HVK Archives: Nuclear deterrence
Nuclear deterrence - The Economic Times
K Subrahmanyam
()
November 26, 1998
Title: Nuclear deterrence
Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Economic Times
Date: November 26, 1998
In this country among the intellectuals there is strong aversion
to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, though of late the BJP
government has put forward minimum deterrence as its strategic
policy. Though leaders of other parties have not been as vocal as
the BJP leadership on nuclear deterrence, the fact that the
nuclear weapon programme was pursued by all Indian prime
ministers from Indira Gandhi onwards would tend to show that
whatever may have been the public doctrinal position, in private
they did espouse the nuclear deterrence doctrine.
Now Jonathan Schell, the author of the book "The Fate of Earth"
published in 1982 in which he denounced the doctrine of nuclear
deterrence, has come out with yet another important book "The
Gift of Time; the case for abolition of nuclear weapons now".
This book makes out a very effective case against nuclear
deterrence and for abolition of nuclear weapons. Now that we in
India, whatever may be our individual private conviction, are in
the nuclear business it is useful to study this book to improve
our understanding of the subject.
Nuclear deterrence is not a monolithic dogma. Schell lists out
sufficiency of deterrence or adequate deterrence, minimum
deterrence, existentialist deterrence, virtual deterrence, non-
weaponised deterrence and self deterrence. Though there are a
number of categories of deterrence what usually people have in
mind when they talk of deterrence is the way the US practised the
strategy. In the book, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt points
out that deterrence as a concept will continue to be valid and
operate even if nuclear weapons are abolished. Therefore,
distinctions should be made between concept of deterrence and
nuclear deterrence and among various categories of, nuclear
deterrence. So long as a political entity can anticipate the pain
or damage that can be inflicted on itself and that influences its
own contemplated actions, deterrence operates. This is neither
good nor bad but just a fact of life.
If, however, the nuclear arsenal is used to threaten an adversary
with consequences of nuclear strike if it did not allow the
threatener to have its way known - in strategic parlance as
compellence - that is immoral. Mostly the US strategy vis-a-vis
the rest of the world was compellence backed by nuclear weapons.
The nuclear era started with US using its nuclear weapons
physically on Japan and politically against the Soviet Union in
order to contain what the Americans felt was Stalinist
ideological and military expansionism. Schell quotes General
George Butler, the former Commander of the Strategic Air Command,
and many others to prove his point that American nuclear
deterrence did not work as claimed. No doubt that is correct. But
the Americans were not exercising nuclear deterrence against the
Soviet Union as they try to project in their strategic
literature. They were attempting to contain the Soviet Union and
it was the Soviet Union which was attempting to resist the US
containment and compellence through nuclear deterrence. In that
attempt it was successful up to a point. Schell never raises the
question whether nuclear deterrence worked successfully against
the US.
In fact it did. The US was self deterred when it abandoned plans
to carry out a disarming first strike against the Soviet Union in
1961 when it had a 17 to one superiority against that country.
The self deterrent and existential deterrent factors operated on
the US on other occasions as well. If they had not, the US may
have used nuclear weapons in Vietnam. The Indo-China bombing
campaign involved more explosives being dropped on the three
South East Asian states than were manufactured up to that point
of time in history - many megaton bombs equivalent. When
Americans like Jonathan Schell and Lee Butler say that nuclear
deterrence did not work on behalf of Americans in wars they
initiated or in their aggressive containment policies they should
pause to reflect why? They were, reluctant to legitimise the use
of the nuclear weapons, also in other peoples' hands. There was
also the problem of command and control in fighting a nuclear war
against a major nuclear power like USSR.
If nuclear deterrence had not worked against the US then the
period 19451990 would have been far more intolerable for most of
the nations of the world outside NATO. We see the impact of
unipolar world order today. Imagine the state of the world if it
had been unipolar with only US having nuclear weapons from 1945
onwards. That is why Andrei Sakharov, the father of Soviet
hydrogen bomb who turned subsequently a great crusader for human
rights and against nuclear arsenals of all countries never
regretted his own role for making the Soviet hydrogen bomb as it
restored certain balance in the world order.
Once the US acquired nuclear weapons, as a result of the combined
efforts of best European, American and Canadian scientists and
the US decided to use that weapon as an instrumentality to
establish its pre-eminence and dominance and to contain the
Soviet Union, nuclear deterrence became inevitable. Therefore,
even while deploring nuclear deterrence and the way in which it
has been used as an instrument of compellence and for domination
and intimidation one should not overlook the fact that without
nuclear deterrence the US hegemony would have been far more
intolerable to the world at large. However as good Americans,
Jonathan Schell and General Butler are not in a position to
appreciate this.
They are, however, right when they point out that nuclear war is
not fightable and therefore nuclear deterrence does not make
sense. Yet in asymmetric situations they are useful as
instruments of intimidation and their possession in the hands of
threatened nations generates self deterrence in major nuclear
weapon powers through a sense of uncertainty. If a number of
nations with independent policies have them it enhances the
existentialist deterrence through uncertainty. Bipolarity
ensured stability and that number increasing by another two or
three will not impair the stability.
Nuclear deterrent doctrine as practised by US, of threatening to
commit genocide in case of a conventional attack was no doubt
immoral. But nuclear deterrence against threat of use of nuclear
weapons is not immoral. Killing is a crime but killing in
legitimate self defence is permissible in law. Therefore, a
careful distinction must be made between Western doctrine of
nuclear deterrence and that practised by others. A no first use
policy makes nuclear deterrence quite ethical in a world where
the international community has legitimised the nuclear weapons
through indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non
Proliferation Treaty.
Schell approves of the idea of prohibition of the use of nuclear
weapons, even when they are continued to be retained, as
advocated by the committee on International Security and Arms
Control of the US National Academy of Sciences. The way to
prohibition is through no first use as happened in the case of
chemical weapons. No first use begins the process of
delegitimisation of the weapon. No weapon which is not
delegitimised first is going to be prohibited and eliminated. At
present the world, with the legitimised nuclear arsenals is in
the worst possible situation. There is no possibility of
reversing the legitimisation by repealing the indefinitely and
unconditionally extended NPT. So long as the offensive nuclear
deterrence is practised by US, UK, France and Russia defensive
deterrence is inescapable. The beginning out of this impasse is
to urge de-alerting, detargeting, reducing nuclear risks and
above all no first use to initiate the process of
delegitimisation. This is the path India has embarked on.
Back
Top
|
