HVK Archives: Terrorism's New (and Very Old) Face
Terrorism's New (and Very Old) Face - The New York Times
Stephen Engelberg
()
September 12, 1998,
Title: Terrorism's New (and Very Old) Face
Author: Stephen Engelberg
Publication: The New York Times
Date: September 12, 1998,
In some ways, Osama bin Laden is a thoroughly modern
terrorist. He announces his intentions on CNN, directs his
worldwide financial network by satellite telephone and sends
messages to his supporters in Saudi Arabia via cassette tapes.
Asked last year by a Western reporter what operations were
planned next in his jihad, or holy war, against the United
States, Mr. bin Laden replied: "You'll see or hear about them
in the media, God willing."
But terrorism experts say that Mr. bin Laden's aims place him
firmly in the traditions of an earlier epoch, a time when
terrorism was used to strike a blow against apostasy rather
than achieve specific goals like national independence.
The distinction is more than a quibble for theoreticians in
the growing field of terrorism studies. American leaders have
declared war on Mr. bin Laden and his brand of terrorism, a
rhetorical flourish that leaves unanswered how the West
intends to combat a millennial movement that flouts the rules
of conventional warfare and has no evident state sponsor.
For much of the 20th century, bombings and assassinations have
been the tools of ethnic groups fighting for their own nation-
states. The tactics were undeniably brutal, and the
consequences global. One of the most notable terrorist attacks
of the century, the 1914 assassination of an Austro-Hungarian
Archduke by a nationalist Serb, ignited World War I.
The aims of these groups could be politically delineated.
Bosnian Serbs, for instance, wanted to escape Austro-Hungarian
rule and join Serbia, a desire that re-emerged after the
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. The Irish were striving for
independence from Britain, as were the Jews living in what was
then Palestine.
Disputes about land and power were subject to political
negotiation, and
for most of these groups, terror ultimately helped them
prevail. As Walter Laqueur, a political scientist, noted in
his 1987 book "The Age of Terrorism," "To succeed, terrorist
demands have to be 'realistic' (i.e. limited in character)."
Mr. bin Laden's loosely organized Al Qaeda movement pursues
goals far harder to define or satisfy. Experts say it is part
of a significant trend in which terrorist groups espouse
millennial or religious ideologies that transcend politics or
national borders.
In his rambling 1997 interview with CNN, Mr. bin Laden said
his jihad against the United States would conclude only when
Washington withdrew from Saudi Arabia and ended its
"aggressive intervention against Muslims in the whole world."
His remarks were dotted with references to Islamic tradition,
invoking God and reminding viewers that it was not permissible
for non-Muslims to remain as protectors in Saudi Arabia. He
makes clear that his targets include the Egyptian and Saudi
Governments, deemed insufficiently devout.
Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for the Study of
Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St.
Andrews in Fife, Scotland, said the ideology of Mr. bin Laden
and other emerging Islamic groups harked backs to the earliest
known forms of terrorism, when religion was the main
justification for what another scholar has termed "holy
terror."
>From A.D. 66-73, a Jewish sect known as the Zealots took up
arms against the Roman occupation, using daggers to slit the
throats of Romans and of Jews who collaborated.
Their rebellion had both religious and political overtones.
>From 1090 to 1272, a Muslim Shia sect known as the Assassins
fought to repel the Christian Crusaders with a campaign of
murder intended to bring on a new millennium. The literal
translation of "assassin," hashish eater, refers to the acts
of "ritual intoxication" undertaken by the warriors before
their missions, Mr. Hoffman writes in his new book, "Inside
Terrorism" (Columbia University Press, 1998).
Although there were scattered instances of fundamentalist,
Islamic-inspired violence in the early 20th century, the issue
gained international prominence only after the Iranian
revolution brought a Shiite regime to power in 1979.
Iran began financing and arming Shiite proxies in Lebanon, and
when the United States backed the Lebanese Government in that
country's civil war, the groups fought back, bombing the
American Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut and seizing
hostages.
Mr. bin Laden's religiously justified program of violence
echoes the public proclamations of those groups, with an
important distinction: He is independently wealthy and
operates from countries like Afghanistan or Albania, which
have minimal governments at best. The Reagan Administration
could negotiate with Iran; Mr. bin Laden answers to no
government.
Mr. Hoffman noted that many of the major terrorist attacks of
the 1990's were by groups without state sponsors and specific
goals. These include the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center by Islamic radicals with ties to Mr. bin Laden and the
1995 attack on Tokyo's subways with nerve gas by a Japanese
religious cult.
Mr. bin Laden proclaimed his holy war against the United
States on Aug. 23, 1996, in a document titled "Message from
Osama bin Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and
Especially the Arab Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against
the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques," a
reference to the continued American military presence in Saudi
Arabia.
The United States did not respond.
Two years later, after investigators tied Mr. bin Laden's
group to bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
that killed more than 250 people, including 12 Americans,
Clinton Administration officials launched a cruise missile
attack on his camps in Afghanistan and declared war. "This is,
unfortunately, the war of the future," Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright said.
Terrorism experts applauded the military action as the sort of
quick response Secretary of State George P. Shultz was urging
in the 1980's when he said the United States could no longer
be the "Hamlet of nations." But they said the notion of
announcing a war against someone like Mr. bin Laden posed
problems for policymakers and the American people.
"It's unfortunate that she used the term war, because it's
very misleading. Americans like their wars to be short, with
no casualties, and then we kick back and watch the Super
Bowl," said David Long, a former State Department official.
"Flu would be a better simile. Every year there's a new strain
of flu, and every two or three years one is lethal. You manage
it. You're not going to win the war on flu."
For theorists, the notion of a war on terrorism is inherently
contradictory. Western nations fight wars under generally
accepted conventions regarding legitimate targets, treatment
of prisoners and types of weapons. Terrorists flout those
rules to attract publicity and strike a blow against a more
powerful opponent.
For example, terrorist groups assassinate political leaders.
The United States has an executive order banning murder plots,
though Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton have authorized
bombing raids on the hideouts of adversaries like Saddam
Hussein, the Iraqi President, and Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi,
the Libyan leader.
Western governments strive to avoid civilian casualties;
terrorists seek to cause them.
Terrorist take hostages, a move Western nations generally
avoid in warfare and would not consider in the fight against
groups like Mr. bin Laden's.
Governments, including the United States, have used their
legal system to bring terror suspects to justice, but that
means subjecting evidence and witnesses to the scrutiny of a
public trial.
Nor is it clear what weapons would work in such a "war."
Terrorists have a minimal infrastructure. There are no big
buildings to bomb or headquarters to destroy. The cruise
missile attack on Afghanistan appears to have destroyed some
rudimentary camps, which can quickly be rebuilt.
"War, in its accepted definition, is fighting of a specific
duration on an identifiable battlefield against an enemy you
know," Mr. Hoffman said. "I think Albright made a big mistake
couching it in these terms. This war is not fought on any one
battlefield. It's timeless. And you're not going to defeat
your enemy."
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