HVK Archives: A failure in leadership
A failure in leadership - The Hindustan Times
Jagmohan
()
3 August 1997
Title: A failure in leadership
Author: Jagmohan
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: August 3, 1997
Duane R. Clarridge, in his book, A Spy For-All Seasons: My Life In The CIA,
has, recorded as follows:
"In 1964, Nehru released Sheikh Abdullah from prison. Abdullah immediately
left for Paris. I flew to Paris to see him. He seemed a bit tentative, and
nothing much came of the meeting, except for an agreement to meet again,
this time in Jidda, Saudi, Arabia, during the hajj.
"Later, I flew to Jidda and contacted him. This time, Abdullah really did
have something to say, and it. was explosive. During his Pilgrimage to
Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for the hajj and- before my arrival in Jidda, Abdullah
claimed he had been briefed on Pakistan's next moves on Kashmir, which
would result in the first Indo-Pakistani War in the fall of 1965.
"The Lion of Kashmir basically gave me the whole plan of the Pakistanis for
Kashmir. The Pakistanis were going to begin infiltrating small guerrilla
units out of Azad Kashmir into Kashmir proper. Those units would then bean
to stir things up. Once the insurrection got under way in Kashmir, regular
Pakistani military forces would come to Kashmir's aid."
The disclosure speaks for itself. It is yet another piece of evidence to
show how Indian leadership failed to understand the mind and motivation of
those with whom it had to deal with in connection with the Kashmir problem.
It failed to judge Sheikh Abdullah. It failed to size up Z. A. Bhutto at
Shimla in 1972 and also Zia-ul-Haq at a later stage.
As regards Sheikh Abdullah, it should have been clear to a discerning mind
that it was his power game that got precedence over everything else. What
suited him at a particular moment was all that mattered. From 1947 to
1952, he kept proclaiming that accession of Kashmir to India was based on
fundamental principles and was irrevocable. At the same time, he was
sounding various quarters for support to the idea of having an independent
'Sheikhdom'. As early as January 28, 1948, he discussed the subject of
independence with American officials. This is evident from the note sent by
Warren Austin to the State Department after an interview with Sheikh
Abdullah on January 28, 1948. The report (September 1950) of Loy
Henderson, the US Ambassador to India, noted: "In discussing
future-Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous that it should be independent". On
May 3, 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinager and had a long meeting with
Sheikh Abdullah. The New York Times, in its issue of July 5, published a
map hinting at independent status for the Valley. On July 10, speaking at
Mujahid Manzil, Abdullah said, "A time will, therefore, come when I will
bid them goodbye."
All these events and pronouncements, taken together, should leave nobody in
doubt that Sheikh Abdullah was dreaming of becoming an independent ruler of
Kashmir and the Anglo-US bloc was encouraging him.
Having ignored the streaks of duplicity and deception in Sheikh Abdullah's
outlook, Nehru was very badly caught on the wrong foot in August 1953, when
he found that there was no alternative but to dismiss Sheikh Abdullah.
This extreme step could have been avoided if Sheikh Abdullah had been
understood correctly.
The same lack of understanding was shown in respect of Z. A. Bhutto at the
Shimla Conference (1972). At that time, India held all the cards in her
hands. The advisers of Mrs Indira Gandhi failed to read the mind of
Pakistan's Prime Minister. The way Bhutto's mind was actually working at
that time comes out clearly in his letter of June 23, 1972, to General
Tikka Khan: "So, neither a few years of arranged peace, nor the present
situation can possibly permit us to ignore the reality that there must
inevitably, sooner or later, come another war.... Great and terrible
scourges have come to India from this side... every invasion from this side
has defeated India... the terror, fear and habit of defeat cannot be wiped
out of their national memory overnight... And we ourselves have ruled them
for eight centuries. All this is not ancient history.. It is current
history... "
P. N. Dhar, in an article published on April 4, 1995 in a national daily,
said that Z. A. Bhutto had agreed to change the ceasefire-line into a de
facto international border. He asserted, "It was thought that with the
gradual use of the LoC as a de facto frontier, public opinion on both sides
would get reconciled to its permanence... When Mrs Gandhi, after recounting
their points of agreement, finally asked Bhutto: Is this the understanding
on which we will proceed?, he replied: 'Absolutely.'"
This account of P. N. Dhar has been refuted by a senior diplomat and member
of Pakistan's delegation to Shimla, Abdul Sattar. gut even if P. N. Dhar's
account is taken as true, it only confirms how naive India had been in
accepting Bhutto's words.
The Central leadership not only let the opportunity slip out of its hand at
the Shimla Conference (July 3, 1972) but also failed to make use of the
favourable circumstances that arose in the Kashmir Valley after the
humiliation suffered by Pakistan in the Bangladesh war. It was a case of
double-fault.
Pakistan was in a state of disarray and its potential for any mischief had
been crippled. It was a time when links between Kashmir and the rest of
India could be firmly founded and firmly institutionalised. All the laws
which encouraged separatist attitude could have been scrapped with a strong
and determined drive and the common Kashmiri persuaded to realise that he
stood to gain in every way by becoming an effective and vibrant part of the
national mainstream a mainstream that emerged not only from the great
tradition of catholicity and compassion but also from a liberal, humane and
enlightened Constitution which provided full scope for advancement of every
culture, language and literature. But, unfortunately, the habit of relying
solely upon personalities persisted. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was brought
back to the helm of affairs through the Kashmir Accord (February, 1975). It
was not even ensured that he would not revert to his old game of whipping
up insular and parochial forces to build up a virtual 'Sheikhdom' for
himself and his coterie.
By the time Sheikh Abdullah passed away, the adverse fallout of unsound
decisions taken in the post-1972 period had spread far and wide both in the
Valley and abroad. If any proof of this phenomenon was needed, it was
forthcoming in the form of virulent anti-India demonstration at the time of
the India-West Indies cricket match, held at Srinagar in October, 1983, the
vicious attack on the Central Income-tax team and the kidnapping and
killing of Indian diplomat, Ravinder Mahatre, by the Jammu and Kashmir
liberation Front, at Birmingham in February, 1984.
The mind and motivation of Zia-ul-Huq, too, was not properly assessed.
While the Indian leadership continued to entertain its usual wishful
thinking and hold that the Shimla Agreement provided a framework for
durable peace - this is exactly what Natwar Singh has reiterated in his
article on the subject in this newspaper (July 2) - Zia went on preparing
for his proxy war, making deft use of lethal and light weapons placed at
Pakistan's disposal by the United States for the Afghan Mujaheideens. The
result is for all of us to see - over eight years of bloody 'proxy war'.
Tragically, it is the Kashmiris who have suffered the most. For this,
there are two main culprits on the Indian side. One, the over-ambitious
local leadership in the Valley which, for its narrow ends of power,
injected a separatist psyche in the people and caused a situation in which
they were not only deprived of gain of peace and prosperity which effective
integration with the rest of the country would have brought to them but
also made them to serve as cannon fodder for the Pakistani guns. The second
culprit was the Indian leadership which failed to understand the
Valley-leaders as well as the rulers of Pakistan. Is the country willing
to correct itself even now?
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