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HVK Archives: Corruption and national security

Corruption and national security - The Economic Times

K Subrahmanyam ()
21 August 1997

Title: Corruption and national security
Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Economic Times
Date: August 21, 1997

Foreign intelligence agencies and organised crime are in a position to buy
up our politicians and political parties.

Addressing the nation from the Red Fort, Prime Minister I K Gujral said
that while the country could be defended by our brave soldiers against
aggression from outside there was no defence against anti-national elements
who give in to greed. He thereby become the first prime minister to
characterise corruption as a security threat.

Some observers have attempted to differentiate external from internal
security threats, including corruption in the latter category. That is
incorrect. Today it is hard to draw a clear line between them. It is
widely accepted that many insurgents receive arms, money - even well
trained infiltrators - from across the border. So war, waged covertly
through insurgencies and terrorists on our soil, has become a standard form
of aggression by external powers who want to hurt our progress and disrupt
our unity, territorial integrity.

Corruption is not limited to internal transactions but have large external
ramifications. Corrupt external linkages constitute a national security
threat and often are an integral part of aggression and subversion by
external powers. Hawala is the monetary equivalent of trans-border
infiltration of arms. As an instrumentality of external aggression
corruption also has a long history in India. The East India Company bribed
Mir Jaffar to switch over. Also, many of the Company's victories were
obtained without battle, by buying off nawabs and maharajas. Lord
Wellesly's Subsidiary Alliance amounted to a subsidy for Indian rulers for
accepting British paramountcy by a surrender of sovereignty.

Indian rulers had no sense of sovereignty, let alone patriotism; they opted
for guaranteed British protection and a subsidy. Today, too, many Indian
politicians receive money from foreign sources, from drug barons, smugglers
and other organised crime establishments in order to sustain their parties
and political status. They in return play roles assigned them by the
foreign sources or the bosses of organised crime.

The CIA claims that it gave money to various parties in India during the
cold war to enable them to fight the communist influence; it is well known
that the Soviet Union was similarly extending financial support to some
other parties friendly to leftist causes. It is widespread knowledge that
money flows into this country from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran to
further what are perceived to be the Islamic causes and also to parties
which pose to be friendly to Muslims. Much of such financial inflows is
directed towards building up casteist and sectarian political organisations.

Today such monetary flows occur world wide. Americans are busy
investigating how money inflows from China are influencing US political
parties. International efforts are on by industrialised countries to
monitor worldwide money laundering and fund transfers. The focus of
industrialised countries is mostly on tracking monetary flows and their
linkages with organised crime, particularly drug trades. A significant
portion of these flows are devoted to buying up politicians, bureaucrats,
channels and law enforcement agencies in various countries where organised
crime operates in western democracies. Election laws and procedures, and
the auditing of party accounts are all aimed at reducing the impact of such
money on electoral outcomes. It is well known how, in countries like Japan
and Italy, there have been considerable interaction between politicians and
organised crime.

Organised crime has no patriotism or political commitments. Such crime is
prepared to ally itself with any state and act against any other state as
long as enormous sums can be made quickly. India experienced the fallout
of this nexus between organised crime and the ISI during the 1993 Mumbai
blasts. Drug traffickers are used by the intelligence agencies of the great
powers to pursue political goals. But for the porosity of our borders,
which was a boon for drug barons and smugglers, there could not have been
such large scale inflows of terrorists, arms and money into our country;
all these have been creating havoc in Punjab, Kashmir and the North East.
One wonders whether this inaction to fence our borders and ensure that they
are non-porous for such a long period is not attributable to a nexus
between the politician, bureaucracy, organised crime and the enemy nation.

The politician who accepts enormous sums of money from organised crime may
not be aware of the linkage between organised crime and the adversaries of
India. But that does not make his act any the less treasonable. The East
India Company bought up nawabs and maharajas, and now foreign intelligence
agencies and organised crime are in a position to buy up our politicians
and political parties.

The biggest factor against the provision of a level playing field to our
industrialists is corruption. MNCs are better placed, have more resources
to bribe politicians and bureaucrats in foreign currency and deposits; they
also therefore develop a greater capacity to blackmail them. All the
corrupt dealings of our politicians and bureaucracy with organised crime -
particularly with the drug trade - should have been recorded and compiled
by foreign intelligence agencies. Such information can be made available to
the MNCs. There is increasing emphasis on CIA assistance for US firms
against their competitors.

Corruption at lower levels cannot be tackled effectively unless the big
corruption at the level of politicians, senior bureaucrats and law
enforcers is tackled. So long as subordinate officials share their loot and
pass on the levies to the echelons above there can be no tackling of grass
roots corruption. Individual officials and politicians who are honest, and
of whom there are many, cannot be effective while the system as a whole is
corrupt.

The denunciation of corruption by the President and prime minister has been
received by the political class with cynicism. So far there has not been a
single conviction ranging from the HDW case, Bofors, through the fodder and
urea scams' the letter of credit scam, Indian Bank's bad loans and the
Harshad Mehta's swindle. People remember how a chief minister facing
corruption charges before a court managed to prolong the proceedings over
decades; he finally died without being convicted and subsequently was also
honoured as a great son of India. The cynics therefore argue that these
corruption cases will continue dragging into oblivion - long after Mr
Gujral has ceased to be prime minister. An anti-corruption cell in the PM's
office will no doubt evoke thousands of complaints. They all have to be
sent down for investigation through the same corrupt machinery. The
establishment of vigilance departments and their ineffectiveness hold
valuable lessons for such routine attempts at fighting corruption.

For the anti-corruption campaign to carry credibility, half a dozen top
politicians and bureaucrats should get convicted and their ill gotten
property confiscated. If the entire effort is focussed on that, and
results achieved, it will change the present climate of permissiveness and
cynicism about corruption. In spite of all this credit should be given to
Mr Gujral for having declared corruption a security issue. Covert war
strategy against this country, large scale corruption on the part of
politicians and senior bureaucrats and their nexus with organised crime
together constitute an entire spectrum of security threats, external as
well as internal.


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