HVK Archives: Reason should replace sentimentalism
Reason should replace sentimentalism - The Financial Express
Sushant Sareen
()
4 September 1996
Title : Reason should replace sentimentalism
Author : Sushant Sareen
Publication : The Financial Express
Date : September 4, 1996
The expectations of a detente between India and Pakistan
which had arisen after the United Front Government
assumed office have predictably been dashed on the rocks
of reality. The reasons for this are not far to see.
The basic problem in bringing back on the rails the
almost non-existent relations between the two neighbours
remains as before. The points of reference as well as
the approach to the disputes between the two countries
have remained unchanged. Also unchanged are the
unrealistic and unfounded assumptions which each country
makes about the other. It is on the basis of these
warped assumptions that they have relentlessly tried to
effect a working relationship whenever there is a change
of government in either of the countries.
This time too it was no different. The Pakistani
leadership saw a glimmer of hope in the UF Government and
convinced itself that Prime Minister H D Deve Gowda, a
South Indian and a non-Congressman, unencumbered by the
anti Pakistani prejudices of a North Indian or a Congress
leader, would be more amenable to resolving issues with
Pakistan.
There were other equally important factors in their
assessment of the situation. Gowda appointed I K Gujral,
a man whose desire for friendly relations with Pakistan
is genuine, as his foreign minister. The UF's unique
selling proposition was aggressive secularism and,
therefore, the Pakistanis believed that the UF would not
have the animosity which Pakistan expects from a Congress
or BJP Government. Finally, the manifesto of the Janata
Dal had promised that discussions with Pakistan will be
held to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, keeping in
view the sentiments of the people of the State. Pakistan
must have thought that under the UF government, India
would accept the conditions Pakistan would impose for
effecting a detente, namely solving of the core issue of
Jammu and Kashmir.
It is now apparent that the basic premises upon which
Benazir Bhutto took the initiative to offer talks to
Gowda were as flawed as the earlier Indian assumption
that the restoration of democracy in Pakistan would lead
to better Indo-Pak relations. In any case, not many
people in Pakistan were sanguine about the Indian
government resolving the core dispute. Of course, their
reasons differed from those of the sceptics in India.
But this was inevitable given the divergence in the
positions, perceptions and assumptions of the two states.
Pakistan considers Kashmir to be the core issue in its
relations with India. It claims that once this issue is
resolved, an era of peace and prosperity (friendship is
not mentioned) would descend upon the subcontinent. But
for the solution to be acceptable it must be resolved
entirely according to Pakistan's prescriptions-which is a
plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir (POK being a settled
issue).
Pakistan seems to have once again adopted the pre-
partition logic of vetoing any solution which does not
conform to the scheme of things it has in mind. The
options in the proposed plebiscite are limited to
choosing between India and Pakistan. And any political
initiative that the Indian Government takes on its own is
unacceptable unless the sole spokesmen of the
Kashmiris the pro-Pakistan All Party Hurriyat Conference
are not party to it.
The rigid and uncompromising stand that Pakistan has
taken on Kashmir has led to a situation in which it
insists that there will be no negotiations with India on
any other issue unless the question of Kashmir is first
settled. Pakistan seems to have come to believe that
India has so much at stake in establishing peaceful and
friendly relations with Pakistan. India can be pushed to
accept any Pakistani prescriptions on the core issue.
This impression has to some extent been strengthened by
some Indian intellectuals and commentators who, not
realising their complete irrelevance, insist upon making
inane statements and promoting utterly impractical
solutions. Pakistan also believes that if it holds out
the horrible spectre of another war, threatening a
possibility of nuclear exchange, it will be able to make
India quiver with fear and at the same time force the
world powers to intervene in what is essentially a
bilateral dispute.
But before one falls for the argument that Kashmir will
lead either to an Armageddon or some sort of
subcontinental utopia, one must pause and reflect on some
basic questions. It is true that Kashmir is an area on
which there is no agreement between India and Pakistan.
But are there any areas of agreement at all between the
two on which they can cooperate and reap the benefits of
such cooperation? If there are, then what is wrong with
the Indian position of at least going forward on them and
resolving the more contentious issues later? This will
help in building confidence in both countries and will
also help them in making a cost-benefit analysis between
confrontation and cooperation. If this happens, Pakistan
may well realise that good relations are more important
for them than they are for India.
Pakistan needs to reconsider its all-or-nothing position
on Kashmir and ask whether Kashmir is the problem or a
symptom of a larger problem. Let us for one moment
imagine that all the demands made by the Pakistanis on
Kashmir are conceded. Will this remove all the
insecurities and identity problems that have plagued
Pakistan vis-a-vis India' P Will the Pakistani army allow
itself to be demilitarised and stripped of the perks and
privileges that it has gained during the years of
confrontation with India? Will India no longer be
considered the worst enemy? Will Pakistan suddenly get
over its fear, nurtured over decades, that India wants to
either gobble them up or reduce them to a client state?
Will Kashmir remove the decades of indoctrination and
hatred against Hindus to which generations of Pakistanis
have been subjected?
The peace dividend which is supposed to result from
thawing of Indo- Pak relations (a concept being
popularised by the noted Pakistani economist Mahbub-ul-
Haq) also needs to be examined. Development has suffered
not on account of defence spending but because of the
rampant corruption and the pathetic delivery mechanism of
the two governments. One cannot help but invoke the
observation made by Rajiv Gandhi that only 1 5 per cent
of the funds reach the target groups. The rest are used
to either administer the schemes or are skimmed by the
politician-bureaucrat-contractor combine. The situation
is equally bad, if not worse, in Pakistan. Thus, funds
released from demilitarisation will only lead to a
situation in which jobs in the military will be replaced
by spawning civilian bureaucracies with the end result
being that we will neither have efficient development nor
effective defence. In any case, peace dividend is a
theoretical concept with a purely notional value.
The Indians too need to alter their common perceptions
and assumptions of Pakistan and Pakistanis which have
been framed by the `Lahore school.'Taking out candle
light processions to the border and mindlessly insisting
that we are one people simply because we sport the same
colour and character, at least some speak a common
language and many among us have relatives and good
friends across the border, is to question the very
foundation of Pakistan. It is bound to raise the hackles
of the Pakistanis who will see it as another Hindu
conspiracy to destroy Pakistan. India must learn to deal
with Pakistan as a separate and sovereign nation and its
people as a separate people. It is a country with which
we have currently an adversarial relationship. If we
wish to transform this into a friendly relationship, we
must reduce areas of disagreement and enlarge areas of
agreement. There should be no attempt to appeal to
emotion where use of cold reason ought to prevail.
Back
Top
|
