HVK Archives: A reactive security policy
A reactive security policy - The Economic Times
K Subrahmanyam
()
25 January 1997
Title : A reactive security policy
Author : K Subrahmanyam
Publication : The Economic Times
Date : January 25, 1997
The Centre for Policy Research and the newly inaugurated
International Centre, Goa held a joint seminar on January 13-16,
1997 on a long term integrated approach to national security. This
is perhaps the highest level seminar on the subject held in the
country. The participants included one former defence minister (Mr
K C Pant) a former minister of state for defence and former
Scientific Adviser (Dr Raja Ramanna) two former chiefs of staff
(Air Chief Marshal Mehra and General Rodrigues), two former vice
chiefs of naval staff (Admirals K K Nayyar and S N Govil), two
former foreign secretaries (Mr M K Rasgotra and Mr J N Dixit), one
former chief of intelligence (Mr A N Verma) a former specialist in
internal security (Mr Ved Marwah), a former secretary, defence
production and defence analyst (Mr K Subrahmanyam), an analyst in
techno-strategic issues ( Professor Brahma Chellany) a former
director, IIT ( Professor Indiresan), a senior media person (Dr
Pran Chopra), a political scientist ( Professor Peter D'Souza) and
the Director of Centre for Policy Research (Dr Pai Parandiker).
The subjects covered were the strategic perspective for next twenty
years, technology export controls and constraints on Indian
security, maintaining a strong conventional defence capability,
role of naval power in safeguarding India's strategic interests,
responding to nuclear threats, countering missile threats, internal
security and meeting threats of terrorism and insurgency, role of
science and technology in national security, China, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Central Asia and intelligence capabilities as
instruments of security.
The following consensus emerged from the seminar deliberations
though it cannot be said the degree of consensus was the same in
respect of all issues. The end of the cold war had not led to great
powers abandoning the use of weapons of mass destruction as
currency of power. Even as probability of high intensity
inter-state wars has come down there is a pronounced trend towards
hegemonism among the leading powers. Flaunting of nuclear weapons
is used to engender a sense of insecurity among nations and then to
exploit that insecurity to impose hegemony. The so-called arms
reductions are only rationalisations of arsenals of mass
destruction and there is no political will towards genuine
disarmament. The probability of the international system evolving
into polycentrism is higher than that of uni-polarity and
bipolarity, though US is attempting to manipulate from outside an
Asian balance of power system over which it expects to have an
overall control. There are grave risks of this attempt failing and
China emerging as the second hegemon. It is against this background
the recent strategic partnership between China and Russia has to he
viewed.
If India is to emerge as a major economic power, given its
geographic location it cannot escape being a significant player in
strategic and technological fields as well. In that context if
India is to attenuate the impact of technology denial regimes there
is an urgent need to prioritise our R&D effort to apply resources
on those areas which are vital to our needs and which are likely to
be denied. India should also formulate a coherent strategy to use
imports of major high technology products (like Jet airliners) to
bargain hard for other technologies. China has set an example in
this respect. There are technology leakages from developed
countries and they should be exploited to the fullest extent.
Crucial weakness in regard to maintaining a cost-effective
conventional defence capability was identified as lack of political
direction and structural deficiencies in decision making. The
country has not developed an adequate foreign policy and defence
establishments which could influence Parliament and the government.
Ad-hocism dominates our decision making culture. This applies
especially to development of our navy which requires long lead
time. The discussion emphasised the linkage between maritime
capability and energy security and the need to raise the risks of
those inclined to use long range missiles in punishing strikes.
On the nuclear issue the participants felt that the 'mantra' of
keeping the option open was meant to cover up indecisiveness of the
government and on occasions the government yielding to external
pressures. The seminar was of the view that India must have a
minimum nuclear and missile deterrent capability and that is quite
affordable: the missiles and nuclear weapons so long as they
existed constituted a threat to our security even if threats are
not identified with particular countries. Capabilities of other
countries are the real threats while intentions may change in short
time.
The phenomenology of insurgencies and terrorism was discussed in
the light of experiences in Punjab, J & K and North East. The main
weaknesses were lack of assessments of emerging situations well in
advance, sacrifice of principled politics and good governance at
the altar of political expediency and lack of coherent policies and
often the absence of integrated command and control. There was
general agreement that army's involvement should be minimised even
as it was recognised that with political interference and
consequent deterioration in the morale and quality of police and
paramilitary forces this is not easy.
On China it was felt that while it would be a mistake to identify
China as a potential adversary it has to be noted that developments
in China as the largest country of the world and potentially the
most powerful nation of Asia being our neighbour will have
multifaceted impact on our security. China's interactions with
other major powers of the world may have an adverse impact on India
as the Sino-Sovict conflict did in 1962. Therefore China can never
be out of our purview while assessing India's security environment.
There was a large measure of agreement that India cannot influence
the developments in Pakistan. The Indian task should concentrate on
minimising the fall out effects of the Pakistani developments.
There was some disagreement whether Pakistan becoming a failed
state would affect the Indian interests positively or negatively
and the opinion was somewhat evenly divided. On Afghanistan, Iran
and Central Asia while the strategic importance of this area to our
security was well recognised it was obvious that India cannot join
the other three major players China, Russia and US since India's
military strategic potential is virtually zero. India could do
more in terms of investments, technical assistance, etc., but
though there have been large scale political contacts not much has
been done for making the Indian presence felt in this area.
On the role of intelligence to support our national security effort
it was readily conceded that in the absence of political and
institutional direction the agency itself sets up its own agenda.
There is no legislation governing the agency nor any oversight
mechanism with the result there is no accountability at all. While
the emphasis is on collection of intelligence the agency does not
employ high quality personnel for analysis. The agency's full
potential can be utilised only if there is a professional body to
direct and supervise it like the National Security Council.
There was unanimous agreement on the need to set up a National
Security Council with a highly professional secretariat while the
formation of the Council itself presents no problem since it would
be the same as Cabinet committee on Political Affairs. It is the
setting up a strong, adequately staffed independent professional
secretariat which is being resisted by the bureaucracy. The
overall conclusion at the end of the seminar is that the problem in
respect of national security is ad-hocism and absence of long range
assessment and planning process, as it is in all other areas of
governance as well.
Back
Top
|
