archive: Influx season
Influx season
Editorial
The Times of India
May 24, 1999
Title: Influx season
Author: Editorial
Publication: The Times of India
Date: May 24, 1999
The massive infiltration of Pakistan-supported militants into Kashmir
is to be expected in the summer months before the rains set in. There
was infiltration last year, too, following the nuclear tests and that
was effectively neutralised and contained by the Indian security
forces. There was no reason to assume that the Pakistani army or the
Inter-Services Intelligence had changed their agenda in regard to
Kashmir, notwithstanding the Lahore spirit. It is possible that the
Indian political uncertainty further encouraged elements in Pakistan
who have a vested interest in sustaining insurgency in Kashmir. The
1965 infiltration - Operation Gibraltar - was carried out when the
Pakistani leadership had an extremely poor image of the Indian Prime
Minister and a dim view of India's internal situation. The 1971
crackdown on Bangladesh happened even as India was putting together a
government after the elections. Again in 1989-90, there was a sharp
escalation in insurgency in the aftermath of a new coalition
government taking office in Delhi. It is in this context that the
chief of army staff, General V P Malik, spoke about Possible
security-related developments for which the country had to be
prepared. The massive Kargil intrusion has validated his fears. The
Pakistani expectation probably is based on the earlier modus operandi,
that given its political preoccupations, India would not respond
effectively. If so, they are totally mistaken as the Indian operation
demonstrated.
Earlier, Pakistan attempted to use cross-border infiltration and the
consequent clashes across the line of control as a leverage to
convince the United States that such clashes could escalate into a
nuclear conflict and therefore the US should intervene in Kashmir
issue. It suited the Western powers to talk of Kashmir as a nuclear
Cashpoint. That tactic does not work any longer as infiltration
attempts and clashes have been routinised to an extent where in the
longer run there will be recognition about the limited nature and
scope of these operations. From the point of view of crying nuclear
wolf such operations have become increasing-Iv counter-productive as
they are repeated. Unlike in the early '90s, most of the infiltrators
today are outsiders who cannot get support from the local population.
Consequently these operations are becoming self-limiting. Unlike
countries in the West which would have used enormous air and fire
power to quell trouble of this kind, Indian armed forces deal with
insurgents with great restraint to minimise casualties. The policy
towards Kashmir and continuance of insurgency through transborder
operations are less under the control of prime minister Nawaz Sharif
and more in the hands of the army and the ISI which operate as a state
with-in a state. Mr Nawaz Sharif obtained the resignation of General
Kara-mat and demonstrated civilian supremacy. But that has not
stopped the Pakistani army from acting as the ultimate decision-maker
on Pakistan's India policy, particularly in Kashmir. The crossborder
insurgency has to be tackled through attrition for some more time till
it is no longer cost effective for Pakistan. Lahore spirit,
unfortunately, has not influenced the Pakistani army and Mr Nawaz
Sharif is yet to become the effective decision-maker on foreign and
defence policies. These may well be meant to indicate to him the
limits of his power.
Back
Top
|
