
restraint measures are on the anvil, especially a fissile
material cutoff and no first use agreement. A CTBT will
strengthen the process.
The linkage between the CTBT and a time-bound framework
for complete disarmament is absurd. What is important is
the goal of disarmament, not its procedure. Further, the
CTBT is a significant arms-restraint measure. It was
never meant to be a disarmament treaty. Even when Nehru
proposed it in 1954, it was still a Stand-still
Agreement, part of the process towards disarmament. Can
New Delhi give a time-bound commitment to solve the
Kashmir problem or London for the Northern Ireland
problem? This condition is only an excuse not to sign
the Treaty. India is doing what everyone sees as
devious, dishonest and nothing to do with genuine notions
of security.
A CTBT will not eliminate India's nuclear capability. It
will only prohibit tests and not eliminate either the
materials or technology with which to make weapons. Even
K Sunderji, a well-known nuclear hawk, concedes that the
CTBT will not affect India's ability to build a reliable
small nuclear arsenal (although its strategic value and
morality is questionable).
For India, CTBT will enhance regional security as it will
prevent Pakistan and China from developing new generation
of nuclear weapons. It will create a conducive
atmosphere where also the kinds of arms transfers
(Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan) and secret nuclear
co-operation and exchanges will become more difficult.
Regional co-operation is closely tied up with CTBT.
The CTBT draft also offers a country to withdraw from the
Treaty "in supreme national interest" by giving six-month
notice in advance. India can exercise this option.
Back
Top
|
