HVK Archives: Chain of command - Insulate armed forces from politics
Chain of command - Insulate armed forces from politics - The Times of India
K Subrahmanyam
()
December 21, 1998
Title: Chain of command - Insulate armed forces from politics
Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Times of India
Date: December 21, 1998
The controversy over the appointment of a deputy chief of staff
(operations) at the Naval headquarters highlights the confusion
in this country about the place and structure of the armed
forces in India. No democratic country, other than India, keeps
the headquarters of the armed forces outside the government. In
all other democratic countries, the armed forces chiefs are the
professional advisers to the defence minister. In India, the
armed forces are treated as a subordinate department of the
government with the ministry of defence staffed entirely by
generalist civilian staff. This situation came about as the
result of a mistake committed by the Indian chiefs of staff when
India became a Republic.
Under the British, the commander in chief of India was only a
theatre commander in the British Imperial defence system but was
the second-ranking member of the executive council of the
viceroy who reported to the British secretary of state for
India. When India became independent, there was a civilian
defence minister. The three chiefs of the services ought to have
become chiefs of staff to the defence minister and his primary
advisers. In the transition period, the Indian armed forces
were governed by the British Indian enactment where the final
authority was the commander-in-chief.
Bifurcate Functions
When the Republic came into being, the acts had to be amended.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was considerate to the service
chiefs and asked for their preference. Unfortunately, because of
their lack of experience the service chiefs preferred to
continue as operational commanders of their respective services
instead of being professional advisers to the defence minister
as his chiefs of staff If they had opted for the latter course,
the army, navy and air force acts would not have mentioned
chiefs of staff as separate juridical personalities independent
of the Indian government.
The chiefs have two roles. The first is as the operational
commander of the forces and second as the planner for long-term
future requirements of services. In countries like the US, the
operational commanders are the theatre commanders who report
directly to the defence minister. The chief of staff is the
primary professional adviser on whom the defence minister relies
to deal with the references from the theatre commanders. The
chiefs of staff are, therefore, in a position to devote more
time to future planning and preparedness having devolved the
operational responsibilities to theatre commanders.
Since the Indian chiefs of staff are operational commanders,
they must have full control and authority on their staff. Unlike
in the UK or the US where the principal staff officers will deal
with the defence minister directly, in India they are
subordinate to the chief in a command structure of an
operational force. The Indian system is not a satisfactory one.
The chiefs are not able to do justice to both their roles as
operational commanders of forces and chief planners of future
requirements of the services and its long-term preparedness.
There is a good case to separate the two functions, devolve the
operational responsibilities to theatre commanders and merge the
service headquarters with the ministry of defence. In that set-
up, the civilian defence secretary will deal with budget and
accounts, coordination with other ministries and states and
foreign procurement.
The service chiefs will look after housekeeping of the services,
professional advice to the defence minister and long-term
defence planning. The financial adviser will ensure necessary
control on spending and that the chiefs observe the appropriate
financial discipline. Even today, that role is performed by him.
This scheme will expedite decision-making, bring the chiefs in
direct daily contact with the defence minister, make them more
effective as planners and reduce their day-to-day operational
hold on the services.
Unhealthy Intrusion
Unfortunately, when this proposal was advocated by the Arun
Singh committee, it was opposed by the civilian bureaucracy
which without understanding the scheme in its entirety thought
it would enhance the powers of the chiefs and reduce civilian
control over the armed forces. In fact, it would decentralise
the powers of the chiefs, make them more effective as planners'
and professional a dvisers and make the civilian control much
more effective than it is today.
However, in the present situation, the chief of staff is the
operational commander of the force and is responsible to the
government for the combat effectiveness of the force. The
service headquarters functions in the culture of a command
headquarters. The army, navy, air force acts and service
promotion rules reflect this reality.
Under such circumstances, a principal staff officer is part of
the command system and no chief should have a principal staff
officer whom he does not recommend imposed on him. That is
against the law and constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into
the operational command structure especially when the office
concerned is that of the deputy chief of staff (operations). If
the government comes to the conclusion, whatever be the reasons,
that a chief of staff should not be continued in his office,
they can ask him to retire. But to interfere with the command
structure of a chief of staff is not good for the service or its
combat effectiveness.
Risks to Democracy
It sends out a message that senior appointments can be secured
bypassing the chief. It would create cliques and factionalism in
the forces. Krishna Menon's services to this country were very
valuable. But he fell from grace because of the personnel
policies he pursued. He was a poor judge of men. He retired P C
Lal in the rank of air commodore. The latter was brought back to
become an outstanding air chief. Maj-General Manekshaw, as he
was then, was subjected to a court of inquiry. General B M Kaul
was imposed on an unwilling army headquarters. History has
recorded the fateful consequences of Krishna Menon's
interference in the command structure of the Army.
Any resourceful defence minister should interact intensively not
only with his civilian bureaucracy but also his service chiefs
and senior officers of the armed forces on a day-to-day basis.
Only then would he be able to function effectively without being
influenced unduly by one or the other. Our democracy has been
safe because of the apolitical nature of our! armed forces. If
armed forces were to be politicised because of civilian
ineptitude there are serious risks to our democracy.
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