HVK Archives: Arms & the mahatma - No place for pacifism in security
Arms & the mahatma - No place for pacifism in security - The Times of India
K Subrahmanyam
()
8 May 1997
Title : Arms & the mahatma - No place for pacifism in security
Author : K Subrahmanyam
Publication : The Times of India
Date : May 8, 1997
In the 50th year of Indian independence it is appropriate to reflect on the
transition of the British Indian Army to the Indian Army. The 2.7 million-strong
army's contribution to the victory over Nazism, fascism and Japanese militarism
was next only to that of Russia, China, the US and Britain and led to India
becoming a founder member of the UN even without its being independent. The Indian
National Army fighting against the British and the rising resentment in the
British Indian forces were significant factors in persuading the British that the
time had come to transfer power and leave India.
Significant Factor
It is against this background that one welcomes the publication of the memoirs of
Major General A A Rudra recorded by Maj General D K Palit. General Rudra was from
the same batch of Indian officers as Field Marshal Cariappa who graduated from
Indore cadet college in 1920. Before that the British Indian Army was run
entirely by British officers. The British felt safer to Indianise the Indian
judiciary, the civil service and the police almost 50 years earlier than the
British Indian Army officer corps. General Rudra fought in World War I as a
soldier in the British Army and was selected for the King's Commission but because
of the excess availability of British officers, was sent down to Indore and
thereby became junior to Cariappa.
Some in India have criticised the British Indian Army as a mercenary force and
anti-Indian. General Rudra was the son of Principal Rudra of the St. Stephen's
College who sent his Vice Principal C F Andrews to South Africa to bring Mahatma
Gandhi over to India. He was host to Gandhi for nine years and, therefore, Rudra
developed close links with Gandhi. Once he sought Gandhi's advice on whether he
should continue in the Army or give up that career as the independence struggle
gathered momentum. Gandhi first evaded giving an answer and finally replied," We
are a poor, uneducated, unarmed people - we can never fight the British. But I do
not despair. I know my Englishman. He will deal with us honourably. When the
time is ripe and if our cause is a righteous one and if our country is ready for
it, he will give us our freedom on a platter. And, then Ajit, when we are a free
country we shall have to have an Army."
According to the instructions issued by the C in C of India, Field Marshal
Auchinleck to all senior commanders of the Army in 1944 that they should make it a
point to meet Gandhi, General Sir Arthur Smith of the Eastern Command met Gandhi
at Rudra's insistence. The next day he told Rudra "Do you know that Gandhi and I
talked for nearly an hour? Charming chap. I was much impressed with him,
particularly his views on Boer War, India, his aims and aspirations and a host of
other subjects. I have arranged to meet him again."
General Rudra was very close to Field Marshal Auchinleck from the days the latter
was a British Indian Army colonel. Rudra never saw action in World War II and was
used by the British to counter the Japanese propaganda and deal with the INA
question. He persuaded Bhulabhai Desai to undertake the defence of the INA
officers. At the time of transfer of power he became the military secretary and
was adviser to both Auchinleck and defence minister Baldev Singh. He also records
how the first paper drafted by the chiefs of staff in independent India on threats
to security and containing recommendations about dealing with them and asking for
a government directive on defence policy was dealt with by Prime Minister Nehru.
When General Sir Robert Lokhart took it to him, the Prime Minister blew his top
and said "Rubbish. Total rubbish. We don't need a defence plan. Our policy is
non-violence. We foresee no military threats. Scrap the Army. The police are
good enough to meet our security needs". According to Rudra, the Pakistani
invasion of Kashmir saved the Indian Army.
Military Training
Contrast Nehru's attitude to that of Gandhi. General Cariappa went and sought his
advice in December 1947 a month before his death. Cariappa asked Gandhiji "I
cannot do my duty well by the country if I concentrate only on telling troops of
non-violence, all the time subordinating their main task of preparing themselves
efficiently to be good soldiers. So I ask you, please, to give me the 'Child's
guide to knowledge' - tell me, please, how I can put this over the spirit of
non-violence to the troops, without endangering their sense of duty to train
themselves well professionally as soldiers". Gandhi did not assert like Nehru
that our policy was non-violence and there was no need for an army. He said, "You
have asked me to tell you in a tangible and concrete form how you can put over to
the troops the need for non-violence. I am still groping in the dark for the
answer. I will find it and give it to you some day". Earlier in 1928 Gandhi wrote
"If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in
any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the
military training of those who wish to take it. For I know that all its members
do not believe in non-violence to the extent I do. It is not possible to make a
person or society non-violent by compulsion".
Gandhi was not only not against sending the Indian army to Kashmir in 1947 but
even earlier on September 26, 1947, said that while he had always been an opponent
of all warfare if there was no other way of securing justice from Pakistan, if
Pakistan persistently refused to see its proved error and continued to minimise
it, war would be the only alternative left to the government. But war was no
joke, that way lay destruction but he could never advise anyone to put up with
injustice. If all the Hindus were annihilated for a just cause; he would not mind
it. True, his own way was different, he worshipped God which was truth and
non-violence. But "he was not the government". (Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The
last phase P472, P502)
A Realist
What this book brings out is that Gandhi, the apostle of non-violence was more,
realistic about the role and need of the Indian army than the Fabian Jawaharlal
Nehru at the time of the transition of India from colony to sovereignty. But
Gandhi had served in a war (the Boer War) though in a non-combatant role. Gandhi
raised stretcher bearer companies to serve with the British Indian army in World
War I and Rudra records how Gandhi asked him about them when he met him first
after his return from the war in France. Gandhi refused to classify himself as a
pacifist.
There is a widespread impression .that the Gandhian values and approach were
responsible for the neglect of defence in independent India. This book, by a
soldier who was in contact with Gandhi and whose family hosted him. for several
years, raises questions about whether the above impression is not erroneous.
Perhaps it is the western Fabian and pacifist professions which influenced
sections of our leadership which was responsible for that approach. By neglecting
history and its policy of not releasing documents more than 25 years old, the
Indian government is not serving the cause of this country and may really be
hurting our interests very seriously.
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