HVK Archives: No first use
No first use - The Economic Times
K Subrahmanyam
()
December 10, 1998
Title: No first use
Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Economic Times
Date: December 10, 1998
Some commentators in India consider that the no first use policy
adopted by India is a wimpish one which degrades the
effectiveness of deterrence. They point to the fact that barring
China none of the other nuclear weapon powers have adopted the
'no first use' policy. The westerners used to decry the 'no
first use' policy as a non-verifiable and declaratory one which
can be reversed without notice.
It is also argued on the basis of the American nuclear theology
that nuclear weapons are meant to deter not only nuclear wars
but also, non-nuclear ones and the 'no first use' policy will
not be able to do that - an argument adopted by Pakistan and
validated by Russia, going back on the Soviet no first use
policy. Therefore, no first use policy needs to be explained to
the Indian public not only in moral and ethical terms but also
in strategic terms.
If the 'no first use' is an unverifiable declaratory policy, so
is non-proliferation obligation of nuclear weapon powers under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is no verification mechanism
and in this country we are only too aware of the fact, that
China had not abided by its obligations and none of the others
have attempted to enforce them. Yet 185 nations have joined a
treaty based on an unverifiable declaratory policy.
Declaratory policies have worked in the past. The Geneva
Protocol of 1925 was only a declaratory treaty of 'no first use'
in respect of Chemical Weapons. The treaty worked effectively so
long as the mutual deterrence operated and broke down only in
situations of asymmetry when the aggressor had the weapon and
the victim did not. The declaratory policy works when there is
an overall balance of deterrence - but not when the five powers
who possess the weapons tend to join together in a hegemonistic
cartel. When the US started conniving at Chinese proliferation,
India could not depend upon the overall balance of deterrence
and had to acquire its own.
The Indian no first use policy is derived from the basic
perception that nuclear wars among nuclear armed powers is not
fightable and winnable in the conventional sense as has been
recognised in the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration of November 1985.
The nuclear weapons are today likely to be used mainly for
intimidation of non-nuclear weapon powers, as currency of power
in international politics or to deter the possible use of
weapons by the five most war prone nuclear hegemonistic nations.
Since nuclear war fighting is no longer recognised as a viable
proposition, use of nuclear weapons, if at all it is done, will
be in small numbers. That cannot reassure the aggressor that the
adversary would not be able to retaliate to inflict unacceptable
damage on him.
During the cold war the two adversaries looked upon it as a
struggle for survival of one system or the other and they
perceived their stakes in the outcome of the conflict so high as
to risk their cities, though Mr Macnamara now says that was only
rhetoric and never the real policy. Today no nation has such
visceral animosity towards any other as to risk a few of its
cities for any military strategic and economic stakes. Surely
Pakistan will not risk Lahore, Karachi and other cities for
Kashmir. Nor China Kunming and Chengdu, and at a later stage
Shanghai, Guangzu and the Three Gorges dam.
In the western strategic literature the emphasis has always been
on the projection of the certainty of unacceptable destruction
to the adversary. That is because the US always maintained
superiority over the adversary. The US policy was not deterrence
but compellence. That did not work very well as many critics of
US deterrence now highlight - Macnamara and General Lee Butler
leading them.
But the US was deterred by a much smaller Soviet arsenal up to
mid sixties because of the factor of uncertainty involved in
initiating a first strike on the Soviet Union. The key to
deterrence is not the certainty factor but the uncertainty. The
credibility arises out of the level of uncertainty perceived.
The Soviets exploited the factor by creating 'bomber gap' and
'missile gap' myths.
Nuclear deterrence is not dependent on whether a nation
proclaims a first use policy or not. NATO maintains a first use
policy not to practice deterrence but to assert US leadership
over the alliance and to exercise compellence. Nuclear
deterrence is effective so long as the potential aggressor is
persuaded that a retaliation is certain and the damage arising
out of it will be extremely disproportionate to the stake he has
in the outcome of the conflict.
The Chinese are able to exercise deterrence vis-a-vis the United
States though their launchers that can reach US is one hundredth
of the number the US can launch on China. The Chinese do not so
far have launchers which can hit eastern cities of US. No one
talks of China not being able to exercise credible deterrence
vis-a-vis the US. China has a no first use policy without its
impairing its deterrent capability.
While no first use policy is no doubt largely declaratory it has
certain logical consequences that are verifiable. A country
which intends to follow no first use policy will not deploy its
nuclear weapons in forward areas and offer them as easily
destroyable targets. It will keep them out of adversary's range.
A country pledged to retaliatory use will not focus very much on
tactical nuclear weapons. It will not be spending excessive
amounts of money on command and control as it mill be doing if
it believes in nuclear war fighting or launch on warning and
launch under attack strategies.
No first use is the logical strategy for countries while they
are still developing their arsenals and which do not want to
waste money on building a war fighting capability. The
requirements of deterrence are fully met by no first use, apart
from its being ethical and moral. The Americans never believed
in deterrence but in compellence and therefore built a wasteful
arsenal. The Soviets started with deterrence and then got lured
into the doctrine of 'equality and equal security' and
consequent arms race which ruined them.
It is quite obvious from Mr Strobe Talbott's Brooking
Institution speech the Americans do not understand these nuances
in nuclear strategy but believe there is only one valid nuclear
strategy in the world and that was made in America. It is quite
probable that our nuclear dialogue with the US is being
conducted within the frame work laid down by the American side.
The Indian side may be handicapped by the fact our diplomats
while dealing with the Indian policy rationally are unable to
put forward the basic strategic rationale of no first use policy
in terms of theory of deterrence. No first use strategy
incorporates all elements of restraint in terms of deployment.
The problem India faces is that the continued rejection by the
US of no first use policy tends to feed those elements in India
who wrongly think that India could and should opt for a
declaratory open ended arms build up. Since India is still
debating the issue Mr Talbott should be asked to explain at the
next round the rationale of the US strategic policy. He cannot
argue it has no relevance to the subject matter under
discussion. Strategists in India from both swadeshi and videshi
schools tend to borrow heavily from the US thinking. There is
wide spread impression that US-India dialogue does not address
adequately the impact of US strategy on Indian thinking.
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