HVK Archives: Interpreting Hindutva as Swadeshi
Interpreting Hindutva as Swadeshi - The Pioneer
Chandan Mitra
()
April 17, 1998
Title: Interpreting Hindutva as Swadeshi
Author: Chandan Mitra
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: April 17, 1998
Neither the BJP's most euphoric supporters, nor its strident
critics are in a position to assert that the formation of a
Government led by the party marks a paradigm shift in Indian
politics. What should have been a momentous occasion, possibly a
decisive break in the polity, has stopped well short of that.
Paradoxically, the fact that the BJP is in power at the head of a
convoluted arrangement should worry its own ideologues more than
the votaries of so-called secularism. Because Mr Atal Bihari
Vajpayee's ascendancy to the post of Prime Minister does not
reflect a paradigm shift, the "secularists" are still in with a
chance. And, it is clear that they will work in two ways. First
they will seek to "secularise" the BJP itself by making it
compromise on its core value, namely, Hindutva. Second, they will
skilfully use the absence of ideological content in the BJP
Government's programme to reduce the whole thing to a power game,
portray the BJP as just another political party and then bargain
with its partners to wean them away and form an alternative
Government.
This, however, is a reality that warms the cockles of a
substantial body of public opinion which prefers to adhere to a
middle-ofthe-road position. The most articulate spokesperson of
this viewpoint is Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister who has
blandly asserted that while parties might be communal,
Governments cannot be. He has used this ingenuous argument to
justify his effective dissociation from the United Front, further
claiming that a sensitive State like his cannot afford to
politically antagonise any Government at the Centre. No advocate
of the "end of ideology" school of thought could have put it more
bluntly. In effect, Dr Abdullah has contended that he sees no
difference between the Congress, United Front and BJP. After all,
he has already been allied to the first two by turns. So, now
that the BJP is in power at the Centre, he has no qualms allying
with the champions of Hindutva either.
Dr Abdullah has candidly said what many other centrist political
leaders, otherwise squeamish about the BJP's Hindutva agenda,
have not quite asserted in so many words. But there is no doubt
that a Chandrababu Naidu, a George Fernandes or a Mamata Banerjee
also see it this way. They might not be entirely in the wrong
because one section even within the BJP itself has begun to
believe that the optimum utility mark of electoral Hindutva has
been reached. Thus, it is a matter of time before the law of
diminishing marginal returns sets in and the BJP is either
outflanked by more radical proponents of the Hindutva ideology or
the ideology itself starts losing electoral appeal. If the BJP
leadership in its entirety concurs with the advocates of the end
of Hindutva" school, significant changes are bound to happen in
the party's political and programmatic approach.
This is already apparent from the National Agenda. for Governance
(NAG) drawn up by the party in association with its allies. The
most significant feature of NAG is the subtle shift away from
vocal Hindutva to robust Swadeshi. Of course, there are many
points of convergence between the ideals of Hindutva and
Swadeshi. Although the two concepts are not co-terminus, it has
always been implied in the BJP's world-view that cultural
nationalism is the locomotive of nationalism. Now that the
propagation of cultural nationalism, a concept often used
interchangeably with Hindutva, has propelled the party to power,
political nationalism must become its governing ideology, or so
the argument runs. In other words, cultural nationalism alone can
be the bedrock of the nationalist ideal and those who do not
subscribe to this cornerstone of the BJP's ideal cannot be
regarded as full-time nationalists.
The essence of cultural nationalism, in turn, has been
interpreted in the BJP manifesto as ne nation, one people, one
culture". This is an ideological offensive against those
distortionists of the Nehruvian weltensschaung who have argued
with increasing assertiveness that India is a confederation of
nations and cultures, even if these overlap. By giving linguistic
origin and ethnicity the pride of place in determining
identities, the confederationist school has sought to downplay
the importance of the commonalities that underlie the Indian way
of life and define "Bharatiyata" or Indianness. The
confederationists are hard put, therefore, to locate a Bengail or
a Tamilian settled in Delhi for three generations, in the scheme
of their multi-polar India. They are unable to account - for what
Girilal Jain used to describe as "layers and layers of Hindu
consciousness' whereby a person could simultaneously be a modern,
westernised, Republican Indian, a proud proponent of a
Tamil/Gujarati Punjabi/Bengali identity, a practising Hindu who
with equal devotion frequently visits mazaars to place a chadar
on the tomb of a local pir and whose nationalist dedication finds
vocal expression only when India plays cricket.
This is the cultural eclecticism that has defined the Hindu ethos
through the centuries. However, a modern nation-state cannot have
such an amorphous collation of consciousnesses as its political
basis. The instilling of some tangible, binding elements is
essential if post-modern India is to rind its defining rationale.
The problem is confined essentially to the Hindus because all
other religions are congregational in nature, with a common book
or living institution to give their adherents a politico-cultural
focus. Even Sikhism, a derivative of Hinduism, contains Semitic
components like the holy book, Shree Guru Granth Sahib, and the
temporal headquarters of the faith, the Akal Takht. By f'ocussing
on cultural nationalism, the BJP appears to have successfully
laid the basis of an intellectual introspection among Hindus.
However, many Hindus find the militant elements of the BJP
agenda, especially the demolition of the Babri Masjid and
proposed construction of a Ram Mandir on the disputed site,
abhorrent to their pacifist notion of Hindutva. Yet, even among
this segment, there is perceptible intellectual acceptance of the
BJP's position on many issues.
The BJP has attempted to kill two birds with one stone by making
Swadeshi the cornerstone of NAG. At one level, it helps translate
cultural nationalism into political nationalism through the
mechanism of governance; at another level, it offers a less
contentious intellectual avenue to the adherents of "soft"
Hindutva. It also enables non-Hindus and even some political
critics of the BJP go along with the party's agenda since
nationalism cannot be a serious bone of contention and Swadeshi
can be projected as only a robust variant of that ideal.
If the BJP succeeds in making this transition from cultural
nationalism to political nationalism as the defining fulcrum of
its ideology, half its battle for "one country, one people, one
culture" would be won. With a majority as precarious as the one
Mr Vajpayee has in Parliament this, however, will mean a
tightrope walk. In the process, the BJP might be compelled to
dilute Swadeshi to a point where its version of political
nationalism becomes indistinguishable from the traditional
Congress philosophy. If that were to happen, even the propagation
of cultural nationalism will carry less and less conviction. It
is, therefore, all very ffy at the moment. But the BJP's
accession to power can enter a momentous and decisive phase only
if its Swadeshi agenda is seen to succeed and wins more
adherents to its cause.
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