HVK Archives: Jihad that boomeranged
Jihad that boomeranged - The Observer
M Ilyas Khan
()
22 August 1997
Title: Jihad that boomeranged
Author: M Ilyas Khan
Publication: The Observer
Date: August 22, 1997
In early April, a contingent of the Taliban border guards posted at Naawa
Kandao, a creek on the Kunar-Mohamand Agency border, crossed over to a
patch of disputed territory and ordered the Pakistani paramilitary
officials stationed there to evacuate the area.
The Pakistani officials resisted, saying they would have to wait for orders
from their high command. The Taliban responded by pumping bullets into the
structure of a building housing the Pakistani force and warned that if the
men refused to budge, they would be the next target of Taliban fire.
Officials at the NWFP department of home and tribal affairs played down the
incident, terming it a routine border skirmish. They said the matter had
been resolved, and the Pakistanis were back in the disputed building.
But the Frontier Corps officials posted at Nawagsai in Bajaur Agency told
the Herald in the first week of June that in spite of several
representations by the. Pakistani authorities, the Taliban were adamant
about holding on to the area, along with its cemented bunkers and a paved
helipad.
The bunkers and helipad were built by the Russians to secure Afghanistan's
border against mujahideen incursions from Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies. When
the Afghan forces withdrew from the border following the Geneva Accord and
the subsequent withdrawal of the Soviet troops, Pakistan reportedly moved
in on the sly and took control of the area.
Last April, the unilateral closure of the Naawa border by the Pakistani
authorities gave the Taliban the opportunity to take back what they claim
to be part of their territory.
Further south, along the Durand Line, another 'skirmish' broke out in May
between the Taliban and Pakistani paramilitary troops near a place called
Mago Kandao in the Ghulam Jan area, connecting Khost with the North
Waziristan Agency. This dispute was similar to the first: Pakistani troops
reportedly occupying Afghan territory in the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal.
A platoon of Taliban raided the forward post of the Pakistani militia,
burned down their camp and chased the men deep into Agency territory.
The Herald has learned on authority that over the last three months, the
Taliban have established extensive contacts with religious groups based in
Peshawar, Charsadda, Swabi and Mardan as well as in the northern and
southern districts of the Frontier. Across the border, the acting governor
of the eastern Ningarhar province, Maulvi Sadr-i-Azam, has been receiving
tribal delegations almost every day for the last three months.
"They come here to express solidarity with their Afghan brothers, and to
offer manpower support for the war in the north," a source in the Jalalabad
governor house told The Herald on June 20.
Pakistani officials have good reason to be disturbed by these developments.
"The results of elections in FATA show that religious leaders have a
decisive influence in the border region," an official with long border
experience says. "With the presence of the Taliban in all areas adjoining
this region, and given the ethnic homogeneity of the population on both
sides of the border this may get us into serious trouble."
Three overtly pro-Taliban candidates with strong religious and madrassa
links in their respective areas were returned by FATA voters in the area's
first adult franchise elections held in February. Two of the other four
winning candidates also have religious backgrounds, while Latif Afridi was
forced to seek support from the Tanzim Ittehad Ulema-i-Qabail (TIUQ) for
his election in the Khyber Agency. The runners-up have also been madrassa
candidates who lost by very small margins.
All these candidates have in some way been associated with the 1994
movement of Tazim Bifaz Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM).
Meanwhile, officials in the Frontier are extremely jittery over the
proposed reforms in FATA, and believe that any step taken in this area to
undermine the traditional Malaki system or the concept of collective
responsibility may lead to an uprising of the kind that the government
faced in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of Malakand, Dir and Swat.
"This will not only have foreign policy implications, but may start border
disputes with Afghanistan," one official fears. These developments have
come at a time when "the raison de'etre for the Durand Line has ceased to
exist," says Afrasyab Khatak, a political activist, scholar and analyst.
"The line was drawn as a result of the Great Game that was played between
Czarist Russia and the British Empire to secure their respective interests
in the region. Both of them no longer exist."
The Taliban's perception of Pakistan as a friendly country underwent a
radical transformation when the former governor of Ningarhar, Haji Abdul
Qadeer, launched an anti-Taliban drive in the Kunar province early this year.
Qadeer was given these concessions under immense diplomatic pressure from
Iran. The Taliban responsonded by re-activating the long redundant
ministry of border affairs, and establishing contacts with religious groups
deep inside Pakistani territory. Pakistan has since 'expelled' Haji Qadeer
from the country, but some anti-Taliban commanders still allegedly enjoy
official patronage.
"Pakistani's problem number one in Afghanistan is its lack of credibility,"
says Jamal Kotwa, an Afghan journalist based in Peshawar. lit has
befriended and discarded every jihad party one after the other, and now it
appears set to do the same with the Taliban. But the Taliban know it, and
they will certainly make counter-moves."
But how potent is this threat? "Pakistan, particularly the less urbanised
regions of the Frontier and Balochistan, are fast descending into a state
of economic anarchy," says Aimal Khan, a journalist. "The decimation of the
PPP and the PML's failure to address the real issues has led to a growing
vacuum on the political scene. If things get worse, the, Taliban appear to
be the only force in the area capable of filling that vacuum."
This threat is more directly felt by the officials responsible for
imple-meting the country's border policy with Afghanistan.
"We have paid more attention to individuals, rather than to a policy of
dealing with Afghanistan as a single entity. This is ,why we have failed,"
he says. And this is also why every friendly government that is installed
in Kabul turns hostile towards Pakistan within months.
"We support individuals because we badly need to keep the fragile Durand
Line from disintegrating," the official explains.
"But every individual soon falls into the typically Afghan mould of viewing
this border as a historical aberration, to be undone at every cost." For
Pakistan, clearly, this is a no-win situation.
(M Ilyas Khan, The Herald, Karachi)
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