HVK Archives: Secularism in the time of Hindutva
Secularism in the time of Hindutva - The Hindu
Mushirul Hasan
()
11 May 1997
Title : Secularism in the time of Hindutva
Author : Mushirul Hasan
Publication : The Hindu
Date : May 11, 1997
As the country celebrates 50 years of independence, we are bound to reflect on
the major theme of secularism. Already, scholarly journals and newspapers in
India and overseas have generated lively discussions on the strength and failings
of the secular experiment.
In recent years, many of the debates are centred on the arguments outlined in the
works of T. N. Madan and Ashis Nandy. The former, a social anthropologist,
declared in 1987 that "at present secularism in South Asia as a general shared
credo of life is impossible, as a basis for state action impracticable, and as a
blueprint for the future, impotent". Likewise Ashis Nandy, also a noted scholar,
argues that both the ideology and politics of secularism have largely exhausted
their possibilities and that it was necessary to play around with a different
conceptual frame.
These are major interventions and should not be dismissed lightly. More so,
because the arguments, if not the implications, have secular underpinnings. They
must command attention at a time when secularism as a concept and as a state
policy is under critical scrutiny.
One thing is clear. Recent debates on secularism, though triggered by the
Hindutva campaigns, take up much the same issues that engaged the Constituent
Assembly members after independence. There was much confusion then, as now, about
the scope, relevance and meanings of secularism. There was uncertainty and
scepticism in the hallowed precincts of the Assembly, just as clouds of doubt
hover around academic and political circles today. Secularism was equated with
western liberalism or with minority appeasement. It still is. Many members argued
then. just as they do now, that the "hegemonic language of secularism" (Nandy) was
no more than a western import grafted on a traditional society. The argument is
tenable for the Nehru era but not thereafter. After all, the secular ideology has
been in a state of steady decline from the early 1970s and its appeal has
diminished even among Nandy's "westernised intellectuals and middle classes".
I return once more to the Constitution makers whose perspective, though now-a-days
repudiated in some circles, must provide ideological sustenance to the democratic
and secular forces. What needs to be underlined is that the issue before many of
them was not the European origin of the secular idea but its rightful
appropriation in a country of diverse faiths, multiple identities and varied
cultural and intellectual norms. Moreover, they were not bogged down, as is the
social science fraternity today, by finer issues of definition, categorisation and
application of secularism. They wanted to ensure that its essence - the
impartiality and neutrality of the State in its relations with the religious
institutions and practices of the different communities - was not lost on the
people. Their aim was to prescribe norms for a democratic civil society, foster
inter-community relations without reference to scriptures or religious texts, and
develop, what was Jawaharlal Nehru's great passion, a scientific temper without
being encumbered by the weight of scholasticism and traditionalism. This was a
modern goal, a rational goal, and an Indian goal. And Nehru, unlike most Third
World leaders, very nearly succeeded in achieving his goal.
The inspiration came from different sources - from the 19th Century British
liberalism, Fabian socialism, and the revolutionary fervour generated by socialism
and communism. But the reference point was the Congress-led liberation struggle
and its broadly secular goals. Independence, the adoption of a democratic
Constitution thereafter, and the hegemony of the Congress not only changed the
political landscape but also paved the way for marshalling the secular forces.
Most grasped the significance of and accepted the implications of their action.
This was because the major players in the Congress and in the Left movement knew
full well that the secular model alone could contain centrifugal tendencies
threatening to undermine the already fractured social structure after 1947. No
wonder secularism, along with "democratic socialism", occupied centrality in their
public discourse. It remained, at least in public pronouncements and party
manifestoes, "a priceless heritage of our country, the foundation on which a
progressive modern state can be built for the welfare of the common man
Secularism itself acquired new meaning and found new modes of expression. This
was not something one could decry. An inflexible, static and doctrinaire
definition would have inhibited newly-emerging social classes and political elite
from being closely identified with the values and symbols associated with the
changing political climate. In fact, a redeeming feature of the post-Nehruvian era
was that these groups did not, as was predicted. shun the secular model. instead,
they enriched its social content. That is how its appeal went far beyond the
charmed circle of the elite. This is probably why what began as a mere experiment
in a riot- ravaged and communally-polarised India of 1947-49 acquired a fair
degree of legimation in the political, cultural and intellectual discourse of the
time.
There is no denying the rise of obscurantist and "fundamentalist" forces and the
gradual weakening of secular tendencies. This is not surprising, for the dice is
loaded against secularism and multi-culturalism not just in India but in many
other societies as well. Yet one must not brush aside the gains and the bright
spots in our country's slow and tardy progress towards achieving the avowed goal
of a secular polity.
This is one of the many reasons why it is worth restoring the democratic and
secular consensus of the 1950s, the outcome and the most powerful legacy of the
anti-colonial struggle, and reiterating Nehru's secular agenda which provides a
raison d'etre for a rapprochement between diverse and conflicting sectarian and
communitarian perceptions and goals. Perhaps, the agenda bears the imprint of
ambiguity and needs to be redefined in parts. Perhaps, it needs to be tailored
and trimmed to suit the rapidly changing realities of political life. Still, the
ideological underpinnings of the democratic and secular consensus, envisaged by
the architects of India's Constitution and assiduously cultivated by the country's
first prime minister, are as relevant today as they were in his lifetime.
For scholars like Madan, the principal question is not whether Indian society will
eventually become secularised as Nehru believed it would, but rather whether it is
desirable that it should. I would imagine that the Nehruvian vision is as
important as the commitment to the secular ideal.
Notwithstanding the consequences of the Hindutva campaign and the passive role of
the State in allowing the anti-secular forces to run amuck and seize the
initiative in the public realm, there is still a glimmer of hope in the coalition
of democratic forces, in the popular revulsion against the excesses of the
religious right, and in the sheer diversity of Indian society. If such a
coalition receives the mandate of the electorate, we can argue with greater
confidence that secularism as a general credo of life is possible, as a basis for
State action practicable, and as a blueprint for the future desirable.
(The author is Pro Vice-Chancellor and Professor of History, Jamia Millia
University, New Delhi.)
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