HVK Archives: Religio-Nationalism
Religio-Nationalism - The Times of India
Dipankar Gupta
()
6 September 1996
Title : Religio-Nationalism Dissensions within the BJP
Author : Dipankar Gupta
Publication : The Times of India
Date : September 6, 1996
Recent dissensions within the ranks of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) have certainly undermined its claim of
being a disciplined and united organisation. Indeed, Mr
Shankersinh Waghela's expulsion from the party and his
unrepentant reaction to it signal a deeper malaise. The
Waghela affair is not just a freak incident within an
otherwise united family. It calls for a closer analysis
of the principles on which religio-nationalist
organisations are formed.
Some religio-nationalist organisations like the Shiv Sena
openly proclaim their anti-democratic preferences. But
then there are many like the BJP that would still like to
function on democratic lines. This is one of the many
factors of discord between the Shiv Sena and the BJP,
though on the face of it the two appear very compatible.
The hard thing about democracy is not that it allows
discussions and considers different points of view, but
that it also allows one to change one's goals, and
rationally choose between alternatives.
Little Room
In religio-nationalist bodies there is little room for a
reconsideration of alternatives. The slightest dithering
on this score can bring about an organisational collapse.
These parties must necessarily be clear, unambiguous and
unflinching about their political aspirations. For
instance, the primary aim of the BJP and the Shiv Sena is
to teach the Muslims a lesson and assert Hindu pride
nation-wide. It is their uncompromising assertion of
ultimate values that makes these organisations more like
social movements than political parties. Hence even when
they are in power, they must initiate movement-like
elements into their political programme. The Shiv Sena
wants to send bar-girls home before it gets too late, and
the BJP started the Ayodhya affair even while it was in
power in Uttar Pradesh.
As long as movement-like elements dominate such parties,
procedures for a democratic reconciliation of differences
will hardly receive any consideration. This explains why
religio-nationalist organisations are generally
authoritarian in character. The Shiv Sena exemplifies
this in a near-ideal fashion. Mr Bal Thackeray is the
unquestioned senapati of his party and all those who do
not agree with him are peremptorily shown the door.
The BJP is, however, caught in a dilemma. While it does
not openly flout inner party democratic norms the way the
Shiv Sena does, it cannot allow its movement-like
features to diminish either. This would be
organisational suicide. In fact the BJP was practically
wiped out in the 1984 elections because it campaigned on
a democratic and secular manifesto. Other parties like
the Congress have less difficulty in switching goals.
>From import substitution they can become advocates of
export promotion and economic globalisation and yet gain
in strength as the Rajiv Gandhi period demonstrates. As
parties like the Congress are not driven by commitment to
ultimate values they are organisationally better equipped
to respond to internal pressures and redefine their
objectives.
Different Logic
But the BJP operates on a different logic. It gives
primacy to ultimate values and goals. This is the reason
it finds it difficult to control power tussles as
democratic procedures have little credibility within the
organisation even though they have not been overtly
undermined. in such instances, political rivalries within
the party can only be resolved by an authoritarianism of
a different sort. The authoritarianism is not founded on
naked power - as with the Shiv Sena. It is far more
subtle in character. It is a cultural authoritarianism
based on status. It demands acquiescence to a certain
kind of lifestyle. It is this favoured lifestyle that
determines, among other things, political choices and
modes of activism.
In the past it was much easier for the BJP to exercise
this subtle silken, or velvet-gloved, authoritarianism
for, the party was still quite small. It was limited to
urban and literate Hindus. This brought about a rather
homogeneous cultural base that allowed an
authoritarianism of lifestyles and etiquette to monitor
the party's functioning. But this restricted support
structure also made the BJP electorally insignificant.
In order to meet the imperatives of electoral politics,
the BJP worked hard to enlarge its mass base by reaching
out to the rural population and to the so-called backward
castes.
Now that the BJP is consciously trying to go beyond its
earlier Brahmin-Bania confines it is forced to project
the interests of other ranks and strata within the Hindu
community. This has led to tensions within the
organisation. That the BJP could be riven, both in
Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, by factions such as those led
by Mr V.K. Saklecha, Mr Sunderlal Patwa and Mr Waghela,
would have been unthinkable some years ago.
Though the late RSS chief, Balasaheb Deoras, and others
like him may have strenuously argued against casteism,
both the RSS and the BJP were, till very recently, upper
caste and urban in their membership. In that sense they
never really had to face the alternative lifestyles,
ethics and ambitions of non-urban backward castes within
their respective organisations. It was only when Kurmi
BJP leaders like Mr Vinay Katiyar emerged in Uttar
Pradesh, or leaders of backward castes like Mr Waghela
began to nurse ambitions of their own in Gujarat, that
the varieties of political styles, and their accompanying
mass bases, within the so-called Hindutva fold became
apparent.
It is not as if these other non-urban classes and
backward caste BJP activists are less zealous about
Hindutva. There are after all Hindus and Hindus: the
Jats do not get along with the Gujjars, the Gujjars are
contemptuous of the Kurmis, the peasant castes together
distrust the village Banias, and the list goes on. Such
cleavages in routine existence can be expressed through a
religious idiom, but religion here is used and understood
differently by different sections of the community.
Ultimate Goal
Such an admission will not do at all for religio-
nationalist parties. This explains why the BJP strives
so hard to present an unified pan-Hindu view of its
ultimate goal and necessarily depends on urban elites to
articulate its ideologies and programmes. It is the
urban literate that are most pretentious about being
universally representative. As they have literacy and
textually sanctioned high culture as their assets, they
believe that they alone can give an all-India perspective
and rise above caste and regional differences. It is
they who dictate the terms on which the authoritarianism
of lifestyle and etiquette is founded.
As long as the BJP's membership was predominantly of the
urban upper caste kind the authoritarianism of status
that these ideologues propagated was warmly received.
The party thus appeared to be committed and disciplined.
But this unity was superficial as it was not built on a
conscious working out of procedural norms. This became
all too evident once the BJP expanded to include members
of other strata into its fold. There is not a single
unit of the BJP anywhere that is not troubled by
dissensions.
A religio-nationalist party therefore has only two
options. Either it remains openly dictatorial and
ridicules all democratic forms like the Shiv Sena and
other fascist organisations do worldwide. Or it stays as
a small and cohesive status-conscious political group, as
the RSS and the Jana Sangh used to be. Since the BJP
wants to be neither, it faces a systemic crisis. The
Waghela affair is just the beginning.
(The author teaches sociology at JNU)
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