Comments on Srikrishna Commission Report (Chapter 2/4) - (no publication)

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Comments on
Srikrishna Commission Report
Chapter II

1.2 The Commission has given four reasons for the Muslim action in the
period immediately after Dec 6. First it talks about the mobilisation of
the Hindus for the Kar Seva. Here it also talks about the propaganda
against the construction of the mandir at the Ram Janmabhoomi by the
Students Islamic Movement of India and Bombay Muslim Action Committee.
Second it talks about the formal announcement of the Kar Seva for Dec 6
and the various programmes in that respect. Third it talks about the Rath
Yatra of the BJP. And fourth it talks about the demolition of the illegal
structures by the Mumbai Municipality and the Mumbai Police action against
criminals.

The Commission says that the Muslim action was spontaneous. Then how is
the propaganda by SIMI and BMAC relevant? While SIMI is a well known
organisation, the antecedents of the BMAC are not well established.
According to our information, this is a paper organisation, and the Dec 2
meeting was attended by religious and secular leaders. It was also
attended by criminals, and those businessmen who operate at the edge of
the law, both Muslims. At the meeting it was stated that if the police
remain a spectator, then the Muslims would have no problem in attacking
the Hindus. However, if the police do their job, then it would be
difficult to foment trouble. It is quite clear that this organisation was
prepared to create problem, and the myth of spontaneous reaction has to
remain a myth. This committee is no longer in existence, since its utility
of fomenting trouble is over.

The programmes for Kar Seva was an all India programme and were also
undertaken in other parts of Maharashtra as well. It would have been
necessary for the Commission to have inquired why so much trouble took
place in Mumbai, and not in other parts of Maharashtra or the country.

Juxtaposing the Rath Yatra in the sequence of events is mischievous. This
had taken place 1990, that is two years prior to Dec 6, 1992. Furthermore,
at the time a petition was taken out, as a Public Interest litigation to
ban the Yatra. The court declined to do so.

The fourth reason given is incredible. These are secular events, and how
the Muslim community should take affront needs to be explained. The
Commission has accepted that these were not targeted against the Muslim,
but against all irrespective of their religious identity. The Commission
should explain how the Muslims can be mobilised through their religious
identity. And how does this conform to its spontaneous reaction theory.

In accepting the validity of the fourth reason, the Commission has put
forward a dangerous principle that every time normal action has to be
taken, the law enforcement machinery has to take into cognisance that it
may lead to communal tensions. Thus, any miscreant can always threaten
such consequence to avoid being punished. We do not understand how the
Commission has not given the issue a serious thought before accepting the
validity.

Two of the persons against whom actions were taken are Shri Hitendra
Thakur and Shri Pappu Kalani, both of whom were MLAs from the Congress
party, belonging to the faction opposing Shri Sudhakar Naik, the then
Chief Minister from the same Congress party. It has been alleged that
part of the problems that Shri Naik had within his party were due to his
actions against these two persons.

1.3A(i) On Dec 6, in the context of the destruction of the Babri
structure, the Commission says, "The cry of danger to Islam reverberated
in the air."

This issue of Islam being in danger has a history going back to the
independence struggle. It was on this basis that the partition of the
country was demanded by the Muslim League. In the post-independence era,
this bogey was continued. To a certain extent, the Commission has accepted
this in Chapter I, para 2.1. The issue of the Ram Janmabhoomi has nothing
to do with this slogan.

Moreover, since the Commission decided to deal with the issue, it should
have also investigated what would have happened if there was a peaceful
transfer of the site, given the just demand of the Hindus.

1.3A(ii) The Commission says that the so-called Muslim reaction turned
violent because of the `victory' rally in Dharavi and the police
mishandling due to an aggressive posture.

How does ONE rally in Dharavi (Central Mumbai) create a reaction in the
Muslim dominated areas in South Mumbai? See the comments on para 4.8 of
Chapter I above.

The `aggressive posture' of the police is a constant refrain by the
Commission. In Vol II, para 16.3, page 94, the Commission says that the
Muslim mob turned violent at the sight of the police! At the same time,
the Commission has accepted in para 1.6 (pg 12) that the police did not
fire on the Muslim crowd with an intention to target and liquidate them.

1.3A(iii) "At this juncture the Hindus had nothing to complain and should
have left the matter to be dealt with by the police as a problem of law
and order."

The Commission should have documented in how many cases the Hindus took to
immediate retaliation of the Muslim violence. In fact, the press reports
at the time clearly show that the media had blamed the police for taking
`harsh' action against the Muslims. The Hindu reaction had come a few
days after the Muslims acted, clearly pointing to the fact that the Hindus
did leave the matter to the police, and reacted only when their patience
ran out. This refrain of blaming the Hindus comes through again and again
throughout the report.

The Commission's contention of significant Hindu reaction should be viewed
along with the ATR (pg 19, para 34) where the following table for police
firing is given:

Police Firings Killed Injured

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

December 153 30 133 93 189

January 308 80 90 326 146

This table clearly shows that the Hindus did, by and large, leave `the
matter to be dealt with by the police as a problem of law and order' in
December. The January figures also clearly shows that when the Hindus came
out on the streets to retaliate, the police did not distinguish the
religious identity of the rioters. This point has to be borne in mind in
discussing the alleged bias of the police.

Here it is pertinent to mention that the Commission in an indirect way
accepts that the order to the police not to shoot at the Muslim rioters
did aggravate the problem. In 1.3 C (ii), the Commission accepts this
contention in the following words: "Perhaps as a matter- of political
prudence, the Chief Minister advised the Commissioner of Police to
instruct his officers and men to "go easy" with the firing. These
instructions were conveyed by B.C. Message No.414 dated 8th December 1992
instructing the police to control the rioting mobs by using tear gas and
lathi charge without resorting to firing." Both the then Police
Commissioner of Mumbai and the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra have
denied that the message was authorised. Whatever may be the case, there
seems to be some impression in the minds of the police that the political
masters would not stand behind them. Here, the issue is not merely the
alleged message, but also the propaganda conducted in certain sections of
the media and some politicians about the police deliberately targeting the
Muslims. The Commission has dealt on this issue in para 1.4.

1.3A(v) "In the jurisdiction of Deonar there was a sharp counter reaction
by Muslims who stoned the house of a local Bharatiya Janata Party leader."

The Commission should have explained whether the `reaction' was justified.
Why does the Commission not pontificate that the Muslims should have left
it to the law and order machinery to deal with the situation instead of
`reacting'?

1.3A(v) "The situation was getting uglier with attacks on Hindu temples in
this area. Efforts of the police to control the situation brought forth
forceful violent reaction from Muslims against them. Large scale firing
resulted, which perhaps justified to quell the violent riots, was
construed as an unwarranted act of suppression by police of what the
violent Muslim elements thought was their legitimate protest."

If the police action was justified then how does it become an `unwarranted
act of suppression' of a `legitimate protest'? Such type of
rationalisation of Muslim actions abounds in the report. We have seen it
earlier when the Municipal action against illegal construction, and police
action against criminals, was turned by the Muslim leadership into a
communal issue.

This incident is related to an attack by the Muslims on two temples and a
school, as mentioned in Vol II, para 9.6, page 37. Is it that the
Commission accepts that attacking temples and schools by the Muslims as
legitimate protest?

1.3B(i) "From 7th December 1992 onwards there was a qualitative
transformation in the situation. Large mobs of Muslims came on the streets
and there was recourse taken to violence without doubt. This time the
Muslim mobs appear to have come out with the intention of mounting violent
attacks as noticed from their preparedness with weapons of offence. There
were violent attacks on the policemen in Muslim dominated areas like
Bhendi Bazar and its vicinity. The jurisdictional areas affected were
mostly Muslim dominated or mixed localities in which the misguided and
irresponsible Hindu youths aggravated the situation by engaging the
rioting Muslims, leading to a situation where the police found it
difficult to restrain both sections; when the police did it by force, the
police came to be attacked by both Hindu and Muslim mobs."

A `spontaneous' and peaceful action of 6th December turns into a violent
one with `preparedness and weapons of offence' the very next day! Most of
the so-called spontaneous events mentioned in para 4 of Chapter I appear
to be a fiction of imagination of the Commission. The fact that the Muslim
actions started only on December 7 has to imply that the Muslim action was
organised. Here the meeting of the Bombay Muslim Action Committee on
December 2 is important. See comments on para 1.1 of Chapter IV.

The Commission talks about Hindus engaging the Muslim crowd obviously bent
on destruction. Does it mean that every time Hindus must just take a
beating without reacting? Kindly refer to the table given in the
explanation to 1.3A(iii) and the comments thereon.

1.3B(ii) "By this time the protest had degenerated into a full scale
communal riot between Hindus and Muslims. Eleven temples in different
jurisdictions were damaged, demolished or set on fire. The Hindus did not
fall behind and damaged Mosques and Madrassas in different jurisdictions.
BEST Buses in the Bombay Central Bus Depot and BEST Bus stops became easy
targets for the Muslim mobs and were damaged and/or set on fire."

The police records show that there were a total of 42 temples destroyed
and 4 mosques. Why has the Commission not given the full information where
Hindus are at the receiving end?

1.3B(iii) "Two Constables in Deonar jurisdiction were killed with choppers
and swords by the rampaging Muslims. While one lay on the ground bleeding
to death, the body of another was dragged and thrown into the garbage heap
from where it was recovered seven days later. One constable was done to
death in Byculla jurisdiction. Several police officers and policeman who
bravely attempted to stem the tide sustained injuries in mob action."

On this day, in the whole city, three police personnel were killed and 216
injured.

1.3B(iv) "A police officer carrying on his duty received a bullet injury
in his head and died subsequently, though it cannot be said with certitude
that it was a case of private firing."

The Commission consistently denies the issue of private firings. It is
done on the basis of non-capture of private weapons by the police. The
police's explanation that they were not able to mount combing operations
immediately after the private firings due to other pressing matters and
lack of manpower is not accepted by the Commission, even though the
Commission has accepted that there is an overall shortage of manpower to
handle even routine activities. However, the existence of sophisticated
weapons in the underworld, which is dominated by the Muslims, is common
knowledge both prior to the December 6 events and afterwards. These are
the tools of the trade for the underworld which is dominated by the
Muslims.

1.3C(ii) With respect to Dec 8, the Commission says, "The police firing
resulted in the death of a large number of Muslims as compared to Hindus.
A clamour went up that the police were deliberately targeting Muslims for
attack. Perhaps as a matter of political prudence, the Chief Minister
advised the Commissioner of Police to instruct his officers and men to "go
easy" with the firing. These instructions were conveyed by B.C. Message
No.414 dated 8th December 1992 instructing the police to control the
rioting mobs by using tear gas and lathi charge without resorting to
firing."

In the same para, the number of people killed in police firing is given as
21 Hindus, 31 Muslims, and three others. It is clear that it was the
Muslims who were attacking both the Hindus and the police. Yet the
slightly larger proportion of Muslims killed was enough to raise a cry
that the Muslims were being deliberately targeted. In para 1.4, the
Commission has clearly identified that the ones who raised this cry were
not only the politicians but also the media. The Commission is silent on
who should be held responsible for raising this cry and misleading the
government.

>From the police statistics, it would appear that in police firing the
number of Hindus dead was 6 and of Muslims was 52. The injured figure
given is 21 Hindus, 37 Muslims, and 3 others. Has the Commission taken the
injured figure for deaths? This is a grave error on part of the
Commission. The police figures would confirm the violence that the
Muslims were indulging in and that the Hindus had `left the matter to be
dealt with by the police as a problem of law and order'. The police
figures would demolish the Commission's theory of peaceful Muslims, and
also the charge made against the Hindus in para 1.3A(iii).

1.3(D) For the 9th Dec, the Commission accepts that the `situation
improved for the better'.

This would show that the police had taken a proper stand in controlling
the situation, and the charge of excessive force made by the media and
some politicians does not hold water. The improvement in the situation is
also accepted by the Commission for the days after 9th Dec.

1.4 "Media had criticized the police for having used unnecessary and
excessive fire power, going far as to suggest that Muslim were
intentionally targeted and selectively killed. This refrain was repeated
by political leaders and ministers, past and current. The explanation of
the Commissioner of a Police that the aggressive and violent mobs in the
initial stages comprised Muslims and, therefore, Muslim casualties were
higher, does not appear to be as far fetched as it has been made out by
Muslims, nor can it be dismissed offhand."

It was this that created a lot of confusion in the minds of the police of
the way they should be taking action against the rioting Muslims. It had
also made the Hindus feel that the government would not protect them. Yet,
the Commission has not taken the whole episode seriously enough. It should
have named the media and the politicians who were responsible. This has
been one of the serious lapses on part of the Commission. The Commission
has also used a very guarded language in dealing with the issue.

1.5 "Considering it from all aspects, the Commission is not inclined to
give serious credence to the theory that disproportionately large number
of Muslim deaths in December 1992 was necessarily indicative of an attempt
on the part of the police to target and liquidate Muslims because of
bias."

In para 1.4 immediately above this para, the Commission mentions that the
media has criticised the police for using `unnecessary and excessive fire
power' and `intentionally' targeting and `selectively' killing the
Muslims. It is clear from the Commission's findings that these atrocious
charges were absurd. However, the Commission does not find any reporter
and/or publication guilty in this respect. One has to ask the Commission
why it has chosen not to appropriate the blame in the right direction. The
Commission had accepted that because of such media reports, the hands of
the police were tied. There is an implicit assumption that this made the
police not to take firm action against the Muslim rioters, who were
targeting not only the government property but also the Hindus. At the
same time, the Commission expects that the Hindus should have kept quiet
and let the police handle the situation, knowing fully well that the
police were not allowed to do their task. It was imperative for the
Commission to have gone into the issue of biased media reporting in this
case.

It is pertinent to note that in case of the killings of the Mathadi
workers on January 5, the Commission identifies two Sena leaders for
making speeches which are alleged to have turned `a case of simple murder
into a communally motivated murder' (Vol II, pg 133, para 23.14).

1.6 "The Commission is of the view that there is evidence of police bias
against Muslims which has manifested itself in other ways like the harsh
treatment given to them, failure to register even cognizable offences by
Muslim complainants and the indecent haste shown in classifying offences
registered in "A" summary in cases where Muslim complainants had
specifically indicated the names and even addresses of the miscreants."

This sentence is so obviously in complete deviation from para 1.5, that
one wonders how it has come into the report. If there was a bias on part
of the police, then they would have resorted to indiscriminate killings,
which the Commission says did not happen. It needs to be pointed out that
in Vol II, it is rare that the Commission accepts the police version,
while it accepts almost all the statements given by the Muslims against
the police.

1.6 "That there was a general bias against the Muslims in the minds of the
average policemen which was evident in the way they dealt with the
Muslims, is accepted by the officer of the rank of Additional
Commissioner, V.N. Deshmukh."

The charge of bias is on the basis of the testimony of one police officer
whose political opinion is clear from the following: "Deshmukh has no
hesitation in calling Bharatiya Janata Party and Shiv Sena as communal
parties as the records show that they have been preaching communal
hatred." (Vol II, para 4.14, page 162.)

To establish such a major charge on the basis of only one officer's
opinion does not show a proper application of the principle of natural
justice. And that too from a person with a strong political leanings as
accepted by himself. We have been given to understand that another
officer, Shri AA Khan, has deposed that the police are not biased.
Similarly, other police officers like AS Samra, RD Tyagi and SK Bapat have
also said that the police are not baised. This type of selectivity does
no justice to the Commission. The deposition of Shri Khan and Shri Samra,
who have placed the police in favourable light, has not been covered in
Vol II.

7.The heading is "12th Dec 1992 to 5th Jan 1993".

The first event recorded is for Dec 20. Does this mean that nothing of
consequence happened between Dec 12 and Dec 20?

1.7(i) "On 20th December 1992 two Muslims were locked inside a room and
the room was set on fire in Goregaon jurisdiction as a result of which
they suffered severe burns resulting in the death of one."

This event does not find mention in Vol II. However, the police records do
show such an incident having taken place.

1.7(ii) The Commission has dismissed the stabbing of a mathadi worker on
24th/25th December as an action of an alcoholic, even though he is a
Muslim.

Given the atmosphere that existed at the time, it was quite easy to
believe that there was a communal angle. During this period there were
stabbing of Hindus in many parts of Mumbai, and there was very little
police action to try and control the situation. This happened in a Muslim
dominated area, and there was a reaction from the Hindus the next day,
when shutters were downed. There is also a clear signal that the Hindus
tried to undertake a peaceful protest, given that there were very few
incidents in the two days immediately following the stabbing.

It has to be also mentioned that in Vol II, para 11.16, page 62, the date
given is December 26. Such mistakes abound in the report, and one wonders
if it was not prepared in haste.

1.7(iii) The Commission defends the calling of Azans (by using
loudspeakers) from the mosques, and the Namaz on the streets by terming
them as `minor irritants'.

Why does the Commission time and again rationalise and justify Muslim
behaviour which irritates the Hindus? Calling these happenings as `minor
irritants' clearly shows a lack of respect for the sensibilities of the
Hindus. The issue of Azans is a major one all over the country. Last year,
the High Court in Calcutta has taken cognisance of the nuisance value of
this obnoxious system, which does not exist in other parts of the world.
It is surprising that the Commission is not aware of this. See also
comments on para 1.2 of Chapter IV. It is also surprising that the
Commission is not aware that the Mumbai High Court had in the past asked
the government that the Namaz on the streets should be restricted.

1.7(iii) "The Mahaartis were started from 26th December 1992 and kept
adding to the communal tension and endangering the fragile peace which had
been established. Some of the Mahaartis were later used as occasions for
delivering communally inciting speeches and the crowds dispersing from the
"Mahaarti" indulged in damage, looting and arson of Muslim establishments
in the vicinity and on their way. The Mahaartis continued unabated
throughout January 1993 and came to an end only by or about the first week
of February 1993."

What is it that made the peace so fragile? The Commission has accepted in
the same paragraph that the Mahaartis were in response to `a sudden spurt
in attendance at Friday Namaaz in Mosques'.

There were a total of 462 Mahaartis starting from Dec 26. Out of these, up
to Jan 5 the number was 52. Thus most of the Mahaartis happened in the
Hindu retaliation phase. Yet these Mahaartis have been construed as a
provocation by the media, certain politicians, and to an extent by the
Commission. Most of the Mahaartis have taken place after the Hindu
backlash commenced.

Time and again the police have deposed that very few of the Mahartis
witnessed communal speeches. But the Commission has chosen to disregard
these depositions. To establish the charge made by the Commission, it
should have given the number of Mahartis that were conducted, in how many
cases were communal speeches given, and after how many were there violence
and when. In the DB Marg Police Station police jurisdiction (Vol II, para
8.6, page 32), out of the 11 Mahartis, only one witnessed violence after
the event. This too was in the second phase of the January riots when the
Hindu backlash had commenced.

1.7(iv) "The last week of December 1992 and first week of January 1993,
particularly between 1st to 5th, saw a series of stabbing incidents in
which both Hindus and Muslims were victims, though the majority of such
incidents took place in Muslim dominated areas of South Bombay and a
majority of victims were Hindus."

The Commission should have given the numbers of stabbing incidents, and in
how many cases were the Hindus the victims. The reticence comes through
whenever the issue is of Hindus as victims. According to the police
information there were 134 cases of stabbing in the first week of January,
and 99 casualties were Hindus. While the Commission goes into great
details in cases were the Muslims are the victims, there is a marked
glossing over of the magnitude where the Hindus are the victims. It should
also be recognised that these stabbing were going on for two weeks, prior
to the murders of the Mathadi workers, and the Radhabai Chawl incident.

1.7(iv) "The killers had not been then identified in several cases, though
it was presumed, at least in the cases where the Hindus were victims, that
the killers were Muslims. The motive for the stabbing appears to have been
to whip up communal frenzy between Hindus and Muslims. Some of the Muslim
criminal elements operating in South Bombay, like Salim Rampuri and Firoz
Konkani, have been identified as the brains behind the stabbing incidents.
That they were criminals was underplayed by Hindus; that they were Muslims
was all that mattered, and a cry went up that the Muslims were bent upon a
second round of riots."

The Commission is very quick to identify the Hindus as aggressors wherever
the Muslims are the victims. In the opposite cases, there is an attempt to
almost deny the communal identity of the aggressors. If the fact that 99
Hindus were stabbed had been mentioned, it would have been very difficult
for the Commission to say with a straight face that it was done by two
criminals who incidentally happened to be Muslims.

The identity of Konkani was discovered only in his confession statement
when he was arrested in a murder case (that of a senior BJP leader Ramdas
Nayak) in 1995, two years after the stabbing incidents had happened. At
the time it was treated by all concerned as Muslims attacking Hindus.

Furthermore, it is obvious that the Commission accepts that it is quite
easy to `whip up communal frenzy' where the Muslim community is concerned.

1.7(vi) "On 2nd January 1993 a number of Muslim hutments in M.P. Mill
Compound in Tardeo jurisdiction were set on fire. On the same day there
was an incident in Dharavi jurisdiction in which two Muslims were
assaulted with iron rods by Hindus."

In Vol II, neither event is mentioned in the details of the respective
police stations. However, the MP Mill incident is mentioned at para 2.14,
page 157, with respect to the statement on Shri S K Bapat, the then
Commissioner of Police. Hence, the Commission has relied on an allegation
made by the Muslims, but one which is not recorded in the police station.

1.7(viii) "On 4th January 1993 a big mob of Hindus led by Shri Gajanan
Kirtikar, Shri Ramesh More and other Shiv Sena activists took a morcha to
the Jogeshwari Police Station complaining of lack of security for Hindus.
Some of the people in the morcha attacked Chacha Nagar Masjid and the
Muslims in the vicinity and injured them. Several Muslims huts in Magdum
Nagar in Mahim jurisdiction were set on fire by Hindus."

Does this not establish the Hindu insecurity? Kindly note the date of the
morcha. Similar sentiments had been expressed all over the city by many
Hindus. Also this is yet another instance where the Hindus asked for
police to do their job in protecting the Hindus from being targeted.

As far as the attack on Muslims is concerned, Vol II, para 14.20, page 84,
says that one Muslim was injured. The extent of damage to the mosque is
not indicated. The Magdum Nagar incident is not mention in Vol II.

1.7 (ix) On the issue of the opinion of the Commission on the murders of
four Mathadi workers these are summarised in Vol II, pg 133, 23.14, where
it says that `a case of simple murder' was converted `into a communally
motivated murder'.

In trying to explain away the magnitude of the incident, the Commission
has once again exposed its bias. It is very difficult to argue with such
blatant statements, and there are many of them in the report.

1.8(i) The casualties for Jan 6, 1993, are given as follows:

Killed Injured
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
Stabbing 1 1 13 1
Mob violence 7 1 9 8

No information is available for casualties in arson or police firing.

1.8(ii) "The situation in Mahim went out of control at 2100 hours (Jan 6).
Hindus attacked Muslims in Muslim pockets in Mahim area led by Shiv Sena
Corporator, Milind Vaidya, and a Police Constable Sanjay Gawade, openly
carrying a sword. There were serious riots in which frenzied mobs of
Hindus and Muslims attacked each other."

Reading the section on the Mahim police station in Vol II (para 19.18), it
is clear that there were attacks on Hindus, just prior to January 6. Also
in Para 19.20, it has been clearly stated that the two persons mentioned
above were arrested on the spot. This clearly shows that even in case
where there was a Hindu reaction, the police did take the appropriate
action. If the Commission had mentioned these facts, then it would have to
do away with the theory of rationalising the Muslim actions, and also
about the police bias.

1.10 The information provided by the Commission for the events on Jan 7 is
as follows:

Killed Injured
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Stabbing 16 4 41 12
Mob violence 2 - 10 2
Arson 2 - 5 2
Police firing - - 6 5
Burning - 2 - -
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 20 6 62 21

The attacks on Hindus is quite clear. Also the report mentions that the
above happenings are in 16 police station, most of which are Muslim
dominated areas, and the fiction that this was the handiwork of two Muslim
criminals should remain as a fiction. The table also establishes that the
police have attempted to be fair in dealing with the violence. In fact,
given that the Hindus have been on the receiving end from the Muslims,
there really should have been more Muslim casualties in the police
firings.

1.10 "A taxi in which two Muslims were travelling was set on fire in
Pratiksha Nagar, Antop Hill jurisdiction resulting in the two Muslims
being burnt alive."

In Vol II with respect to the Antop Hill Police Station (pg 6+), there is
no mention about such an incident. The closest one gets is at 2.14 (pg 7)
where it talks about three (not two) Muslims being burnt in a Maruti car
(not a taxi) on Jan 14 (not Jan 7). This is yet another example of
inconsistency in the two volumes.

1.11(i) "During the wee hours of 8th January 1993, at about 0030 hours,
some of the Hindu residences in a chawl popularly known as Radhabai Chawl
in Jogeshwari jurisdiction were locked from outside and set on fire by
miscreants. one male and five female members of a Hindu family (Bane) and
their neighbours were charred to death and three other Hindus sustained
serious burn injuries. One of the victims was a handicapped girl. This
incident was sensationalized by the media by giving exaggerated and
provoking reports."

This was the major incident of the whole episode, and one that provoked
the maximum anger of the Hindus against the Muslims. It is obvious that
the Commission has tried to minimise the magnitude of the incident,
because those killed were Hindus. It is also pertinent that no angry
adjectives are used to describe the incident. The ATR has the following to
say on the subject: "This was such a horrifying, cruel and gruesome
incident that even an ordinary person would have got highly excited and
would have lost his mental balance. Government is surprised as to how the
Commission does not acknowledge this incident with adequate gravity and,
on the control, blames some parties for inciting religious frenzy and
alleges that some Marathi newspapers gave exaggerated reports and
sensationalised the issue. Government cannot accept these conclusions
because the news items were indeed based on facts."

In the Vol II of the report (14.25, pg 85), this incident is covered in
less than 25% of a page. In contrast the coverage given to incidents where
Muslims are attacked is quite extensive, even in cases where there are
individual attacks on the Muslims, and where there is injury and not
deaths. The whole emphasis is to downplay the communal angle in the
Radhabai Chawl case, and blame the votaries of Hindutva for the so-called
playing up the incident. The Commission has refused to look at this
incident in context of the overall attacks that were taking place against
the Hindus, and has treated it as an isolated incident.

1.11(ii) This para starts with the sentence "The Hindu `backlash'
commenced."

One does not understand why the word `backlash' is in quotes. Perhaps the
Commission wants to maintain the fiction that there was no `backlash' as
such. The backlash is accepted by the police, by the government (both of
the time and the present), and by the Hindutvavadi political parties. In
fact in para 1.12(ii), narrating the events of 9th January, the Commission
has said that `the Shiv Sainiks mobilised themselves for retaliating
against the Muslims.'

If the Commission is correct, then how did the trouble which was in 16
police stations areas on January 7 went up to 32 on January 8? The figures
of casualties for Jan 8 are as follows:

Killed Injured
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Stabbings 11 15 29 30
Mob violence - 6 11 17
Arson 6 2 2 5
Police firing 9 18 20 24
-----------------------------------------------------------
Total 26 41 62 76

Even though the Hindus were still being attacked, it is clear that the
Hindu retaliation had started and the Muslims were now getting to be at
the receiving end as well.

1.11(iii) "That the rioters had become defiant and the authority of the
police was considerably eroded, appeared clear when a crude bomb was
hurled at the Police Commissioner's car from one of the buildings in
Pydhonie jurisdiction and exploded on the road."

The authority of the police was eroded because they were not permitted to
take the necessary action. The reasons for this has been stated by the
Commission earlier. Had there been a proper maintenance of the law and
order, then the severity of the whole situation would have been far less.
For this the blame should not be laid on the police. It should be laid on
the then political masters, and the media which projected the police
action in a perverted manner.

1.12 (i) The Commission reports the summary of the events for Jan 9 as
follows:

Killed Injured
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
Stabbing 8 18 27 33
Mob violence 1 6 19 24
Arson 3 6 4 6
Police firing 15 22 52 37
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total 27 52 102 100

This is another evidence of the Hindu retaliation.

1.12(ii) "The Shiv Sainiks mobilized themselves for retaliating against
the Muslims. The shakhas in different jurisdictional areas turned into
centres of local commands. The attacks on Muslims by the Shiv Sainiks were
mounted with military precision, with list of establishments and voter's
list in hand."

That the Sena mobilisation started on Jan 9 clearly establishes that there
was a retaliation of the events that had happened in the previous fifteen
days. It is also clear that the Hindus did not react immediately, but did
so when their patience was stretched to the limit. Between Jan 1 and Jan
7, out of 134 stabbing casualties, 99 were Hindus.

The incident of going around with the voters' list is mentioned in only
one case in Vol II at the Antop Hill Police Station jurisdiction. This
cannot be taken as a rule. Moreover, as the ATR has also commented (para
14(8), pg 15), `group of young persons' in Vol II (para 2.6, pg 7) becomes
Shiv Sainiks in Vol I. Just as the Commission has converted one so-called
victory rally at Dharavi (para 1.3A(ii)) as victory rallies, the
Commission is guilty of blowing up one incident to make it look like it
was the rule. In case of the Muslims, the Commission does exactly the
opposite.

1.12(iii) "Police suspected terrorists to be holed up on the terrace of
Suleman Usman Bakery in Pydhonie jurisdiction. Operation launched against
the alleged terrorists by the Special Operation Squad (SOS) under the
direction of Joint Commissioner of Police, R.D. Tyagi, and extensive
firing by the SOS resulted in deaths of nine Muslims. The police failed to
apprehend even a single so-called terrorist, nor did they seize any
fire-arms, sophisticated or otherwise, from which firing was done at them
as claimed."

The Suleman Bakery is not under Pydhonie but Dongri police station, as
mentioned in Vol II, where the incident is covered in great details, and
goes on for three pages. At the same time, the Radhabai Chawl incident is
covered in less than 25% of a page.

The police version is completely disbelieved, while the Muslim version is
completely accepted. The Commission goes out of the way to disprove the
police case, as it has done in many other incidents as well. There were 9
Muslims who were killed in the action, and 78 were captured. If one were
to accept the Commission's contention of bias and indiscriminate firing,
surely there would have been more killed.

In Shri Bapat's affidavit, he states that after the operations, the police
found four empties of AK47, one slug of AK47, two live cartridges of AK47,
one empty of 7.62 SLR and two empties of 9mm pistols. Surely, the
Commission does not want to say that police planted them!

1.13 (i) The Commission gives the following summary of the casualties of
various events on Jan 10.

Killed Injured
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
Stabbing 10 39 24 42
Mob violence 2 9 13 27
Arson 1 5 1 1
Police firing 22 23 77 27
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 35 76 115 97

In para 1.13(ii), the report has stated that the police were given orders
to fire. This had removed the confusion that was existing in the minds of
the police. In The Times of India (Jan 10, 1993), it says, "However, in
view of the unprecedented riots last night, Mr Naik, it is learnt, has
issued strict instructions to the police to be `tough and no nonsense'. He
is believed to have assured the city police commissioner that he would
answer allegations in the press, if any, of `police excesses'." As will be
seen from the above table, there were significant Hindu casualties in
police firing. Also, when the Hindu retaliation commenced, the police
treated the Hindu reaction as a law and order issue, once again
demolishing the Commission theory of bias against the Muslims. The police
`bias' against Muslims of December that was made so much hue and cry by
the media and certain politicians does not exist. As the police have been
saying, when they see a rioter on the street they do not distinguish the
communal identity of the person.

Since it was the Hindus who were at the receiving end, the media, of
course, did not raise a hue and cry about a community being specifically
targeted by the police. Shri Naik did not have to face any awkward
situation in this case!

1.14 The Commission gives the following summary of the casualties of
various events on January 11.

Killed Injured
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
Stabbing 11 44 23 58
Mob violence 4 19 12 26
Arson 2 12 - 7
Police firing 19 7 45 21
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 36 82 80 112

1.15(i) "A gruesome incident occurs in Devipada in Kasturba Marg
jurisdiction." This incident relates to an assault on two Muslim women,
one of whom is killed. The uncle is also killed in his attempt to rescue
them.

The Commission rightly calls this incident `gruesome'. However, in dealing
with the murders of the mathadi workers and the Radhabai Chawl incident,
the Commission does not use any `angry' adjectives. In fact, the
Commission has tried to pass off these incidents where Hindus are the
victims as minor and of little significance in the whole events that have
happened.

(From Jan 13 onwards, the situation started to improve considerably. The
figures for subsequent days are given in the table enclosed.)

1.24 The report summarises the casualties for December and January as
follows:

Dead Injured

Hindus 275 893

Muslims 575 1105

Unknown 45 38

Others 5 -

------------------------------------------------
Total 900 2036

The causes of the deaths are summarised as follows:

Police firing 356
Stabbing 347
Arson 91
Mob action 80
Private firing 22
Others 4
----------------------------------
Total 900

The Commission has admitted to 22 deaths due to private firings. However,
when one reads the Vol II, there is a consistent doubt that is placed on
the veracity of private firings. The Commission has pointed out that there
have been no arms seizure, and has refused to accept the police version
that this was due to the fact that sufficient force was not available to
undertake the exercise. In its habit of being inconsistent, the Commission
has also accepted that the police are understaffed to the extent of 30%
for normal duties.

1.25 "After studying the conclusions of the expert panel the Commission is
inclined to accept the report and conclusions drawn by the panel of
experts from the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS). Class conflict,
Economic Competition, Decline in employment opportunities, Changing
Political Discourse are some of the immediate causes of urban riots in
different studies undertaken by sociologists."

Our reading of the report of the experts from TISS is that except for
`Changing Political Discourse' none of the other factors are important.
There seems to be an effort on part of the Commission to down play the
essential findings of the TISS, since it does not conform to the leftist
propaganda of the past to explain the occurrence of riots. Probably for
the first time, some experts, and that too from an institute that is well
known for its leftist leanings, have come out with debunking a theory that
the people always knew to be false. These factors have been used only to
cover up the deficiencies of the `secular' politicians and intellectuals.

1.25E(ii) On the issue of the Changing Political Discourse, the TISS
findings say, "Originally confined to the forward caste and the middle
class in Mumbai, Hindutva has recently gained currency and fashionableness
and its appeal cuts across economic strata and linguistic divisions."

It has to be accepted that the ideology of Hindutva has come to the centre
stage only since the mid-80s. Even the Shiv Sena adopted this programme at
that time. Until this change took place, the destiny of the nation was
being guided by the leftists, who projected that they had all the answers
to the problems being faced by the nation. They were the ones who had
control of the levers of power, not only political but also intellectual.
Many of the latter are still clinging on to the positions that they have
allotted themselves, and are living off the funds provided to them by the
society. What the TISS findings do not touch upon is why the ideology of
Hindutva has gained currency amongst all the sections of the society.
Controlling the intellectual space enables them to undertake a propaganda
against the votaries of Hindutva. Yet the people seem to be not listening
to them. A recent poll in one of the many national weeklies which are
editorially controlled by the leftists, clearly show that the people of
Mumbai are not satisfied with findings of the Commission.

The TISS findings can also be disproved when one considers that the riots
took place only in Mumbai, while the ideology of Hindutva has `gained
currency and fashionableness' in other parts of Maharashtra and the rest
of India.

1.25E(iii) "Unlike elsewhere in the country the Muslims have not acquired
sufficient political clout, nor have they been able to increase their
representation in B.M.C. or in the Legislative Assembly. This has
contributed to the Hindutva idiom gaining ground."

It is not correct to say that it is ONLY in Mumbai that the Muslims have
not acquired sufficient political clout. This has happened in many other
places in India, and they have not resulted in the violence of the type
that has been seen in Mumbai. One will have to find other reasons for
explanation, which reasons the Commission has chosen to ignore and instead
rationalise and justify the so-called anger of the Muslims. The
non-Hindutva politicians and academics have been projecting (and they
still try and do it) that they are the protectors and benefactors of the
Muslims.

This analysis of TISS is also an exhibition of the mind set of vote bank
politics, because it makes a clear assumption that it is only through
political clout that the Muslims will be able to address their problems.
The fact of the matter is not that the Muslims have not been able to
`acquire sufficient political clout' but that they have lost whatever
clout that they have had. This clout was available to them because the
votaries (political and otherwise) of the so-called secularism have used
them for their own agenda, and not to create an environment whereby the
Muslims benefit economically and socially.

1.26(i) In the Commission's opinion: "The immediate causes of the communal
riots on 6th December 1992 were: (a) the demolition of Babri Masjid, (b)
the aggravation of Muslim sentiments by the Hindus with their celebration
rallies and (c) the insensitive and harsh approach of the police while
handling the protesting mobs which initially were not violent."

With respect to (a) an honest inquiry was needed to find out whether there
were efforts made by the Hindus to come at a negotiated solution. And also
an inquiry was needed why the negotiations had failed. This inquiry would
have revealed that there is a very strong historical case for the Hindus
to ask for the site back, since it is considered holy by the Hindus for
the last at least 3000 years, when there was no Islam around. Not only did
the Commission not make the inquiry, but prevented the votaries of
Hindutva to present their point of view.

As far as (b) is concerned, the Commission bases its whole conclusion on
one event, namely the cycle rally at Dharavi. While an explanation for the
same has been provided by the Sena and the police, the Commission has
chosen to ignore it. And this cycle rally seems to have been given
importance much, much later, and not at the time.

As far as (c) is concerned, the Commission has taken it upon itself to
rationalise and sweep under the carpets the real reasons. Even while
accepting that the police were not specifically targeting the Muslims, it
has come to this conclusion. Had the police been biased as claimed in para
1.5 (pg 12), they could have easily used the opportunity of the Muslims
being on the streets to do the things a biased person would do

1.27(i) "As far as the causes for January 1993 phase of the rioting is
concerned, the Commission does not accept the theory that it was merely a
backlash of the Hindus because of the stabbing, Mathadi murders incidents
and the Radhabai Chawl incident."

The Commission would like the people to believe that the Sena acted
entirely on its own, and that there was no provocation of the Hindus. And
that the Hindu anger was created by the Sena out of thin air. We think
that this has severely eroded the credibility of the Commission.

This is from a paper which the Commission would not like to dismiss out of
hand. "The Maharashtra govt has cited incidents in three areas in Bombay
as the causes for January riots. The first is the fatal stabbing of two
Mathadi workers with a sword and chopper by a gang of goondas at Vijay
Laxmi godown in Dongri. The second is the killing of 37 people, following
138 cases of stabbing in Dongri, Pydhonie, Nagpada, and VP Road police
station jurisdictions in 48 hours, after January 6. The burning to death
of four members of a family in Radhabai Chawl at Jogeshwari on the night
of January 7 and 8 is mentioned as the third main reason..... Though the
Mahrashtra govt has not said so, a clear inference which can be drawn from
the incidents mentioned is that the attacks by the minority community
provoked the riots." (The Times of India, Feb 18, 1993.) Kindly note that
the Maharashtra govt at the time was of the Congress party.

1.27(ii) The Commission says that the stabbing incidents that happened
between Dec 12 and Jan 15 were the handiwork of a couple of criminals (who
incidentally happened to be Muslims). The Commission says that `the
communal passions of the Hindus were aroused to fever pitch by the
inciting exaggerated accounts of the Mathadi murders and the Radhabai
Chawl incidents.' Here the Commission particularly blames Saamna and
Navakal. The Commission says that at least from Jan 8 the Shiv Sena
leadership in general, and Balasaheb Thackcray in particular, assumed the
leadership of the retaliation. Subsequently the criminal elements took
over, and when the Sena felt that the retaliation was sufficient, it
issued an appeal for peace.

One has to really stretch one's imagination beyond the maximum limit to
think that 136 stabbing incidents in the first week of January, out of
which 99 were Hindus, were the handiwork of two criminals.

If only the mathadi workers' murders and the Radhabai Chawl incidents had
happened, without the others that preceded it, probably one could agree
with the Commission. But one has to see the situation as a whole. And one
should, in any case, understand the horrific element in the Radhabai Chawl
incident. Given the situation of attacks on the Hindus in the first week
of January, the killings of the Mathadi workers and the Radhabai Chawl
incident, one has to see the whole thing as part of a concerted programme
of targeting Hindus. It is difficult to understand why the Commission has
taken it upon itself to play down this incident.

As far as the media is concerned, the Radhabai incident has been reported
in all the papers, and not only the two that the Commission names. Again,
one has to see it in terms of the straw that broke the camel's back, and
not in isolation.

With respect to the writings in Saamna, we are sure that the Commission is
aware of the Public Interest Litigation that was filed by two so-called
conscious citizens of the country residing in Mumbai. The High Court said
that it did not agree with the litigants that the writings broke any law
of the land. In the judgement on the petition, the High Court judges
opined that Balasaheb was referring to Muslims who were working against
the nation, and not the whole community. An appeal was made to the Supreme
Court, which did not even admit the same. All this had happened before the
Commission finished its hearing and started to write the report.

That Balasaheb and the Shiv Sena took the lead in channelling the Hindu
anger is something that is accepted by everybody, including Balasaheb.
However, without a genuine Hindu anger, no organisation would have been
able to create it. The Commission has accepted that the backlash has
started from Jan 8, and the Sena mobilisation from Jan 9.

1.28 "Effete political leadership, vacillation for political reasons and
conflicting orders issued to the Commissioner of Police and percolated
downwards created a general sense of confusion in the lower ranks of the
police, resulting in the dilemma "to shoot or not to shoot" Four precious
days were lost for the Chief Minister to consider and issue orders as to
effective use of Army for controlling the riots."

The effete and vacillating leadership was reflected in the way the January
stabbing by the Muslims were handled. Due to the media pressure, the
government had given orders not to shoot at the rioters then. Even while
all the stabbing of Hindus was going on in late December and early
January, there was no effort made by the police, under pressure of the
political leadership, to control them. There is also a clear case that
there has been internal bickering in the then ruling party, namely the
Congress. The Commission has reported at many places in Vol II about the
interference of Congress ministers, both in the state and the centre, in
the working of the police. In Vol I of the report, the Commission has not
mentioned the persons who were responsible for the interference, and not
recommended any action that should be taken against them.

"The assertion by All India Congress Committee general secretary Janardhan
Poojari in Hyderabad today that the Bombay riots were cause of infighting
within the Maharashtra unit of the party is being echoed by senior
Congressmen here. According to a UNI report, Poojari said that "some
disgruntled elements within the Congress" were fanning communal violence
in order to seek the removal of Chief Minister Sudhakar Naik." (The Sunday
Observer, Jan 10, 1993.)

Then there is the case of compensation to the families victims of the
riot. For political reasons, the amount that was given was announced by
the state government as Rs 1 lakh. This was increased to Rs 2 lakhs by the
central government. Both of them were of the Congress party. This
compensation was given even to the criminals who had instigated the riots,
and not only to innocent bystanders, and those who were provoked. This
compensation was also doled out in a public function, giving it political
overtones. This created a great deal of demoralisation amongst the police,
who were less inclined to do their duty.

The role of the so-called secular media in December has also got to be
analysed. Their reporting and placing of the blame on the police for
killing the rioters was biased. The Commission has blamed the two Marathi
papers for reporting the news. But it has completely ignored the so-called
secular media for perverting the news about an alleged police bias, as
well as the Urdu press.

1.29 "The built-in bias of the police force against Muslims became more
pronounced with murderous attacks on the Constabulary and officers and
manifested in their reluctance to firmly put down incidents of violence,
looting and arson which went on unchecked."

Here the Commission is talking about not putting down the Hindu reaction
firmly. However, even from the Commission's own report of the number of
Hindu casualties during the retaliation phase of the January riots, it is
clear the police took firm action when the confusion of the December order
was removed, and orders to fire were given on Jan 10, that is within 48
hours of the start of the retaliation. There is also The Times of India
report, quoted above, that the then Chief Minister gave clear indications
to the police that he was behind them if there was any criticism on their
action as had happened earlier. In Vol I, the Commission has mentioned
that the media and the anti-Hindutvavadi politicians has unfairly
criticised the police for taking harsh action against the Muslim rioters
during the first phase of the December riots. It is also to be mentioned
that in Vol II, in its report on individual police stations, the
Commission criticises the police for dealing harshly with the Muslim
rioters, who were supposed to be peaceful at the beginning and became
violent only when the police started to take the necessary action.

On the issue of bias, the Commission has contradicted itself, as has been
pointed out earlier.

The first part of the above statement is quite confusing.

(continued .....)

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