HVK Archives: A dithering State cannot tackle insurgency
A dithering State cannot tackle insurgency - The Asian Age
M.K. Narayanan
()
1 September 1997
Title: A dithering State cannot tackle insurgency
Author: M.K. Narayanan
Publication: The Asian Age
Date: September 1, 1997
A great deal of pessimism exists in knowledgeable circles about the
over-all law and order situation in the country today. These persons are
especially worried that if problems are not suitably addressed it could
adversely affect the security situation per se posing a grave threat to the
nation. However, it would seem that those at the helm of affairs in the
country do not feel concerned to the same extent, if their off-the-cuff
responses and routine remarks are any guide to their thinking. Whether
this stems from an ignorance of the true state of affairs in the country or
helplessness is difficult to discern.
On more than one occasion in the recent past, the home minister while
responding to searching questions about the law and order situation has
provided such vague and incomplete answers that it gives a distinct
impression of his not having been properly briefed about the actual
developments. For instance, when questioned at Chennai recently on the
prevailing situation in Assam, the home minister - who probably was
pre-empted by his secretary in visiting that troubled state - merely
confined his remarks to the need for the security forces to display more
effectiveness in combating the militants there. Asked if the Centre was
fully seized about the problems of militancy, his only response was that
they could advise the states and no more, as law and order was a state
subject. This did not, however, preclude him from making the observation
that while units of the Army and the paramilitary forces had been sent to
the affected states in large numbers, there could have been better
coordination.
Questioned closely on the activities of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu during this
same visit, the home minister appeared to have committed a faux pas by
stating that the Centre had no evidence to show that LTTE activities had
increased and that law and order appeared to be under control. It was riot
clear whether he meant the Centre was unaware of the LTTE's activities or
that the situation had been brought under control. Either way, it would
appear to lend substance to the charge levelled by Janata Party leader, Dr
Subramaniam Swamy, that the LTTE was "dangerously present" in Tamil Nadu.
While the home minister might be accused of ambiguous remarks, some of the
observations of his high profile Union home secretary confirm an impression
that, unlike in the past when the home ministry and the home secretary gave
out their mind only after a thorough and indepth study of the situation,
those occupying these offices today have fallen a victim to instant
analysis and over-the-counter remedies. This is the impression gained from
the home secretary's observation in Guwahati (August 23) and Chennai
(August 28). The "certificate" - of competence or incompetence - given to
the state governments of Tamil Nadu and Assam respectively was also clearly
unnecessary. Most astonishingly, however, after holding a law and order
review meeting all he had to say to the Press in Chennai about LTTE
activities was that there could be some activities but he was yet to
receive any feedback.
One would expect, given the gravity of the situation, that senior policy
makers while flitting from one trouble spot to another, instead of
indulging in sweeping generalisations, would try and address core law and
order issues. Little in the way of any concrete plan of action has emerged
from these meetings. In Guwahati, the home secretary's announcement to the
press that anti-insurgency strategies in Assam needed "improvement and
refinement" and that a major restructuring of the intelligence setup has
become necessary, is an instance of bureaucratic grand standing. For more
times, than one can care to remember, we have revamped the intelligence
set-up and refined counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist strategies. It
would have made greater sense if during the visit a decision to put the
Unified Command under the Army had been taken, for this would have sent a
clear signal to the Ulfa and Bodo militants that the authorities meant
business, instead of waffling as at present. Spasmodic reviews of law and
order situations held at short notice mean little, unless some specific
results emerge from such expensive get-togethers.
One unfortunate fallout is that an inadequate understanding of facts on the
ground, together with a penchant for "grand solutions," generates misplaced
enthusiasm for "shortcuts" such as holding parleys with representatives of
militant organisations. It needs to be understood that meaningful
solutions are not possible unless detailed spade work is carried out behind
the scenes. Also important in any dealings with terrorists and insurgent
groups - and in nudging them closer to a negotiated solution - is to try
and gain the upperhand in the war of attrition. This has been the Indian
experience while dealing with the Naga underground, the Mizo rebels, the
TNV in Tripura, the GNLF in North Bengal, the ULF (post '91) and the Punjab
terrorists. The skill of the political leadership lies in choosing the
right moment and converting that into an opportunity by offering the
militants a suitable and honourable solution. Sardar Beant Singh in the
Punjab was able to consolidate the situation in the state only because the
Punjab police and the security forces during '92 had greatly blunted the
edge of militancy, which skilled practitioners of real-politik like former
Prime Minister Chandrasekhar converted into an advantage paving the way for
elections.
Merely holding talks with rebel or militant groups will not produce
results. It is said that an invitation for talks with the Ulfa has been
extended by the highest quarters, but has not elicited any response. One
would be surprised if they had. Politically inspired militant movements do
not give up their "cause" merely because an appeal is made to their
"patriotism" - misplaced or otherwise. A related question is what purpose
would be served even if the Ulfa were to respond, excepting that it would
satisfy the growing numbers of "voluntarist" brokers for peace in the country.
Much the same applies to the suggestion for renewed talks with the Bodo
leadership to bring peace to Assam. This hardly takes into account the
sea-change that has taken place in Bodo politics since the last round of
"talks." Even then the Bodo leadership had felt that the terms offered,
were unsatisfactory but had gone along.
The perfidy of the Assam Congress:, leaderships represented by the likes of
the late Hiteswar Saikia effectively sabotaged whatever hopes the agreement
held out for peace. The actions of the AGP leadership subsequently drove
the last nail into the coffin. Meantime, the relatively moderate All Bodo
Students Union and the Bodoland State Movement Committee have been
marginalised and the more militant Democratic Front of Bodoland has emerged
as the leading force. It is unclear what can now be achieved by holding
talks with this group even as violence here is on the upswing.
Talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland led by Isac Swu and
Thanghul Muivah are reported to have commenced. It is hence too late now
to plead against "holding high-level talks" with the NSCN (I/M). As it is,
the well-intentioned but tactically incorrect decision of former Prime
Minister Deve Gowda, to meet with two high level representatives of the
NSCN (I/M) in Switzerland earlier this year, has given this faction -
struggling for recognition from such UN bodies as the Unrepresented
People's Organisation (UNPO) - a great deal of respectability without
countervailing benefit for peace-makers on the Indian side. At the time
when these moves Were taking place, there was documented evidence available
with the Indian authorities indicating a spurt in violence by this group
and their growing involvement in inter-ethnic conflicts in Nagaland and
Manipur. To have expected a "peace dividend" at the time showed naivette
of a high order. This situation remains, the three month long "ceasefire"
notwithstanding.
One immediate fallout of the "talks" being held with the NSCN (I/M) is that
the two other important Naga factions viz. the NSCN-(Khaplang) and the Naga
National Council (Adino) who have been left out of the talks, have embarked
upon a separate plan of action. This has made it possible for the American
Baptist Church aided and abetted by Naga leaders with somewhat dubious
credentials in this regard like the Nagaland chief minister S.C. Jamir - to
get involved in Naga affairs once again. A meeting was scheduled to be
held in Atlanta (USA) at the end of July which is aimed at unifying the
various Naga groups under the auspices of the Church. Fresh pressures are
hence likely to be exerted by the powerful Church in Nagaland which can
only complicate an already tangled situation. Instead of chasing a
chimera, the leadership should try and come to grips with the on-going
situation. The situation in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura is indeed
critical and real-time solutions are called for. State and central leaders
have to display moral courage and own up to the difficulties, recognising
also that there are extrinsic as well as intrinsic forces at work. Foreign
intelligence agencies like the ISI are active while the "strategic
interests" of some regional and other big powers here hardly coincide with
that of India. Even now we are yet to fathom whether the end users of the
"Purulia arms drop" were the Ananda Margis as is the conventional wisdom,
or some other militant organisation in the Northeast with a wider agenda.
There is need for greater application of mind and more foot-slogging, then
for theories and ideas.
In the South, the situation is becoming equally volatile in some areas.
Naxalite violence in Andhra Pradesh has gained a serious dimension. The
state government's appeal for assistance to the central government needs to
be heeded. In a report to the Centre, the state government refers to the
vast organisational spread of the PWG today, extending to areas outside
Andhra Pradesh like Delhi, Haryana, West Bengal, Gujarat and Kerala, apart
from Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. The
report also mentions that the PWG is seeking to link up with the NSCN and
the Ulfa in the Northeast. There are other unconfirmed reports about the
PWG trying to emulate the LTTE, and seeking to create its own diaspora abroad.
In Tamil Nadu, the "hidden hand" of the LTTE periodically becomes
transparent, as for instance "seizures" are reported or smugglers are
apprehended. While there is little in the way of violence or other kinds
of depredation involving the LTTE, the finger of suspicion points to
sustained attempts being made by them to convert Tamil Nadu into a safe
sanctuary and also use it as a base for supplies. These were ' the tactics
employed by the. LTTE even during 1990 and 1991, which resulted in their
developing an innate capacity for subversion and suborning of loyalties.
It is from this kind of activity that the polity faces its most serious
threat.
For all the above reasons there is a very real need for deeper
introspection. This will demand a great deal of hard work and a clearer
sense of direction. From present indications it would seem that this is
sadly lacking.
(M.K. NARAYANAN is former director of Intelligence Services)
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